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Abstract 
In order to assure the safety in nuclear facilities, it has been worldwide recognized an 
important and effective means to obtain the lessons and insights through the analysis of 
incidents and accidents and to feed them back to the design, construction, operation and 
management of facilities.  Using event information, the activity called operating 
experience feedback (OEF) has been carried out on a national or international basis.  
This activity can be achieved by a systematic and comprehensive review and analysis of 
events from various points of view such as generic aspects, specific aspects, and risk 
significance aspects.  Aiming at providing insights and technical issues useful for 
regulating and improving the safety of nuclear facilities, the present thesis addresses a 
series of studies on analysis of nuclear and radiological events as follows: the generic 
studies (including comprehensive reviews) of various events, topical studies on safety 
significant events, accident sequence precursor (ASP) studies, and review of the five 
investigation reports on the Fukushima accident.  As well, described are new computer 
software tools developed to assist in the comprehensive reviews.  Finally, provided are 
discussions on insights from these studies and precursors to the Fukushima accident to 
clarify the generic safety issues to be resolved. 
In the generic studies, a number of event reports were reviewed to examine overall 
trends and characteristics of safety relevant events and to identify the safety significant 
events which (might) have affected the facility, environment and/or public health.  The 
studies provide the observations on safety issues to keep in mind among the nuclear 
community and indicate that the safety significant events can be roughly categorized 
into three groups of events: recurring events, events associated with external hazards 
and the events related to new phenomena or unexpected aggravating conditions.  As a 
supporting tool for comprehensive reviews, a new computer software package CESAS 
was developed to extract the event sequence from the event description in English.  
Through its applications, it is shown that the CESAS-extracted event sequences 
generally agree with manually-extracted ones, demonstrating the effectiveness and 
feasibility of CESAS.   
Three topical studies are described on loss of decay heat removal during reactor 
shutdown at pressurized water reactors, criticality accidents at nuclear fuel fabrication 
and reprocessing facilities, and setpoint drift in safety or safety/relief valves at light 
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water reactors.  These studies derive the generic safety issues and insights useful for 
examining the measures against individual topics and show that the lessons learned 
from past events have not sufficiently been employed and effective measures have not 
taken, implying that sharing the relevant information on operating experience should be 
enhanced on a national and international basis.  In particular, the lessons learned and 
insights obtained should be disseminated into the nuclear community. 
In the ASP studies, the analysis of steam generator tube ruptures identifies the technical 
issues to be resolved for mitigating such an event, by indicating the significance of 
timely depressurizing the reactor in terms of core damage probability.  The trending 
analysis with use of newly proposed quantitative risk indicators, that is, annual core 
damage probability and occurrence frequency of precursors, reveals that the core 
damage risks have been lowered and the likelihood of risk significant events has 
been remarkably decreasing at U.S. nuclear power plants.  Also, the proposed risk 
indicators are shown to be useful for determining the risk characteristics of events, 
monitoring the risk level at nuclear power plants, and examining the industry ri sk 
trends. 
The Fukushima accident is delineated with use of event trees to clarify the differences 
among accident sequences at Units 1 to 3 and the actual responses to avoid the severe 
accidents are discussed.  Also, the review of five investigation reports on the accident 
identifies the technical issues to be further examined and discussed so that effective 
OEF can be performed at other nuclear facilities.   
Finally, the present thesis discusses the insights obtained through the analysis of 
operating experience in terms of commonalities in the Fukushima accident and 
identifies precursors to the Fukushima accident.  Highlighted are the importance of 
physical separation, the necessity of paying special attention to protection against 
common cause failures, the need to protect the site against external hazards and the 
importance of considering new phenomena or unexpected aggravating conditions.  
Based on the observations, generic safety issues to be resolved are addressed.  The 
present thesis also indicates that the Fukushima accident should be analyzed more 
comprehensively and in detail considering the insights gained from past events.   
The studies described in the thesis reveal the importance of bringing to light the generic 
safety issues from the operating experience by executing the systematic and 
comprehensive analysis of various events, in-depth analysis of significant events from 
various points of view, and accident sequence precursor studies. 
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Chapter I 
Introducing Remarks 
 
I.1 Background 
It has been recognized an important and effective means to learn from experience and/or 
accidents, for identifying the matters that have not been noticed in the design stage and/or 
those to be considered for operation and management of facilities, not only in the field of 
nuclear technology but also in all types of technological fields.  In order to assure the 
safety in nuclear facilities, in particular, one of the essential elements is to obtain the 
lessons and insights through the analysis of incidents and accidents that actually occurred 
and to feed them back into the design, construction, operation and management of 
facilities.  Such activities have been carried out worldwide as “operating experience 
feedback,” and thus, the incident reporting has become an important aspect of the 
operation and regulation of nuclear facilities. 
However, it may be the rare case that an incident or accident took place due to a 
completely new phenomenon and factor and in a large majority of events, similar 
occurrences have been experienced in the past.  As shown in Figure I.1, for example, 
the criticality accident that occurred at the JCO uranium fuel processing plant in 
Tokai-mura in Japan on September 30, 1999
(1)
 was extremely similar to the criticality 
accident at the Wood River Junction uranium recovery plant in the United States in 
1964
(2)
.  Both accidents were caused by a massive amount of high-concentration 
uranium solution being injected into a container that was not designed for such use.  The 
container reached a critical state, resulting in workers being exposed to lethal doses of 
radiation.  Considering that these similar accidents had taken place, we may well 
wonder whether we have actually been learning the lessons from experience and 
accidents.  It is highly likely that the criticality accident would have been avoided if the 
workers, who died as a result of the JCO criticality accident, had been given sufficient 
information about the Wood River Junction accident and had fully recognized the risk 
involved in what they were doing. 
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Criticality Accident at JCO 
(Source: Nuclear Safety Commission of 
Japan, "The Uranium Processing Plant 
Criticality Accident Investigation Committee 
Report", December 24, 1999)
Criticality Accident at Wood River Junction 
(July 24, 1964)
(Source: Ohnishi, et al., “Accidents in 
Nuclear Installations”, JAERI 4052, 
September 1970)
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Figure 1.1 Circumstances at Onset of Criticality Accidents at Wood River 
Junction and JCO 
 
Similar events have occurred at nuclear power plants.  The accident at the Three Mile 
Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) that occurred on March 28, 1979
(3-5)
 had some similarities to the 
event that occurred in 1977 at the same type of reactor at the Davis Besse Nuclear Power 
Plant
(6)
.  However, the safety significance of this event had not been well recognized and 
it was said that the plant operating staff at TMI-2 had not known about this event.  
While, at that time, one nuclear engineer did realize the importance of the Davis Besse 
event and warned about the potential risk of this event, almost nobody did give attention 
to his warning, resulting in his prophecy coming true by the TMI-2 accident.  These two 
events highlighted the importance of analyzing incidents and accidents and feeding the 
lessons learned back into the design, operation, and management of the plant. 
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At the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant, three units resulted in a severe core 
damage and the subsequent large release of radioactive materials into the environment, 
the major cause of which was the station blackout stemming from the tsunami-induced 
flooding in the buildings by the huge earthquake
(7)
.  However, the tsunami hit a nuclear 
power plant in India, resulting from the earthquake in Sumatra Island in 2004 without any 
serious damage to the plant facilities.  As well, the heavy rain with high winds resulted 
in the flooding of reactor building in a French nuclear power plant and the some 
safety-related systems were affected.  However, the lessons learned from these flooding 
events had not been fed back into the design of the nuclear power plants in Japan.  
  
I.2 Incident Reporting 
Licensees or operators of nuclear facilities are required to notify and/or report the events, 
which occurred at their own plants, to the regulatory authorities immediately, analyze 
their causes, and take preventive measures.  Such activities, that is, the event notification 
and/or reporting and the analysis of events, had mainly been carried out within individual 
national regulatory frameworks prior to the TMI-2 accident.  
The TMI-2 accident prompted enhancement of the analysis and evaluation of operating 
experience at nuclear power plants.  In the United States, partially in response to lessons 
from the TMI-2 accident, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) 
revised its immediate notification requirements via the emergency notification system 
(ENS) in 10 CFR 50.72 and modified and codified its written licensee event report 
system requirements in 10 CFR 50.73 in 1983
(8,9)
.  While these reporting requirements 
range from immediate telephone notifications to written reports, covering a broad 
spectrum of events from emergencies to component level deficiencies, the USNRC 
wishes to emphasize that reporting requirements should not interfere with ensuring the 
safe operation of a nuclear power plant.  Licensees' immediate attention must always be 
given to operational safety concerns. 
In the light of the TMI-2 accident, as well, the Organization of Economic Cooperation 
and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA) established the Incident 
Reporting System (IRS; so-called NEA-IRS) as a forum for the exchange of information 
on operational events at nuclear power plants and started its operation in 1981 with 13 
member countries.  Under this system, member countries are requested to submit an IRS 
report to the OECD/NEA Secretariat when an abnormal event or failure with safety 
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significance occurs at their respective nuclear power plants, and then the Secretariat 
distributes the reports to member countries.  As well, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) established a similar system (so-called IAEA-IRS) and started its 
operation in 1983 with 16 member countries.  These two systems had been operated 
independently for a few years and the two agencies reached an agreement on the mutual 
exchange of IRS reports in 1988.  Since then, OECD/NEA and IAEA member countries 
can receive all of the IRS reports submitted to both agencies.  To promote the 
effectiveness of IRS, the IAEA and the OECD/NEA approved the implementation of joint 
guidelines
(10) 
in 1997, resulting in the official integration of both IRSs into one system, 
the IAEA/NEA-IRS.  In accordance with the integration and joint operation, the 
reporting formats were unified in 1998.  After that, the Advanced IRS (AIRS), an 
IAEA’s computer database of the IRS reports, was developed and the CD-ROM 
containing the database updated had been periodically distributed to member countries.  
In recent years, a new database system for IRS, Web-based IRS, was developed and has 
been operated by the IAEA in cooperation with the OECD/NEA, and member countries 
can enter the events that occurred at their nuclear power plants and retrieve the report in 
the database
(11)
.  In addition, the official name of IRS was changed from “the Incident 
Reporting System” to “the International Reporting System for Operating Experience.”  
As of the end of December 2012, 32 countries are participating in the IRS, and more than 
3,750 events had been reported since 1981.  As the IRS was designed to facilitate the 
exchange of information on operational events among regulatory agencies in member 
countries, access to the IRS reports is, in principle, limited to the individuals registered in 
the database
(12,13)
.  (However, decisions on access are left to the IRS national 
coordinators of the individual member countries.) 
As well, the IAEA, in cooperation with the OECD/NEA, operates the International 
Nuclear Event Scale (INES: currently the International Nuclear and Radiological Event 
Scale)
(14)
.  The INES is a means for promptly communicating to the public the safety 
significance of events that occurred at nuclear facilities and radiation utilization facilities 
aiming to facilitate common understanding among the nuclear community (industry and 
regulators), the media and the public.  The INES was introduced in March 1990 as a 
trial use for the events occurring at the nuclear power plants in the individual member 
countries.  Afterwards, the scale was refined in the light of experience gained through 
the trial use and extended to be applicable to any event associated with radioactive 
materials and/or radiation, including the transport of radioactive materials.  In March 
1992, the official operation of INES was commenced.  Japan formally introduced the 
INES in August 1992 and has been operating it since then.  Since January 2002, the 
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original reports are available at NEWS (Nuclear Event Web-based System) on the IAEA 
website
(15)
, and their translated versions can be found at the website of the Japan Nuclear 
Energy Safety Organization (JNES)
(16)
 
The scale can be applied to any event occurring at all types of civilian nuclear facilities 
(power reactors, research reactors, testing reactors, uranium mining and refining facilities, 
uranium enrichment facilities, fuel fabrication facilities, spent fuel storage and 
reprocessing facilities, waste treatment/storage/disposal facilities), transport of 
radioactive material between these facilities, and irradiation equipment/devices using 
radioactive sources (for medical or industrial uses).  The INES is also applicable to the 
lost or stolen radioactive sources and the discovery of orphan sources at a place where 
they should not be.  In addition, each event reported to the INES is accompanied by both 
the event summary that describes where and when it occurred, what kind of event 
occurred, and how it affected radiologically, and the "scale" that shows the safety 
significance of the event.  On the scale, events are classified at 8 levels from level 0 for 
an event with no safety significance to level 7 for a major accident that may cause a wide 
range of health and environmental effects.  These levels are determined according to the 
following three criteria
(14)
.
 
(1) Criterion 1 (Impact on People and the Environment): This criterion is to rate an 
event resulting in the off-site releases of radioactive materials or the actual 
radiological impacts on workers and members of the public.  The scale is set based 
on the amount of radioactivity actually released to the environment or the exposure 
dose of the workers or the public members.  The rating based on this criterion 
covers a range from level 7, which corresponds to major release of radioactive 
materials with widespread health and environmental effects, to level 2, which is an 
event involving the exposure of a member of the public in excess of 10 mSv or the 
exposure of a worker in excess of the statutory annual limits.  
(2) Criterion 2 (Impact on Radiological Barriers and Controls at Facilities): This 
criterion applies to facilities handling a large quantities of radioactive materials such 
as power reactors, reprocessing plants, or large source production facilities and is to 
rate an event involving significant damage to the primary barriers that prevent a 
large release of radioactive materials (e.g., reactor core melt or loss of confinement 
of radioactive materials) or a major spillage of radioactive materials or a significant 
increase in dose rate.  The rating based on this criterion is classified into 4 levels 
ranging from level 5 to level 2.  Specifically, an event resulting in significant 
damage to the primary barriers or a significant release of radioactive material within 
an installation is rated as level 4 or 5; an event involving significant contamination 
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within the facility into an area not expected by design is rated as level 2 or 3.  
(3) Criterion 3 (Impact on Defense in Depth): This criterion applies to an event that 
deteriorates the defense-in-depth concept at a nuclear facility, a radioactive source 
utilization facility or during the transportation of radioactive material with no or 
lower levels of actual radiological consequences.  All nuclear facilities are 
designed to avoid any significant on-site or off-site consequence by providing 
multiple layers of safety provisions based on the "defense-in-depth" concept.  As 
well, the similar concept is applied to the design of radiation source utilization 
facilities and transportation of radioactive materials.  For example, the radioactive 
materials are confined by using multiple layers.  This criterion rates an event as a 
level from 3 to 1 considering the following two factors: the maximum potential 
consequence of the facility in the case that all the safety layers are lost, and the 
number of safety layers remaining their respective integrity (and reliability).  For 
the lost or found radioactive source/device, the rating of such an event is carried out 
according to its activity.  In addition, the rating based on this criterion may be 
upgraded by one level when the possibility of common cause failure, deficiencies in 
operating manuals/procedures or lack of safety culture is identified, while it may be 
downgraded by one level when the time period during which the concerned safety 
protection layer is lost is very short.  
The individual member countries are strongly encouraged to communicate events 
internationally through the IAEA within 24 h, if possible, according to the criteria which 
are events at level 2 or higher, or events attracting international public interest.  The 
INES has 61 member countries, including all countries except Taiwan that have nuclear 
power plants (32 countries).  As of December 2012, approximately 850 reports have 
been submitted to the INES since its trial use was commenced in 1990.  
In the nuclear industry, the necessity of a global network for informing events at nuclear 
power plants and disseminating the lessons learned from them was recognized worldwide 
after the Chernobyl accident in 1986
(17-19)
, resulting in establishment of the World 
Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) in May 1989 to provide a forum for sharing 
and utilizing operating experience over the world.  Currently, more than 440 nuclear 
power plants in 35 countries take part in the WANO.  The WANO analyzes operational 
events reported by members to identify important safety issues and prepares the reports, 
according to the safety significance and the number of events, as follows; SOER 
(Significant Operating Experience Reports), SER (Significant Event Reports), JIT 
(Just-in-Time Briefings)
(20)
.  In addition, the WANO dispatches an international review 
team consisting of specialists from the member countries, investigates the performance of 
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plant and personnel through walkdowns and interviews with staff, and makes proposals 
for improving safety and reliability.  Furthermore, the WANO facilitates the exchange of 
information on good practices in routine works, the exchange of opinions and information 
on operations through the interchanging of operating staff, and the comparison of 
operating experience at the individual plants by quantifying performance indicators in 
nine major areas related to plant safety and reliability. 
 
I.3 Objectives of Present Thesis 
Operating experience feedback has been recognized one of the important issues needed 
for ensuring the public and environmental safety.  This can be achieved by a systematic 
and comprehensive review and analysis of events that actually occurred from various 
points of view such as generic aspects (generality, commonality, similarity), specific 
aspects (specificity, uniqueness), mechanical aspects, human aspects, and risk 
significance. 
The present thesis aims at identifying the safety significant events and their trends, and 
providing insights useful for improving nuclear and/or radiological safety, in particular, 
on nuclear power plants, through the generic studies, topical studies, and accident 
sequence precursor studies.   As well, this thesis addresses the technical issues to be 
further examined on the severe accidents at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant 
(hereafter, the Fukushima accident) and the safety significant insights which should have 
been taken into account prior to the Fukushima accident so that the lessons learned from 
the accident can be fed back to the design, construction, operation and management of 
existing and future nuclear facilities in the world. 
 
I.4 Outline of Present Thesis 
The present thesis consists of the following chapters: Chapter II describes the generic 
studies and comprehensive reviews of operational events to identify safety significant 
events, that is, events which could threaten the plant safety.  These studies and reviews 
cover the nuclear and radiological events reported to the INES and IRS.  As well, 
addressed are the supporting tools which were developed so that the comprehensive 
reviews of events can be carried out more efficiently.   Chapter III describes the topical 
studies on the safety significant events identified in the comprehensive review and/or 
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generic study, focusing on three topics; loss of decay heat removal during reactor 
shutdown at pressurized water reactors, criticality accident in fuel processing facilities 
and setpoint drift of safety or safety/relief valves at light water reactors.  In the topical 
studies on events at nuclear power plants, the event information is obtained mainly from 
the USNRC’s licensee event reports (LERs).  Chapter IV addresses the accident 
sequence precursor (ASP) studies on steam generator tube rupture, one of safety 
significant events, and the risk trends at nuclear power plants with newly proposed 
indicators, and provides the findings and insights from these ASP studies.  The 
analytical approach for the ASP studies is also mentioned.  Chapter V delineates the 
accident scenarios of the Fukushima accident with event trees and identifies the technical 
issues to be further discussed through the review of the five investigation reports on the 
Fukushima accident, which focuses on the accident progression and causes.  In Chapter 
VI, the insights and precursors to the Fukushima accident are discussed based on the 
studies mentioned in Chapters II to IV.  The relations of the individual chapters in the 
present thesis are shown in Figure I.2. 
Study on Analysis of Incidents and 
Accidents at Nuclear Installations
Chapter II: Generic Studies/Comprehensive Review
- INES, IRS Reports
Supporting Tools for Analysis
- Computerized Event Sequence Abstracting System
- WWW for Database of INES
Chapter III: Topical Studies
- Loss of Decay Heat Removal during Reactor 
Shutdown at US PWRs
- Criticality Accidents in Fuel Processing Facilities
- Setpoint Drift of Safety/Relief Valves at US LWRs
Chapter IV: Accident Sequence 
Precursor Studies
- Analysis of Steam Generator Tube Rupture Events
- Quantitative Risk Indicators and Trending Analysis
Chapter V: Analysis of Severe 
Accidents at Fukushima Dai-ichi
- Analysis of Accident Scenarios
- Review of Five Investigation Reports
Chapter VI: Discussion on Insights and Precursors 
to Fukushima Accident
 
Figure I.2   Outline of Present Thesis 
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Chapter II 
Generic Studies and Supporting 
Tools 
 
II.1 Generic Studies on Nuclear Events 
Generic studies comprehensively review and analyze event reports to the 
IAEA-OECD/NEA INES and IRS as well as USNRC’s generic communications.  The 
objectives of these studies are to (i) identify events with safety significance or safety 
implications, which (might) have affected the facility, environment and public health, and 
(ii) observe the overall trends and characteristics of such safety significant events. 
The INES places emphasis on rapid communication of nuclear or radiological events.  
Therefore, it can be used as an effective tool for promptly understanding what type of 
event has recently took place and for identifying and/or categorizing events with safety 
significance, involving radioactive release to the environment or involving overexposure of 
public members or employees.  As well, rough analyses of these event reports may 
provide some insights useful for determining whether the individual events implicate any 
important issues from the points of facility and/or radiation safety even though the 
respective event information is limited.  To facilitate common understanding among the 
nuclear community, the media and the public in Japan, the individual event reports have 
been translated into Japanese and the Japanese versions have been published through the 
internet
(1)
 and in the documents
(2,3)
.  In addition, the generic study was performed to 
examine trends and characteristics of approximately 500 events reported to the INES 
during the period 1990-2000
(4 )
. 
On the other hand, the IRS aims at ensuring that feedback of operating experience gained 
from nuclear power plants (NPPs) worldwide on safety related events is widely shared 
amongst the international nuclear community to help prevent occurrence or recurrence of 
serious events.  As the IRS has to provide sufficient detail to highlight the wider 
relevance of operating experience to the recipient, an IRS report should provide detailed 
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information on root causes, safety significance, lessons learned, and corrective actions 
from the technical, organizational, and human factors aspects.  As such, the IRS is 
designed for specialists of the nuclear community as a source of detailed information on 
analysis and lessons learned from operating experience and information reported is not 
intended for distribution to the general public.  Thus, access to the IRS reports is 
restricted to encourage openness within nuclear community, including the disclosure of 
incident details and related plant actions
(5,6)
.  Since 1988, more than 2000 IRS reports 
have been analyzed.  For the first ten years, approximately 700 IRS reports submitted to 
the OECD/NEA were reviewed and the results were reported to the Nuclear Safety 
Commission of Japan
(7-11)
.  After the two IRS systems operated by the OECD/NEA and 
the IAEA separately were officially integrated into one system in 1997, the individual IRS 
reports have been analyzed and complied in confidential documents on a yearly basis and 
these documents were disseminated to the regulatory authorities and utilities in Japan to 
assist them in understanding the events which had occurred in foreign countries
(12-27)
. 
Also, the USNRC’s generic communications are useful for identifying safety significant 
events because these are issued for the events with safety implications or generic issues. 
In this section, discussed are the generic studies of events reported to the INES and IRS, 
respectively. 
 
II.1.1 Generic Study on Events Reported to INES – 
Trending Analysis. 
1. Overall Trends 
1.1 Number of Reports by Year 
Although, according to the criteria of INES, the individual member countries are strongly 
encouraged to report the events with a rating of Level 2 or higher, as previously mentioned, 
many events with a rating of lower than Level 2 have been reported from member 
countries.  During the period 1990-2000, there have been reported a total of 488 events, 
which consist of 409 events at NPPs (237 at pressurized water reactors (PWRs), 61 at 
boiling water reactors (BWRs), 46 at light water cooled graphite moderated reactors 
(LWGRs), 51 at pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs), 5 at gas cooled reactors 
(GCRs) and 9 at fast breeder reactors (FBRs)), 28 events in fuel reprocessing or fabrication 
facilities, 14 events at testing or research reactors and 37 events in other facilities.  In the 
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following, the overall trends are discussed for these events.  
Figure II.1 shows the number of the INES reports with a rating of Level 2 or higher and 
that with a rating of lower than Level 2 year by year.  The first two years, 1990 and 1991, 
were the period for a trial use and 3 events and 26 events were reported to the INES during 
these two years, respectively.  Approximately 70 events were reported during the first five 
years, 1992-1996, after the official use was launched, and more than 50 events of them 
were rated at lower than Level 2.  However, the number of reports decreased to 20-30 
events since 1997.  While, in particular, the number of events with a rating of lower than 
Level 2 dramatically decreased, that with Level 2 or higher was almost constant throughout 
the years. 
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Figure II.1  Number of INES Reports Year by Year 
1.2 Characteristics observed in Events with uprating 
When rating an event based on the “defense-in-depth” criterion, the uprating may be 
applied if additional factors were observed; common cause failures (CCFs), procedural 
inadequacies or lack of safety culture (violation of procedures or limiting conditions for 
operation (LCOs), quality assurance issues, repetitive human errors, recurring similar 
events, inadequate control of radioactive materials).  The characteristics of such uprated 
events are discussed below. 
There were 58 events uprated, 25 of which were uprated at Level 1, 30 of which were at 
Level 2, and 3 of which were at Level 3.  Focusing on the factors of uprating, 4 events 
were due to CCFs, 7 events due to procedural inadequacies, and 43 events due to lack of 
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safety culture as shown in Figure II.2.  As well, 4 events involved both procedural 
inadequacies and lack of safety culture.  The 43 events involving lack of safety culture 
can be divided into 13 events with violation of procedures or LCOs (4 at Level 1, 7 at 
Level 2, and 2 at Level 3), 6 events with recurring similar events (2 at Level 1, 3 at Level 2, 
and 1 at Level 3), 9 events with quality assurance issues (3 at Level 1 and 6 at Level 2) and 
15 events with factors unidentified (8 at Level 1 and 7 at Level 2). 
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Figure II.2  Number of Events Uprated by Additional Factors 
 
2. Trends on Safety Significant Events 
The safety significant event is defined as an event rated at 2 or higher in this study.  This 
subsection describes the trends observed on these events. 
2.1 Number of Reports by Level 
A total of 131 events were rated at Level 2 or higher.  Figure II.3 shows 114 events at 
Level 2, 15 at Level 3, and 2 at Level 4.  
Being sorted by facility type, 73 of 114 events rated at Level 2 occurred at NPPs, 17 of 
them in fuel reprocessing or fabrication facilities, and 5 events at testing or research 
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reactors.  Sixteen events in other facilities include those in experimental facilities and 
non-nuclear facilities which used radioactive materials and those involving lost sources.  
Fifteen events rated at Level 3 consist of 6 events at NPPs, 2 events in fuel reprocessing or 
fabrication facilities, and 7 events in other facilities.  During this period, two events rated 
at Level 4 were reported to the INES: the JCO criticality accident involving two fatalities 
in Japan in 1999 and the radiological accident involving two fatalities caused by a lost 
source in Egypt in 2000.  A total of 409 events at NPPs were reported to the INES during 
this period and only about one-fifth (79 events) were rated at Level 2 or higher, implying 
that events at NPPs had actively been reported even in the case that it was rated at lower 
than Level 2.  
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Figure II.3  Number of Reports by Level 
2.2 Number of Reports by Rating Criterion 
The rating of each event is based on three criteria: Impact on People and the Environment 
(Criterion 1: “offsite consequence” criterion), Impact on Radiological Barriers and 
Controls at Facilities (Criterion 2: “onsite consequence” criterion), and Impact on Defense 
in Depth (Criterion 3).  From this point of view, the characteristics of events with Level 2 
or higher are discussed below. 
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(a) Events with Level 2 
As shown in Figure II.4, 27 of 114 events with Level 2 were rated according to the 
Criterion 2, which consist of 19 events involving overexposure of workers or employees 
and 8 events associated with radioactive release or contamination inside facilities.  The 
former includes 7 events at NPPs and 7 events in fuel reprocessing or fabrication facilities，
most of which attributed to inadequate work control during fuel handling or maintenance 
activities.  For the latter, 6 events in fuel reprocessing or fabrication facilities occurred as 
a result of radioactive release inside the facilities caused by equipment failures or work 
control deficiencies but one event at a NPP resulted from a human error.  In addition, 83 
events were rated based on the Criterion 3, most of which (64 events) took place at NPPs.  
Thirty-one events were uprated at Level 2.  Only 4 events in fuel reprocessing or 
fabrication facilities were rated according to the Criterion 3.  Although there were many 
events at NPPs caused by equipment failures, none of which involved the radiation 
exposure or contamination, the events in fuel reprocessing or fabrication facilities resulted 
in radioactive release inside facilities stemming from equipment failures.  The different 
trends were observed between events at NPPs and those in fuel reprocessing or fabrication 
facilities.  This implies that the difference of multi-layered safety provisions is one of the 
contributing factors. 
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Figure II.4  Number of Reports by Rating Criterion 
(b) Events with Level 3 
According to the rating criteria, as shown in Table II.1, 15 events with Level 3 can be 
categorized into 2 events based on the Criterion 1, 7 events on the Criterion 2, and 6 events 
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on the Criterion 3.  Two events based on the Criterion 1 resulted in overexposure of the 
public members due to a lost source and in particular, one event involved three fatalities, 
which is equivalent to the event to be rated at Level 4.  At that time, however, the rating 
criteria were not clear and thus, this event might have been provisionally rated at Lever 3.  
Four of the 7 events based on the Criterion 2 are associated with overexposure of workers, 
which took place in the non-nuclear facilities.  One event involved high radiation doses to 
a worker, resulting in amputation of limbs (the Jihua event in 1996).  The other three 
events consist of two involving contamination at NPPs and one involving a lost source.  
Four of the 6 events based on the Criterion 3 occurred at NPPs and the other two in fuel 
reprocessing or fabrication facilities.  Among them, the event at Smolensk Unit 2 in 
Russia involved unavailabilities of two emergency core cooling system (ECCS) trains 
during restart operation and the event at Narora Unit 1 in India involved complete loss of 
onsite power due to fire in its turbine building.  These might have been safety significant 
events because of the defense in depth being significantly degraded.  On the other hand, 
the event at Kola Units 1 and 2 and the event at the bituminization facility were basically 
rated at Level 2 and uprated to Level 3 due to lack of safety culture.   
Table II.1  Events Rated at Level 3 
No. 
Facility Name (Type) 
Country, Event Date 
Event Summary 
Rating 
Criterion 
1 Bilibino A (LWGR) 
Russia, 07/10/1991 
While transporting cask with fuel fragments, the container struck the 
pipe located in the upper section of tunnel and fell overboard remaining 
retained by the safety cable. In this position it was transported to the 
radwaste repository, resulting in the radioactive contamination of the 
tunnel surfaces and of the road on the plant territory. 
2 
2 Smolensk-2 (LWGR) 
Russia, 07/22/1991 
While preparing for restart after maintenance, three of four main safety 
valves failed to completely close during testing, leading to pressure 
increase in the sealed room up to the setpoint of emergency protection 
system.  Two of three ECCS subsystems failed to actuate as 
designed. 
3 
3 Kola-2 (PWR) 
Russia, 02/02/1993 
While operating at power, transmission lines were damaged due to 
tornado and as a result, turbine generators tripped and the reactor 
scrammed.  Emergency diesel generators started but tripped due to 
undervoltage on essential buses.  The core was cooled by natural 
circulation. 
3 
4 Kola-1 (PWR) 
Russia, 02/02/1993 
While operating at power, transmission lines were damaged due to 
tornado and as a result, turbine generators tripped and the reactor 
scrammed.  Emergency diesel generators started but tripped due to 
undervoltage on auxiliary power buses.  The core was cooled by 
natural circulation. 
3 
5 Narora-1 (PHWR) 
India, 03/31/1993 
While operating at power, a fire occurred in the turbine building.  The 
reactor was tripped manually.  Many cables were damaged due to fire, 
resulting in complete station blackout.  Decay heat removal was 
carried out by natural circulation.  Water was fed to the secondary 
side of steam generators using diesel fire pumps. 
3 
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Table II.1  Events Rated at Level 3 (continued) 
No. 
Facility Name (Type) 
Country, Event Date 
Event Summary 
Rating 
Criterion 
6 Chernobyl-1 (LWGR) 
Ukraine, 11/27/1995 
A considerable contamination of reactor hall floor was detected.  
Average contamination level was monitored to be 15000-20000 
cpm/cm2 and maximum level monitored 126000 cpm/cm2.  The 
contamination was caused by a damaged fuel assembly which earlier 
had been taken out of the reactor. 
2 
7 Sellafield 
(Reprocessing) 
UK, 09/08/1992 
Plutonium nitrate leaked from a corroded pipe to the containment cell 
and accumulated as a crystalline solid mass.  There was no release to 
the operations areas nor the environment. 
3 
8 PNC Tokai Works 
(Bituminization Facility) 
Japan, 03/11/1997 
A fire occurred in the cell of the Bituminization Demonstration Facility 
and ventilation system stopped.  Ten hours later, an explosion took 
place and the confinement of cell and building was degraded. 
3 
9 Xinshou (Rad. Facility) 
China, 12/00/1992 
One piece of Cobalt-60 source was lost.  One person who picked up 
the lost source and his brother and father died due to overexposure. 
1 
10 Tianjin (Accelerator) 
China, 11/21/1995 
During the commissioning of high-frequency and high-voltage electron 
accelerator, five workers entered the irradiation hall to change cooling 
water pipe.  Two of them were injured (burnt) by exposure and treated 
by skin transgraft. 
2 
11 Jihua (Chemical Plant) 
China, 01/05/1996 
The Iridium-192 source slipped out from the container of gamma 
radiograph and dropped on the ground because of the broken safe lock 
key and the unlocked shutter.  A worker picked up the lost source and 
kept it in the pocket.  Due to overexposure, his right leg and left 
forearm were amputated. 
2 
12 Treviso (Radiography) 
Italy, 09/29/1997 
Due to a misconnection between the remote control cable and the 
Cobalt-60 source holder during a non-destructive test, the source was 
left in the exposure head at the end of irradiation.  A worker who 
collected all the instruments and apparatuses received radiation doses 
(whole body: 0.98 Sv, hand: 3.56 Sv, eye-lens: 0.89 Sv). 
2 
13 Not identified 
(Scrapyard) 
Turkey, 01/08/1999 
Accidental overexposure occurred due to the Cobalt-60 source being 
broken into pieces by scrap dealers.  The five seriously affected 
patients received an estimated absorbed dose of 3-6 Gy.  One of them 
showed signs of radiation induced burns on two fingers. 
2 
14 Not identified  
Turkey, 01/08/1999 
An approximately 26 TBq shielded or unshielded Cobalt-60 source was 
lost.  The explanations by the source owner are very confused, 
leading to the competent authority to consider that the source has been 
sold and probably sent aboard. 
2 
15 BECO 
(Gammagraphy) 
Peru, 02/20/1999 
A radioactive source of Iridium-192 was found out of its container in a 
construction field of a new hydroelectricity plant.  The worker took the 
source with his hands and put it into his trouser in the pocket.  The 
worker and 5 people around him were exposed.  The worker was 
locally injured severely due to high dose (the local dose was estimated 
at greater than 50 Gy). 
1 
 
(c) Events with Level 4 
As indicated in Table II.2, two events with Level 4 involved fatalities due to high radiation 
exposure, one of which is the criticality accident at JCO resulting in two fatalities of 
workers and the other is due to a lost source in Egypt leading to two deaths of the public 
members.  For the JCO accident, the public members received 10-20 mSv of doses and 
thus, the event was rated at Level 4 based on the Criteria 1 and 2.  Any rating criterion for 
 Chapter II 
II-9 
the event in Egypt was not identified but it seems that this event would have been rated 
based on the Criterion 1 because of the public fatalities being involved.   
Table II.2  Events Rated at Level 4 
No. 
Facility Name (Type) 
Country, Event Date 
Event Summary 
Rating 
Criterion 
16 JCO (Fuel Fabrication) 
Japan, 09/30/1999 
For the homogenization of uranyl nitrate solution, the workers fed 
several batches of the solution into the precipitation tank using a 
stainless steel bucket and a funnel. The uranyl nitrate solution in the 
tank reached a criticality.  Three workers were seriously exposed 
to radiation and two of them died.   
1, 2 
17 Not identified  
Egypt, 06/26/2000 
The accident resulted from a lost Iridium-192 source found in the 
way to one of the village’s houses.  Due to overexposure, the 
farmer and his son died and the other five family members suffered 
from radiation sickness. 
1 
 
As summary, there are two events based on the Criterion 1 involving the public fatalities 
due to lost sources.  The events rated based on the Criterion 2 involved overexposure of 
workers or employees, most of which at NPPs and in fuel reprocessing or fabrication 
facilities attributed to work control issues related to refueling and maintenance activities.  
For the events based on the Criterion 3, most of them occurred at NPPs, including the 
safety significant events involving loss of redundancy of ECCS or loss of onsite power 
supplies. 
 
3. Number of Reports by Facility Type 
A total of 131 events with Level 2 or higher can be grouped into 79 events at NPPs, 20 
events in fuel reprocessing or fabrication facilities, 8 events at testing or research reactors, 
and 24 events in the others.  The following discusses the characteristics of events by 
facility type. 
3.1 Events at Nuclear Power Plants 
As shown in Figure II.5, the 79 events at NPPs (73 with Level 2 and 6 with Level 3) 
consist of 53 at PWRs (51 with Level 2 and 2 with Level 3), 11 at LWGRs (8 with Level 2 
and 3 with Level 3), 8 at PHWRs (7 with Level 2 and 1 with Level 3), 4 at BWRs (with 
Level 2), 2 at GCRs (with Level 2), and 1 at FBR (with Level 2).  During the period of 
years 1990-2000, there were 250-260 PWRs operating per year, which are several times 
higher than the other types of reactor (BWR: 80-90 units per year, PHWR: 30-40 units per 
year, GCR: 30-40 units per year, LWGR approximately 20 units per year). 
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Figure II.5  Number of Reports at Nuclear Power Plants by Reactor Type 
Of the 53 events at PWRs, 50 events were rated according to the Criterion 3 and involved 
failures of safety provisions such as electric power supplies or safety systems, primary 
coolant leakage, broken feedwater pipe, and loss of decay heat removal or loss of coolant 
inventory during reactor shutdown.  Seven events involved failures in electric power 
supplies, two of which were initiated by loss of offsite power (LOOP) due to tornadoes 
followed by inadvertent trips of emergency diesel generators (EDGs) and uprated to Level 
3 because lack of safety culture was observed.  Five events involved failure to fully insert 
control rods, two of which occurred at French PWRs and were caused by a structural 
problem of control rod drive mechanism.  This problem was a potentially common issue 
to all of the same type of French PWRs.  Other two events with failure to fully insert 
control rods occurred at Hungarian PWRs and resulted from intrusion of foreign materials.  
Three of four events with safety equipment unavailable stemmed from inadequate 
procedures or violation of rules.  The other one involved the internal flooding, which 
resulted from overflow of the river due to heavy rainstorm, causing plant equipment 
unavailable.  One of three events with the primary coolant leakage took place during 
reactor shutdown and resulted in a large leakage of 30 m
3
/h caused by a crack with 180 
mm long in residual heat removal system pipe.  Three events involving radiation exposure 
were caused by work control problems during maintenance such as inadvertent entry into 
the access limited areas. 
Of the four events at BWRs, three involved actual or potential loss of ECCS.  In 
particular, in one event, an assistant operator error shut the valve in component cooling 
system, making its associated containment spray system, residual heat removal system and 
EDG unavailable. 
Five of the 11 events at LWGRs involved the radiation exposure or contamination (3 
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exposure events and 2 contamination events).  These events took place during fuel 
handling or maintenance activities and resulted from inadequate work control and violation 
of procedures.  In addition, it should be noted that an event involved loss of two ECCS 
trains with 3 safety valves unavailable, an event resulted in the turbine building fire due to 
the leaked hydrogen stemming from the turbine reversing (i.e. motoring) and in another 
event, the fuel assembly was damaged due to loss of coolant flow in the fuel channel. 
Four of the 8 events at PHWRs are associated with the primary coolant leakage, three of 
which were caused by the failures of relief valve or drain valve.  In particular, one event 
involved a small beak LOCA due to rupture of a relief pipe followed by ECCS actuation.  
In another event, as well, the turbine building fire resulted in damages of many electric 
cables, causing a station blackout.  This event was rated at Level 3 according to the 
defense-in-depth criterion. 
Two events at GCRs were rated at Level 2, one of which was the partial blockage of fuel 
channels due to the parts being dislodged from fuel handling machine and the other was 
two LOOP events with EDG temporarily unavailable. 
As mentioned above, at NPPs, there were many events where part of safety systems such 
as ECCS failed, offsite power or EDG was unavailable, or the primary coolant leaked.  
The events involving radiation exposure or contamination occurred, during the 
maintenance or fuel handling, due to work control issues or violations of procedures.  
3.2 Events in Fuel Reprocessing or Fabrication Facilities 
Sixteen of the 20 events occurred in fuel reprocessing facilities and, as shown in Figure 
II.6, are composed of 6 events involving the contamination due to leakage or release of 
radioactive materials, 7 events involving the radiation exposure of workers and 3 events 
with a loss of ventilation due to cable damages, a loss of radioactive confinement due to 
fire/explosion or inadequate storage of radiation sources in a non-standard transportation 
cask and a long-term utilization of it. 
The remaining four events took place in fuel fabrication facilities, including the JCO 
accident in 1999.  The other three events were the radiation exposure of workers, a 
long-term loss of ventilation due to electrical system failure and a failure of MOX (mixed 
oxide) fuel assembly followed by plutonium contamination. 
It should be noted that the events involving the radiation exposure of workers and the 
contamination were mainly caused by work control issues and/or radiation control 
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deficiencies. 
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Figure II.6  Event Characteristics in Fuel Reprocessing or Fabrication Facilities 
3.3 Events at Testing or Research Reactors 
The eight events consist of two involving power excursion due to misoperation, one 
involving inadvertent radiation exposure of workers, one with the fuel element dropped 
due to procedural error, one involving thimble failures due to violation of rules, one with 
coolant leakage due to corrosion, one involving hydrogen explosion followed by trip of 
ventilation system, and one with control rod control system inadvertently disconnected.  
The event with thimble failures was uprated to Level 2 because lack of safety culture was 
observed.  Any event at testing or research reactors should be rated at Level 2 or lower 
based on the defense-in-depth criterion, considering the maximum potential consequence 
these facilities have, and 7 events were rated at the highest level (Level 2) according to this 
criterion.  As well, it can be observed that most of the events were caused by mistakes or 
errors of workers. 
3.4 Events in Other Facilities 
There are 24 events which consist of those in the facilities such as experimental, medical 
and non-nuclear ones and those involving lost sources.  As indicated in Figure II.7, more 
than half of them (15 events) were associated with lost sources and include 6 events 
involving overexposure of public members.  Particularly, two events in 1992 (in Xinshou, 
China) and 2000 (in Egypt) involved three and two fatalities, respectively.  In another 
event in 1995 (in Jihua, China), the overexposure of a worker was caused by a lost source 
in the chemical plant construction site, resulting in amputation of his extremities.  Eight 
events associated with lost sources occurred during the transportation, two of which 
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involved overexposure and six of which were rated at Level 1.   
Lost Source:15
(Radiation 
exposure: 6)
Non-nuclear 
facilities:3
(Radiation 
exposure: 2)
Experimental 
facilities: 6
(Radiation 
exposure: 4)
 
Figure II.7  Event Characteristics in Other Facilities 
 
The other 9 events consist of six at accelerators and experimental facilities and three at 
non-nuclear facilities.  For the former type of event, four involved radiation exposure of 
workers, in one of which (in Tianjin, China, in 1995), a skin grafting was made for the 
worker who heavily exposed to radiation due to inadvertent entry to the irradiation 
chamber.  The other two were contamination events, both of which were caused by the 
release of radioactive wastes into the facilities due to workers’ misoperation.  For the 
latter type of event, two involved overexposure of workers when handling the radiation 
devices due to their errors and the other was the contamination event caused by a broken 
radiation source in a chemical plant. 
The characteristics of such events can be summarized as follows: Events associated with 
lost sources include those involving fatalities and/or serious physical damages due to 
overexposure and those involving sources found at inappropriate places such as scrapyards 
and/or thefts of vehicles with sources.  As well, some events with lost sources during 
transportation have been reported, indicating the importance of enhancing the control of 
radioactive sources.  Events at the accelerators, experimental facilities and non-nuclear 
facilities involved the overexposure or contamination due to inadvertent workers’ actions, 
implying the importance of improving educational training of workers.  
 
4.  Summary 
In this generic study, approximately 500 event reports to the INES were analyzed to 
examine overall trends and characteristics of events rated at Level 2 or higher.  The 
results are summarized as follows: 
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(1) While approximately 70 events were reported to the INES annually during several 
years since its official operation was initiated, the number of reports had been 
decreased afterwards.  However, the number of events rated at Level 2 or higher has 
been remained almost constant (10-20 events per year) throughout the period. 
(2) Since additional factors such as common cause failure(s) or lack of safety culture were 
observed, approximately 60 events were uprated.  Lack of safety culture was main 
reason of uprating and included violations of operating/maintenance procedures or 
LCOs, quality assurance issues, and administrative control issues. 
(3) Two events rated at Level 4 were reported, both of which involved fatalities due to 
overexposure to radiation.  About half of 15 events rated at Level 3 were associated 
with overexposure resulting from lost sources or radiation devices in non-nuclear 
facilities, one of which involved a fatality.  About two thirds of 114 events with Level 
2 occurred at NPPs. 
(4) Categorizing the events reported based on the reporting criteria, 5 events including the 
JCO accident were rated on the “offsite consequence” criterion and resulted in the 
deaths and/or physical damages of worker(s) or public member(s).  The events rated 
on the “onsite consequence” criterion were dominated by overexposure and/or 
contamination events in fuel reprocessing or fabrication facilities and overexposure 
events in experimental or non-nuclear facilities.  Although most of the events at NPPs 
were rated on the “defense-in-depth” criterion, there were only a few such events 
involving contamination in the plant site and no event involving radioactive releases. 
(5) The events at NPPs have different characteristics depending on the reactor types but the 
degraded functions of ECCS and electric power systems were common issues to all 
types of reactors.  The events in fuel reprocessing or fabrication facilities involving 
overexposure and contamination were mainly caused by work control and/or radiation 
control issues during maintenance activities.  Although there were a small number of 
events at testing or research reactors (8 events), those were mainly due to the workers’ 
errors.  As well, the events associated with lost sources had been remarkably 
increasing, some of which involved fatalities and/or physical damages of public 
members.  Furthermore, the events in the experimental or non-nuclear facilities 
involved radiation exposures and/or contamination due to workers’ errors. 
 
II.1.2 Comprehensive Reviews of Events Reported 
to IRS 
The IRS is designed to be of value mainly to technical experts working in the nuclear 
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power field and therefore, event information reported is written with technical detail not 
intended for distribution to the general public because of its proprietary nature.  To 
encourage openness within the nuclear community, as mentioned previously, access to the 
IRS reports is restricted.  Although generic and topical studies have been carried out 
based on the IRS reports, the results from these studies are also restricted.  Thus, only a 
limited number of publications are available to the general public
(28-32)
.  These 
publications highlighted important lessons learned based on a review of 200-300 event 
reports submitted to the IRS over the respective three-year periods and provided the short 
summaries of individual events with safety significance.   
 
1. Outlines of Comprehensive Reviews 
The comprehensive reviews have been carried out such that the reported event information 
can be shared among regulatory authorities and operating organizations to learn from 
operating experiences in foreign countries and to enhance the safety of NPPs in Japan.  In 
particular, since 1997, the individual IRS reports have been reviewed and the results have 
been complied in a confidential report on a yearly basis
(12-27)
, which provides their 
respective event summaries of individual reports and identifies the IRS reports addressing 
safety significant events or generic issues, and disseminated to the relevant organs in Japan 
in accordance with the basic principle of IRS.   
During the years 1988 to 1996, more than 700 IRS reports submitted to the OECD/NEA 
were reviewed and approximately 60 reports were identified as ones addressing the events 
with safety significance.  Examples of them are listed in Table II.3.  Particular attention 
should be paid to some of them.  For example, several reports addressed the control rod 
insertion problems such as failure of rod assemblies to fully insert and slow insertion time.  
Other significant reports included those describing the pressure locking of valves, actual or 
potential ECCS strainer clogging, core shroud cracking, reactor vessel head cracking, 
turbine fire and missile events, power oscillation events, or LOOP. 
Since 1997, more than 1300 IRS reports have been analyzed and approximately 140 
reports were identified as safety significant ones.  Figures II.8 and II.9 show the number 
of IRS reports reviewed and that of reports identified significant in the individual calendar 
years, respectively.  As well, Table II.4 lists the safety significant events identified in the 
individual years.   
The 1997 edition of comprehensive reviews covered 99 IRS reports submitted from 20 
member countries in the calendar year 1997
(12)
.  At that time, a total of 24 countries 
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participated in the IRS.  Of these, five IRS reports were identified as significant ones 
addressing the events with potential or actual degradations of plant equipment due to cold 
weather conditions, control rod cluster drive mechanism anomaly and so on.  The 1998 
edition covered 122 IRS reports from 18 member countries
(13)
.  Nine of these were 
identified important, addressing the events associated with water hammer, loss of coolant 
inventory during reactor shutdown, potential sabotages, LOOP followed by excessive 
cooldown, or inadvertent containment spray.  The 1999 edition analyzed 119 IRS reports 
from 21 member countries and identified 10 reports describing the events related to 
adverse effects of fire protection system actuation (internal flooding), inadequate 
configuration control of safety systems, CCFs, potential degradation of ECCS, or control 
rod seizure
(14)
.  In the 2000 edition, 82 reports from 23 countries were analyzed, 7 of 
which were identified safety significant.  It should be noted that these significant reports 
addressed the events involving LOOP, external flooding, steam generator tube failure, 
power oscillation, and weld cracks in reactor coolant system piping
(15)
.  The 2001 edition 
covered 64 reports from 18 countries and identified 6 reports addressing the safety 
significant events related to CCFs, stress corrosion cracking in safety injection pipes, 
residual heat removal pump failure during mid-loop operation, or through-wall cracking of 
reactor vessel head control rod drive mechanism penetration nozzles
(16)
.  In the 2002 
edition, 55 IRS reports from 16 countries were reviewed and 7 reports were identified 
safety significant.  These reports addressed the events with LOOP, significant degradation 
of reactor pressure vessel head, primary system leakage, etc
(17)
.  The 2003 edition 
analyzed 70 reports from 20 countries, 9 of which described the safety significant events 
including pipe rupture due to hydrogen explosion, steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), 
EDG failures, leakage from reactor vessel bottom mounted instrument nozzles, and 
potential ECCS sump clogging
(18)
.  The 2004 and 2005 editions covered 67 reports from 
20 countries and 63 reports from 13 countries, respectively.  For both years, 7 reports 
were identified as significant ones which addressed LOOP, cable penetration fire, damages 
to fuel assemblies in cleaning tank, pressurizer penetration nozzle cracking, potential 
ECCS sump clogging, or external flooding by tsunami attack
(19,20)
.  The recent editions 
for the years 2006 to 2012 reviewed approximately 80 reports per year.  The reports were 
submitted by 19, 16, 21, 22, 19, 27 and 24 countries in the individual years.  Each edition 
identified about 10 reports as significant ones.  The 2006 edition addressed the significant 
events involving EDG failures, control rod insertion problem, or foreign material intrusion 
in ECCS or primary system piping
(21)
.  In the 2007, 2008 and 2009 editions, it should be 
noted that several reports addressed failures of EDGs and their associates.  In addition, 
there were some notable events involving silting up of raw water intake channel of 4 units, 
potential CCFs of essential service water system (ESWS), safety/relief valve malfunction, 
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or transformer failures
(22-24)
.  The 2010 edition identified the significant reports which 
described the events related to the environmental adverse effects such as fragile icing in 
cooling water channel, loss of heat sink due to ingress of vegetable materials or seaweeds, 
or massive ingress of plant debris into raw water pumping station, in addition to the EDG 
problems
(25)
.  The 2011 edition also addressed the events with the EDG problems, 
pressurizer relief valve failure, or ESWS unavailability due to cold weather condition
(26)
.  
In the 2012 edition, it should be noted that a station blackout took place during shutdown, 
resulting in loss of residual heat removal and spent fuel pool cooling.  As well, the 
significant events identified included those involving siphon breaker problems in spent fuel 
pool and LOOP
(27)
.  
Table II.3  Examples of Safety Significant Events Identified during Years 1988-1996 
Significant Events Identified No. of IRS Reports 
Control rod insertion problems 4 
Scram solenoid pilot valve problems 2 
Pressure locking of valves 2 
Core shroud cracking 4 
Actual or potential loss of decay heat removal during shutdown 8 
Power/neutron flux oscillation 4 
Actual or potential emergency core cooling system (ECCS) strainer clogging 3 
Turbine fire 4 
Cracks found on reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head at PWRs 3 
Emergency diesel generator (EDG) problems 1 
Digital system/component malfunction 3 
Loss of offsite power (LOOP) 1 
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 Figure II.8  Number of IRS Reports Reviewed Year by Year 
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Figure II.9  Number of IRS Reports Identified Significant Year by Year 
 
Table II.4  List of Safety Significant Events Identified during Years 1997-2012 
Report 
Edition 
Significant Events Identified 
Event 
Category 
1997 
- Degradation of cooling water systems due to icing External hazard 
- Abnormal impact of cold weather on equipment operation  External hazard 
- Localized corrosion in fuels - 
- Toppling of a new fuel stringer - 
- Control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) anomaly Recurring 
1998 
- Water hammer events (3 reports) Recurring 
- Loss of coolant inventory during shutdown (3 reports) Recurring 
- Indications of tampering, vandalism, or malicious mischief - 
- Excessive cooldown of primary coolant system following loss of offsite power (LOOP) - 
- Inadvertent containment spray - 
1999 
- Adverse effects of fire protection system actuation (3 reports) – Internal flooding (2) Recurring 
- Configuration control errors (2 reports) Recurring 
- Common cause failures (CCFs) (3 reports: emergency diesel generators (EDGs), 
pumps, breakers, valves) 
Recurring 
- Potential for degradation of emergency core cooling system (ECCS) and containment 
spray system due to protective coating deficiencies/foreign material 
Recurring 
- Control rod seizure Recurring 
2000 
- Cracks in weld area of reactor coolant system piping (2 reports) Recurring 
- Non-vital bus fault leading to fire and LOOP External hazard 
- External flooding due to bad weather External hazard 
- Power/neutron flux oscillation Recurring 
- Risks in refueling outage - 
- Steam generator tube failure Recurring 
2001 
- CCF of motor operated valves (MOVs)  Recurring 
- Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) in austenite stainless steel components Recurring 
- Excessive response time from reactor pressure vessel (RPV) level sensors - 
 Chapter II 
II-19 
 
Table II.4  List of Safety Significant Events Identified during Years 1997-2012 (continued) 
Report 
Edition 
Significant Events Identified Event Category 
2001 
- Potential loss of safety-related equipment due to lack of high-energy line break barriers - 
- Through-wall cracking of CRDM penetration nozzles Recurring 
- Defect in residual heat removal (RHR) pump during mid-loop operation Recurring 
2002 
- LOOP Recurring 
- Non-compliances with technical specifications and human-based CCFs  - 
- Primary coolant unisolable leak caused by thermal fatigue Recurring 
- Refueling error Recurring 
- Significant degradation of RPV head New/Unexpected 
- Turbine trip followed by safety injection due to steam generators overfill Recurring 
- Erroneous design assumptions for refueling water storage and emergency feedwater 
system tanks 
- 
2003 
- Safety injection (SI) actuated by very low pressurizer pressure protection caused by 
inappropriate operator manoeuvre 
- 
- Pipe rupture due to radiolysis gas explosion New/Unexpected 
- Failure of reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) injection valve Recurring 
- Steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) during plant cooldown Recurring 
- Degraded 6.6 kV breakers and failure of two EDGs on demand Recurring 
- Leakage in bottom-mounted instrumentation nozzles (2 reports) New/Unexpected 
- Emergency sump recirculation blockage issues Recurring 
- ECCS recirculation valve stuck closed Recurring 
2004 
- Fire in secondary electrical penetration External hazard 
- Loss of bulk electrical system Recurring 
- Inspection of alloy 82/182/600 materials in pressurizer penetrations & pipe connections Recurring 
- Damage of fuel assemblies in cleaning tank New/Unexpected 
- Reactor scram due to loss of non-class uninterruptible power Recurring 
- LOOP resulting in dual unit scram Recurring 
- Emergency sump recirculation blockage issues Recurring 
2005 
- Reactor shutdown following tsunami strike External hazard 
- Three-unit trip and LOOP Recurring 
- Containment sump screen blockage problems (2 reports) Recurring 
- Tin whisker New/Unexpected 
- Torus cracking New/Unexpected 
- Compliance deviation of connection boxes - 
2006 
- Loss of 400 kV and failure to start EDGs Recurring 
- Control rod insertion problem Recurring 
- Foreign material in ECCS/containment spray piping or primary system (3 reports) Recurring 
- Insufficient water level in containment spray recirculation sump Recurring 
- Air entrainment into ECCS/containment spray Recurring 
- Unavailabilities of low head SI/containment spray pumps due to excessive vibration Recurring 
2007 
- Configuration control error Recurring 
- Silting up of raw water intake channel of 4 units External hazard 
- Wrong settings of voltage protection relays Recurring 
- Potential common cause vulnerabilities in essential service water systems Recurring 
- Double inversion of remote control to safety related valves New/Unexpected 
- Unavailable containment spray recirculation Recurring 
- Failure on 6.6 kV emergency switchboard Recurring 
- EDG problem (2 reports) Recurring 
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Table II.4  List of Safety Significant Events Identified during Years 1997-2012 (continued) 
Report 
Edition 
Significant Events Identified 
Event 
Category 
2008 
- EDG problem (2 reports) Recurring 
- Radioactive particles outside radiation controlled area New/Unexpected 
- Loss of safety electrical equipment due to generator high voltage Recurring 
- Unintentional opening of safety/relief valves Recurring 
- Unavailable RHR and containment cooling system train Recurring 
- Gas accumulation in ECCS, decay heat removal and containment spray systems Recurring 
- Cracking on steam generator tube Recurring 
- Hydrogen hazards Recurring 
- Failure of containment prestressing cables New/Unexpected 
2009 
- Incorrectly installed anchor - 
- Unavailability of 2 of 3 high head SI lines Recurring 
- Unavailability of letdown line due to water soluble paper clogging New/Unexpected 
- EDG problem and LOOP Recurring 
- Transformer failures Recurring 
- Excessive drainage of reactor coolant Recurring 
- EDG inoperable due to painting and cleaning agents Recurring 
- Configuration control error Recurring 
- Inadvertent withdrawal of two fuel assemblies Recurring 
- Transformer fire and intrusion of fire gas into control room External hazard 
2010 
- Frazil ice/icing in cooling water system (2 Reports) External hazard 
- Loss of heat sink due to vegetable materials, seaweed, plant debris (3 reports) External hazard 
- Power reduction due to external impacts External hazard 
- Excessive suspended materials in cooling water External hazard 
- Trip of busbars in switchyard and loss of standby power due to current transformer fire External hazard 
- EDG problem (2 Reports) Recurring 
- Submerged electrical cables New/Unexpected 
2011 
- Failure on 6.6 kV emergency switchboard Recurring 
- EDG problems (3 reports) Recurring 
- Loss of grid supplies to transformer Recurring 
- 500 kV line trip due to hill fire External hazard 
- Failure of main transformer resulting in LOOP Recurring 
- False activation of RPV float level switches and ECCS flow oscillation - 
- Unavailable reactor protection system containment isolation function Recurring 
- Failure of pressurizer safety valve to close Recurring 
- Control rod problem (2 reports) Recurring 
- Inoperability of essential service water system trains due to cold weather External hazard 
2012 
- Complicated events due to fire External hazard 
- Loss of shutdown cooling due to station blackout New/Unexpected 
- Dual unit LOOP Recurring 
- Low voltage safety grade power electronics failure due to lightning overvoltage Recurring 
- Cracking in RPV bottom head penetration Recurring 
- Flaw indication in RPV Recurring 
- Cracking of CRDM housing Recurring 
- RPV closure head studs de-tensioned New/Unexpected 
- Flood in containment New/Unexpected 
- Spend fuel pool syphon breaker problem (2 reports) New/Unexpected 
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2. Safety Significant Events Identified by 
Comprehensive Reviews 
As mentioned in the previous subsection, the comprehensive reviews identified a total of 
approximately 200 IRS reports which addressed safety significant events or generic issues.  
These can be categorized into three types of events; recurring events, events associated 
with external hazards, and the events related to new phenomena or unexpected aggravating 
conditions as shown in Table II.4.  In this subsection, the safety significant events 
identified are summarized focusing on these three types of events. 
2.1 Recurring Events 
A recurring event is defined as one with actual or potential safety significance that is the 
same as or similar to the previous events and/or has the same or similar causes as the 
previous ones.  About two-thirds of safety significant events identified during the years 
1997 through 2012 (89 of 139 events) belong to this event category.  Examples include 
loss of residual heat removal during reactor shutdown at PWRs, service water degradations 
due to bio-fouling, power oscillations at BWRs, reactor vessel head stress corrosion 
cracking at PWRs, and SGTR. 
The actual or potential loss of residual heat removal during reactor shutdown was reported 
from more than 10 PWRs and in particular, several PWRs experienced such events during 
mid-loop operation, most of which took place during the period 1988 to 1996 as seen from 
Table II.3.  The dominant causes were loss of power to the flow control valves or pumps, 
procedural errors, inadequate reactor water level instruments.  Since 2000, only one event 
was reported, the cause of which was different from the previous events.  In this event, a 
special type of pump called “canned motor pump” failed due to a lost locking screw for the 
radial bearing. 
At least three events involving an actual or potential STGR were reported, including one at 
the Mihama Unit 2 in 1991.  Both of the other two events also involved the pressurizer 
level decrease which required the manual actuation of safety injection.  In one event, the 
excessive cooldown was carried out, leading to several conditions that complicated the 
subsequent event response and delayed the reactor cooling system (RCS) cooldown.  As 
well, the operators were slow to recognize configuration lineup problems that could 
prevent successful operation of the auxiliary spay system to lower the RCS pressure.  The 
other event occurred during reactor shutdown and the N-16 radiation monitor was out of 
service, delaying the detection of primary-to-secondary leak (the first indication of leak 
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was at 13 min after the indication of pressurizer level decrease). 
During the period 1988 to 1996, several IRS reports addressed the control rod insertion 
problems where the control rod elements were inserted at a slower rate than usual, or 
inserted only partly at both PWRs and BWRs.  One of dominant causes was that fuel 
assemblies were found to have been deformed, such that there was not a straight, smooth 
path for inserting a rod.  Other potential causes were as follows: debris (foreign material), 
control rod swelling, corrosion products, thimble tube bowing, fuel assembly bowing 
and/or twisting, reduction in thimble tube diameter and/or design tolerances.  In addition, 
the slow rod insertion was observed at several BWRs, which were caused by the 
degradation of scram solenoid pilot valve diaphragms.  Since 1997, as well, control rod 
insertion problems were observed but the causes were different from the previous ones.  
For example, at a PWR, 22 of 61 control rods were stuck in the upper position, direct cause 
of which was ‘detention’ in the foreheads of the movable and immovable poles of the 
fixing electromagnet.   
Other reports described the core shroud cracking at BWRs, power oscillations at BWRs, 
actual or potential ECCS strainer clogging at BWRs, reactor vessel head penetration 
cracking at PWRs, LOOP, EDG failures, and turbine fires.  The cracks in the core shroud 
have been reported from more than 10 plants.  These cracks were found within base 
material or in the heat-affected zone of the welds.  The causes of shroud failures were 
intergranular stress corrosion cracking related to high carbon content in the material, 
unfavorable heat treatment, and unfavorable welding procedures.   
The power oscillation events at BWRs resulted from the operation in the forbidden region 
(instable region) of the power-flow diagram, skewed power distribution (depending on 
control rod pattern and fuel loading configuration), and/or low feedwater temperature.   
The ECCS clogging events might have resulted from debris generated or materials 
used/brought inside containment.  One event involving strainer clogging took place as a 
result of piping insulation material being damaged and carried to the suppression pool.  
Another event involved the strainers being covered with fibers, sludge and corrosion 
products, potentially leading to their blockage.   
The reactor vessel head penetration nozzles were generally made of nickel-based alloys 
(e.g., Alloy 600), cracking of which was caused by the primary coolant water and the 
operating conditions through a process called primary water stress corrosion cracking 
(PWSCC).  In particular, at a PWR, a significant cavity in the low-alloy reactor vessel 
head was found unexpectedly.  The cavity was apparently caused by boric acid 
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erosion/corrosion resulting from leakage of reactor coolant from a crack in the control rod 
drive mechanism nozzle.  In this event, the pressure boundary was retained by only the 
stainless steel cladding with its thickness of 0.3 inch.  The susceptibility of vessel head 
penetrations to PWSCC appears to be strongly linked to the operating time and 
temperature of the vessel head and thus, the PWSCC-related problem has increased as 
plants have operated for a longer period of time.   
LOOP events occurred in many countries.  In some cases, a LOOP was caused by the 
electrical grid disturbances, which occurred due to equipment failure, overloading, lack of 
maintenance, human errors, etc.  These events are considered risk-significant because 
they challenge multiple safety systems required to bring the reactor into a safe shutdown 
condition.  In one event, a LOOP was caused by a human error during a protective relay 
test of the main generator and followed by a EDG failure to start with the other EDG being 
out of service for maintenance, resulting in station blackout (SBO).  The SBO condition 
lasted for 12 min.  The EDG failure was resulted from the air start system failure.  In 
another event, the maintenance activities in the switchyard were not performed according 
to the applicable procedures by the grid operator and the plant personnel were not informed 
of the ongoing work in the switchyard.  The inadequate maintenance work resulted in a 
high voltage short circuit.  An additional maintenance error at the plant led to a high 
voltage spark propagating to the uninterruptable power supply system (UPS).  As a result, 
two out of four redundancies of UPS were unavailable for about 20 min, resulting in loss 
of two 220 VAC bus bars.  All four EDGs started automatically but two of them did not 
connect to their respective bus bars due to loss of power in the 220 VAC grid served by the 
failed UPSs. 
Many events involved the EDG failures caused by problems in the air start system, fuel oil 
supply system, cooling system, output breakers, lube oil system, voltage regulators, engine 
itself and so on.  In some events, two EDGs failed to start due to a common cause.  In 
such cases, as the likelihood of SBO would increase, a movable or immovable generator 
such as gas turbine generator has been installed as a backup at plants in European countries 
and the United States. 
At least four major turbine fire events reported resulted from hydrogen leakage, explosion 
and burn.  Two of them involved the turbine blades having broken and penetrated the 
casing (so-called turbine missiles), leading to the damages to several system pipes 
including condenser.  One was caused by the turbine overspeed due to solenoid valve 
failures in the turbine trip system and the other was by excessive vibration of turbine.  
The latter event involved internal flooding due to the damage of tube which circulates 
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cooling water from the lake.  In the third event, turbine fire caused the electrical cables to 
be burned, resulting in an SBO.  Although the SBO condition lasted for about 17 h, the 
core cooling was maintained by the thermosyphoning effect by supplying water to the 
steam generators with use of diesel driven fire pumps.  The fourth turbine fire caused 
several system failures inducing a significant flooding of reactor building.  As a 
consequence, the core cooling was compromised due to loss of two gas circulators and the 
regulation problems of feedwater to the main heat exchanger.  The fire lasted for 6 h, 
water extraction from the building was ended 12 h later and feedwater to main heat 
exchanger was stabilized 19 h after event initiation. 
2.2 External Hazards 
Although nuclear power plant systems, structures and components important to safety are 
designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, 
storms, floods and so on without loss of capability to perform their safety functions, some 
plants have suffered from natural phenomena, in particular severe weather condition or 
earthquake induced floods.  Nineteen safety significant events during 1997-2012 are 
placed in this category.  
Strong winds and heavy rains resulted in the high waves moving up the river along which 
the plant is located, causing a partial flooding of two reactor units.  Offsite power supplies 
were lost due to loss of grid and mechanical and electrical penetrations were damaged.  
The buildings where safety-related components are located were partially flooded, causing 
portions or all of ESWS, the safety injection system, containment spray system unavailable.  
The site was momentarily isolated, impairing emergency assistance from the outside.  
Although the flooding has been taken into account in the plant design, this event revealed 
that conditions could be encountered where further design improvements are desirable.  
The disastrous tsunami caused by the massive earthquake off the coast of island hit the site.  
As a result, seawater entered the pump house through the intake tunnels and water level in 
the pump house rose up to condenser cooling water (CCW) pump level, causing all the 
CCW pumps and all the process sea water pumps unavailable.  There was seawater 
inundation of about 0.5 m above the ground/road level up to the east periphery of the 
turbine building but no seawater entered into the reactor building, turbine building or 
service building.  Thus, the effect of tsunami waves on the plant was minimum and 
limited to a plant outage only.  The tsunami events should be considered in the siting and 
design of existing and future nuclear facilities. 
A riverside plant experienced a serious accumulation of sand in the sand trap.  The 
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collapse of the heap of accumulated sand would have blocked the raw water intake tunnel 
under the river connecting the river water intake and intake channel.  Therefore, the site 
would have totally lost the normal supply of raw cooling water.  This situation originated 
from the weakness of river water intake design, which was very sensitive to environmental 
condition and resulted from shortcomings in the silting monitoring methods. 
At several plants, low temperature challenged the plant safety-related systems such as 
ESWS.  In 2011, particularly, three plants reported the associated events.  At one plant, 
frazil ice was formed in cooling water intake and blocked its protective grid, causing the 
water level at the entrance of the pumping station below the lowest water level without 
causing ESWS pumps to malfunction.  Another event involving frazil icing resulted in 
partial blockage of the screen in cooling water channel, causing low water level in the 
snore pieces of the main seawater pumps.  As a consequence, those pumps stopped and 
pressure in the condensers increased, leading to reactor shutdown.  In such cases, ESWS 
might have been affected, leading to reactor shutdown.  As well, at a plant, both 
independent ESWS trains became inoperable due to the blockage of the valve caused by 
the freezing water in the valve bonnet.   
Several events involved loss of heat sink due to clogging of the water intake structures 
including trash rack and drum screen by vegetable materials, seaweeds, plant debris and 
suspended debris.  At one plant, a very significant amount of vegetable materials blocked 
the pumping station intake for two units by clogging the trash rack and drum screens, 
resulting in one of two ESWS trains being unavailable.  Thus, one unit was manually 
shutdown.  After switching to the other ESWS train, its water intake became clogged in 
turn and as a consequence, a total loss of heat sink occurred at the unit.  Another plant 
experienced significant seaweed ingress to the station cooling water inlet.  Both reactors 
were manually shut down and there was a partial, temporary loss of reactor seawater 
cooling at one unit.  At a riverside plant, three events involving loss of heat sink took 
place during one month.  In each case, the circulating water pumps were tripped on high 
drum screen head loss due to the fouling of the drum screen by massive ingress of plant 
debris from the river.  The two cases led to the reactor trips of all four units on the site.  
In the third case, two units tripped.   
2.3 New Phenomena or Unexpected Aggravating Conditions 
The events in this category cover a pipe rupture due to hydrogen burning at BWRs, a fault 
on a solid state protection system (SSPS) circuit card due to the growth of tin whisker, a 
failure of prestressing cable of the containment dome, and a syphon breaker problem on 
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spent fuel pool cooling (SFPC) lines.  This category includes 17 events identified safety 
significant. 
Two events involved a pipe rupture due to the explosion of radiolysis gases (hydrogen and 
oxygen) which accumulated during power operation.  One event occurred during the 
surveillance test of high pressure coolant injection system (HPCI), where the steam 
condensation pipe of residual heat removal system (RHR) ruptured.  The other event took 
place, in which the reactor pressure vessel head spray (RPVHS) line ruptured.  In the 
former event, it was presumed that the noble-metal which was used for suppressing the 
stress corrosion cracking, would work as a catalyst at the time of ignition.  For the latter 
case, the ignition source had remained unknown but it was assumed that the ignition may 
have started in the area of the flange in the ruptured pipe. 
Tin whiskers are electrically conductive crystalline structure of tin that sometimes grows 
from surface and would cause short circuits in electronic system by bridging closely 
spaced circuit element.  One event involving tin whisker resulted in an unexpected safety 
injection and reactor trip caused by a fault on an SSPS circuit card.  Tin whiskers appear 
to have increased following the efforts to remove alloying metals from solder and other 
circuit card.  Tin whiskers have been cited as the cause for various minor component 
failures in the nuclear industry. 
At a plant, control measurement of prestressing forces showed a complete loss of prestress 
on both ends of one dome prestressing cable.  The direct cause of this failure was the 
exhaustion of wire plastic deformation capacity on the outer part of ring reel surface that 
led to the violation of strength limit due to the combination of design factors (value of wire 
stress and wires number, radii of bends, possibility of crossings), manufacturing, 
assembling and stretching technology factors (radii of reels and pulleys, wire rectification 
method, cable introduction method, wire tension uniformity), and operational factors 
(checks by hydraulic lifts, temperature changes). 
The syphon breakers are provided to interrupt the excessive drainage of spent fuel pool in 
the case of a leak, rupture or alignment error in an SFPC line.  One plant operator 
checked the operability of the syphon breakers and found that these devices were not 
present on the pipes submerging in the pools of two units because they had not drilled at 
the time of construction.  In addition, the diameter of the syphon breakers was less than 
the specified value at other plants.  In another country, it was found that the syphon 
breaker valve had never been tested functionally and was not included in the inspection 
program.  Both events were identified by the inspection carried out in the wake of the 
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accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant. 
 
3. Summary 
The comprehensive reviews covered more than 2000 IRS reports during the period 1988 
through 2012 and identified approximately 200 safety significant events.  Safety 
significant events can be roughly categorized into several groups.  In this section, 
described are three groups of events: recurring events, events associated with external 
hazards and the events related to new phenomena or unexpected aggravating conditions.   
In particular, the recurring events indicate that the previous corrective actions have not 
necessarily been effective to prevent the recurrences and thus, the event analysis should 
place more emphasis on why the actions taken after the first event have failed to prevent 
the recurrences.  As for the external hazards, more attention should be paid for ones 
beyond the design basis assumptions based on the previous events which challenged the 
plant safety.  The new phenomena or unexpected aggravating conditions have a potential 
to threaten the plant safety but it seems difficult to detect them prior to their appearances.  
However, such events might have been observed in other fields of technologies and thus, 
special attention should be paid to the operating experience in such fields, especially in the 
design phase.  
The results of comprehensive reviews provided inputs to the topical studies described in 
Chapter III. 
 
II.2 Supporting Tools for Generic Studies 
It is required for the comprehensive reviews to look at many event reports written in 
English and to identify the events with safety significance or safety implications.  
Therefore, the reviews take much effort because of a large number of reports and the 
results should be accumulated so that the significant events can be easily reached if 
requested.  In order to reduce such effort and promote the effective use of review results, 
two types of software tools were developed as follows: 
- Computerized Event Sequence Abstracting System (CESAS) (33-37) 
- World Wide Web for Database of Japanese Translation on INES Reports(1) 
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II.2.1 Development of Computerized Event 
Sequence Abstracting System 
When analyzing event reports, it is necessary to identify occurrences such as 
component/system failures/unavailabilities and operators’ actions from beginning to end of 
the incident and then, to understand the sequential and causal relationships between 
occurrences, that is, event sequence.  Such an event sequence is useful for determining 
the causal factors which have the potential to lead to another event, identifying the events 
which have similarity in terms of plant behaviors, predicting the occurrences which could 
exacerbate the plant conditions and examining the preventive measures for recurrence of 
events
(38)
.  For the purpose of more efficiently utilizing event reports, however, it is 
necessary to systematically extract the event sequences from individual event reports. 
On the other hand, most of event reports from foreign countries are generally written in 
natural language of English and there are a large number of reports.  Therefore, it takes 
much effort, in particular, for Japanese to grasp the gist of event description and to extract 
the event sequence from these reports.  Aiming at reducing such effort, a new 
computer-based analysis system, named Computerized Event Sequence Abstracting 
System (CESAS), was developed using the knowledge engineering technique used in the 
field of natural language processing such as machine translation
(33-37)
.  This system 
analyzes the narrative description written in English, systematically identifies sentences or 
clauses representing occurrences and schematically abstract event sequence.  To 
implement such processing on a computer, the following three processes are required; (i) 
analyzing grammatical structures of individual sentences and clarifying modification 
relations between words and the subject-predicate relations, (ii) understanding the meaning 
of each word and identifying the phrases, clauses and sentences representing occurrences, 
and (iii) recognizing the relations between the phrases, clauses and sentences.  As for (i), 
applied was the existing analysis method which was developed and has been utilized in the 
machine translations and for (ii) and (iii), the analytical approach was newly developed.  
In this section, the analysis approach incorporated into CESAS is described and analytical 
results are shown in comparison with manually-extracted event sequences to verify its 
feasibility. 
 
1. System Design 
1.1 Basic Concepts 
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Machine translation is generally executed through the analysis of original sentences, the 
transformation of sentence structures and the generation of target sentences
(39-42)
.  The 
process in the machine translation is processed by using the dictionaries which contain 
grammatical and semansiological information of words, and the rules which contain the 
grammars for original and target languages.  The machine translation cannot necessarily 
translate all styles of sentences and thus, the controls are introduced or the modification of 
original text is required prior to translation
(43)
.  Considering such circumstances in the 
machine translation technique, the system design was performed based on the following 
concepts.  
(a) Since the dictionaries and rules are needed to analyze the natural language, the system 
is configured based on the knowledge engineering technique, enabling the system to 
have dictionaries and rules independently from computer programs and to manage the 
variety of sentence styles by modifying the dictionaries and rules. 
(b) The existing analysis method is applied to the process of analyzing grammatically 
sentences.  
(c) The dictionary is newly prepared taking into consideration the frequent appearances of 
words specific to event reports and/or nuclear power plant systems/components. 
(d) The rules are prepared for the basic grammar of English. 
(e) A new analytical approach is developed for the processes of understanding the meaning 
of words and recognizing the relations between phrases, clauses and sentences.   
1.2 System Configuration 
As shown in Figure II.10, CESAS consists of one dictionary, three analysis rules and one 
model as knowledge-base, and a four-step analytical process.  The analytical process is 
composed of morphemic analysis, syntactic analysis, semantic analysis and syntagmatic 
analysis, each of which is outlined below, together with analysis rules and a model. 
1) Morphemic Analysis 
Morphemic analysis is a pre-process of syntactic analysis to identify the part-of-speech 
for each word in sentences by referring to the word dictionary.   
2) Syntactic Analysis 
Syntactic analysis defines phrases and clauses and determines the grammatical structure 
of each sentence by collating a row of words (row of parts-of-speech) with the English 
grammatical rules (syntactic rules).   
3) Semantic Analysis 
Semantic analysis consists of two steps; semantic structure analysis and extraction of 
occurrence expressions.  The former clarifies the semasiological relations between 
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words and phrases and identifies the subjects, predicates, objects and so on using the 
semantic rules.  The latter extracts phrases and clauses representing occurrences by 
applying the semantic model.   
4) Syntagmatic Analysis 
Syntagmatic analysis recognizes phrases and clauses indicating the identical items and 
occurrences and then, deduces mutual relations between phrases, clauses and sentences 
representing occurrences with use of the syntagmatic rules.   
The analysis method proposed by Marcus for the machine translation
(44)
 was applied to the 
morphemic and syntactic analyses.  For the semantic structure analysis, the existing 
approach
(45)
 was modified so that the semasiological relations could be identified. 
Semantic 
Models
Event Description
Morphemic Analysis
Syntactic Analysis
Semantic Analysis
Syntagmatic Analysis
Event Network
Event Sequence Diagram
Word Dictionary
Syntactic Rules
Semantic Rules
Syntagmatic Rules
Knowledgebase
 
Figure II.10  Structure of CESAS 
 
2. Analytical Approach 
2.1 Morphemic and Syntactic Analyses 
In the morphemic analysis, each sentence in an event description is firstly divided into 
words and phrases.  Next, the part-of-speech for each word or phrase is defined by 
referring to the word dictionary.  The dictionary contains syntactical properties such as 
part-of-speech and conjugations for words and phrases.  Nomenclatures and abbreviations 
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of equipment, systems and components at nuclear power plants are also stored in this 
dictionary. 
In the syntactic analysis, phrases and clauses are determined for each sentence by collating 
a row of parts-of-speech with the syntactic rules.  Then, the grammatical tree structure 
(syntactic tree) of sentence is constructed according to combinations of the phrases and 
clauses.  The syntactic rules were prepared by quoting from Ref. (44).  Figure II.11 
shows an example of syntactic tree for a sentence, “The MSIVs closed automatically when 
reactor water level decreased to -30 inches”.  As seen from this figure, several kinds of 
phrases such as noun-phrase (NP) and verb-phrase (VP) are identified by applying 
syntactic rules (①～⑥ in Figure II.11) and then, grammatical structure of the sentence is 
determined with rules such as ⑦ and ⑧.   
DET (*THE  DET) : THE
N (*MSIV  N  NPL  ABBR) : MSIVS
VERB (*CLOSE  VERB  PAST  EN) : CLOSED
ADV (*AUTOMATICALLY  ADV) : AUTOMATICALLY
S NP
VP
CONJ (*WHEN  CONJ) : WHEN
N (*REACTOR  N) : REACTOR
N (*WATER  N) : WATER
N (*LEVEL  N) : LEVEL
VERB (*DECREASE  VERB  PAST  EN) : DECREASED
PREP (*TO  PREP) : TO
S NP
VP
PP
⑤
①
②
③
④
⑦
⑧
⑥
⑦
NUM (NUM) : -30
N (*INCH  N  UNIT  NPL) : INCHES
(*. (FINALPUNCTURE)
NP
S
（NOTE) DET: demonstrative or definite article N: noun NUM: numeral
PREP: preposition CONJ: conjunction ADV: adverbial
NPL: plural PAST: past tense EN: past particle
ABBR: abbreviation *: original form S: sentence
NP: noun phrase VP: verb phrase PP: prepositional phrase
(SYNTACTIC RULES APPLIED)
① DET + S = NP ② VERB + ADV = VP ③ N + N + N = NP
④ NUM + N = NP ⑤ PREP + NP = PP ⑥ VERB + PP = VP
⑦ NP + VP = S ⑧ S + CONJ + S = S
 
Figure II.11  Example of Syntactic Trees 
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2.2 Semantic Analysis 
It is necessary to understand their respective meanings of words and identify the words and 
phrases representing occurrences.  In the event description, occurrences are often 
represented in predicative verbs, subjective nouns and objective ones underlined as shown 
below.  
 “The reactor tripped automatically.”    
 “The level decrease caused the reactor trip.”   
Taking into account such features of event description, the semantic analysis is divided into 
two parts; (i) analyzing semantic structure (semantic structure analysis) and (ii) extracting 
occurrence expressions (occurrence extraction).   
The semantic structure analysis utilizes the existing analysis method
(45)
 to identify 
grammatical parts such as predicates, subjects and objects based on the syntactic trees 
using the semantic rules.  For a simple sentence, the predicative verb is obviously 
determined.  A compound or complex sentence is divided into two simple sentences and 
then, the predicative verb of each sentence is identified.  After that, defined are their 
respective subjects, objectives and complements of individual simple sentences according 
to the semantic rules shown in Table II.5.  As seen from this table, the subjective part is a 
noun-phrase in front of the predicate and the objective or complementary part is a noun- or 
adjective-phrase in rear of the predicate.  In addition, the noun-phrase is analyzed to 
determine its main noun and antecedent.  The main noun is defined as the word located at 
the end of noun-phrase and the word located ahead is regarded as an antecedent.   For 
example, in the noun-phrase, “reactor water level”, the main noun is defined as the word, 
“level”, and its antecedent is the word, “water”.  The word, “reactor”, is the antecedent 
of “water”.   
Table II.5  Semantic Rules 
Syntactic structure Five standard patterns 
NP + Vi (+ ADV or PP) S – V 
NP + Vi + ADJ  S – V – C 
NP + Vt + NP (+ ADV or PP)  
NP + Vt + to do 
NP + Vt + that-clause 
 
S – V – O 
 
NP + Vt + NP + NP (or that-clause) S – V – O – O 
NP + Vt + NP + to do 
NP + Vt + NP + ADJ 
S – V – O – C 
NP: Noun Phrase, Vi: Intransitive Verb, Vt: Transitive Verb, 
ADV: Adverbial, PP: Prepositional Phrase, ADJ: Adjective, 
S: Subject, V: Predicate, O: Object, C: Complementary 
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The occurrence extraction process determines whether or not the individual phrases and 
clauses represent occurrences, such as failure or actuation of plant systems/components, 
and identifies the noun-phrases representing plant systems/components and plant 
parameters, such as pressure and water level, to clarify what happened by making out the 
semantic primitives of nouns or verbs.  The semantic primitives are classified into several 
concepts such as objects, phenomena, operations and so on according to the meanings of 
nouns or verbs.  The semantic primitives are described in the form of “FRAME” 
organized in a hierarchical structure as shown in Figure II.12.  This hierarchical structure 
is called “semantic model” here.  In this model, as seen from Figure II.12(a), the lowest 
level (WORD-LEVEL) is a node corresponding to each noun or verb and its upper level 
(CLASS-LEVEL) is one standing for a semantic marker common to nouns or verbs which 
belong to one group and is divided into 26 categories (10 for verbs and 16 for nouns).  
For example, a node, V@PHENOMENON, is a semantic marker for verbs representing 
failure or anomaly such as “fail”, “fault” and “rupture” and a node, V@OPERATION, is 
one for verbs representing system/component response such as “open” and “operate”.  
Each node is an element of the node, V@EVENT, which stands for occurrence, in the upper 
level, TYPE-LEVEL.  In the process of CESAS, the semantic primitive of each noun or 
verb is identified by tracing the semantic model from the WORD-LEVEL to the 
TYPE-LEVEL.  If the TYPE-LEVEL for a noun (or verb) is N@EVENT (or V@EVENT), 
in other words, it is recognized that the noun (or verb) represents an occurrence.  As well, 
a node, V@SUBEVENT, is prepared for verbs such as “find” and “notice” and the 
sentence where such a verb is the predicate is regarded as an occurrence if its subject or 
object represents an occurrence as indicated below.  
 “The valve failure was found.” 
 “Licensee speculated that the valve failed.” 
Furthermore, in the semantic model, the synonymous words are defined in the “FRAME” 
as shown in Figure II.12(b).  For example, a verb, “fail”, is defined as synonymous with 
a verb, “fault”, and a noun, “failure”, by linking the node, #FAIL, with the nodes, #FAULT 
and #FAILURE, via RELATION and DUALITY.  RELATION is used to link two verbs (or 
nouns) and DUALITY is to link a verb (or noun) with a noun (verb).   
As a result of the semantic analysis, the syntactic tree is transformed into a semantic tree 
shown in Figure II.13, which contains the grammatical relations among the subjects, 
predicates, objects, and so on together with the semantic information for each noun or 
verb. 
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TOP LEVEL TYPE LEVEL CLASS LEVEL WORD LEVEL
SYSTEM
V@PHENOMENON
V@TRANSITION
V@OPERATION
V@ACTION
V@TRANFER
V@RECOGNITION
V@EVALUATION
V@CAUSALITY
V@SITUATION
V@MISCELANEOUS
N@PHENOMENON
#FAIL
#FAULT
:
#ORDER
#REQUEST
:
#OPERATE
#CONTROL
:
#ANALYZE
#CALCULATE
:
#CAUSE
#RESULT
:
#FAILURE
#FAULT-N
:
#OPERATOR
#SUPERVISOR
#SYSTEM
#REACTOR
#PRESSURE
#LEVEL
V@EVENT
V@SUBEVENT
V@NONEVENT
V@SEM
(verb)
N@TRANSITION
N@OPERATION
N@ACTION
N@TRANSFER
HUMAN
ORGANIZATION
EQUIPMENT
NUMERAL
COMPONENT
STRUCTURE
PROPERTY
PARAMETER
UNIT
QUANTITY
N@CAUSALITY
N@EVALUATION
N@RECOGNITION
N@SITUATION
N@EVENT
N@SUBEVENT
N@NONEVENT
N@SEM
(noun)
SEM@MODEL
<FRAME>a
(NAME) #FAIL
(UPPER) V@PHENOMENON
(FEATUR) FAIL
(RELATION) #FAULT
(DUALITY) #FAILURE
<FRAME>b
(NAME) V@PHENOMENON
(UPPER) V@EVENT
(LOWER) #FAIL
#FAULT
:
:
<FRAME>c
(NAME) V@EVENT
(UPPER) V@SEM
(LOWER) V@PHENOMENON
V@TRANSITION
:
:
NAME: Frame Name
UPPER: Upper Level Primitive
LOWER: Lower Level Primitive
FEATURE: Word
RELATION: Similar Meaning Verb
(or Noun) Frame
DUALITY: Similar Meaning Noun
(or Verb) Frame
(a) Hierarchical Structure
(b) Frame Structure
 
Figure II.12  Semantic Model 
<CLOSED>
(ABBREVIATION)  MSIV
SUBJECT: <THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE>
PRINCIPLLE-NOUN: <VALVE>
(PRIMITIVE) #CLOSE
(PRIMITIVE) #VALVE
DET: THE
ADVERBIAL:  AUTOMATICALLY
CONJUNCTION:  WHEN
<DECREASED>
(PRIMITIVE) #DECREASE
SUBJECT: <REACTOR WATER LEVEL>
PRINCIPLE-NOUN: <LEVEL>
(PRIMITIVE) #LEVEL
PRECEDE-NOUN: <REACTOR>
(PRIMITIVE) #REACTOR
<WATER>
(PRIMITIVE) #WATER
PREPOSITION:  TO
PRINCIPLE-NOUN: <INCH>
(PRIMITIVE) #INCH
<-30 INCHES>
NOUN: -30 
 
Figure II.13  Example of Semantic Trees  
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2.3 Syntagmatic Analysis 
In the event description, the same systems/components, parameters or occurrences often 
appear in the different expressions.  For example, systems or components are expressed in 
their respective full names and abbreviations (e.g. “safety relief valve” versus “SRV”) and 
a definite article or a demonstrative adjective is used to refer to the items or occurrences 
previously described (e.g. “the valve” or “this valve”).  As well, some occurrences can 
be expressed in different grammatical styles; the sentence and the noun-phrase (e.g. 
“reactor tripped” versus “reactor trip” or “reactor scram”). 
The syntagmatic analysis firstly recognizes phrases and clauses representing the identical 
items such as systems, components, or parameters and the same occurrences, and then 
defines the sequential and causal relationships between occurrences, using the syntagmatic 
rules.  The sequential and causal relationships are defined focusing on how a specific 
system/component or operators responded, how the parameter varied, and what caused the 
occurrence. 
In order to recognize the phrases and clauses indicating the identical items or occurrences, 
the syntagmatic analysis uses three processes as described below. 
(a) Correspondence analysis  
This process clarifies the correspondence relation among noun-phrases, where their 
respective main nouns are the same or synonymous, by searching (i) the noun-phrases with 
the same row of words and (ii) those expressed in the full names and abbreviations and 
then identifies the same items and occurrences.  In the former search process, it is 
required that all the following rules be met; 
 Rule 1: antecedent nouns (phrases) are in agreement, 
 Rule 2: antecedent adjectives are in agreement, and 
 Rule 3: antecedent quantifiers are in agreement. 
Additionally, the above three rules are used to take the correspondence between 
noun-phrases with the same or synonymous meanings in different expressions.  For 
example, two noun-phrases, “the failure of the valve” and “the valve failure”, are regarded 
as the same occurrence based on these rules.  As a result of the semantic structure 
analysis for the former noun-phrase, the noun located ahead of preposition (“failure”) is 
identified the main noun and the noun located behind preposition (“valve”) is an 
antecedent noun.  Therefore, its semantic tree structure is the same as that for the latter 
noun-phrase.  Applying the above rules, the noun-phrases with the main noun being the 
same or synonymous can be identified.  As well, the noun-phrases, “reactor trip” and 
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“reactor scram”, can be recognized identical if the relation between two words, “trip” and 
“scram”, is defined as synonymous by RELATION in the semantic model shown in Figure 
II.12.  In the search process (ii), surveying the abbreviation dictionary, the individual 
abbreviations are temporarily replaced by their respective full names and the noun-phrases 
are recognized identical. 
(b) Anaphoric analysis 
In this process, the identical systems/components, parameters and occurrences are 
recognized by identifying phrases, clauses or sentences which a definite article or a 
demonstrative adjective refers to.  The anaphoric relation is determined between the 
noun-phrase with a deictic (definite article, pronoun, demonstrative adjective) and any 
preceding noun-phrase which meets the following two rules;  
Rule 1: the main noun is the same as or synonymous with that of the phrase with 
a deictic, and 
Rule 2: the antecedent noun or noun-phrase is in agreement or includes that of 
the phrase with a deictic, 
Such a relation is also clarified between the noun-phrase with a deictic and any preceding 
clause or sentence if it meets the two rules as follows; 
Rule 3: the predicate is synonymous with the main noun of the phrase concerned, 
and 
Rule 4: the subject is a noun or noun-phrase which has the same row of words as 
the phrase concerned or which includes the antecedent noun or 
noun-phrase of the phrase concerned. 
Consider the case that the four sentences appear in the order as follows. 
 “A turbine-driven feedwater pump tripped.” ① 
 “A motor-driven feedwater pump started.”  ② 
 “The pump trip was caused by the stop signal.” ③ 
 “The motor-driven pump continued to run.” ④ 
This analysis process recognizes that the noun-phrase, “the pump trip”, of the Sentence ③ 
refers to the Sentence ① using the Rules 3 and 4 and that the noun-phrase, “the 
motor-driven pump”, of the Sentence ④  refers to the subject, “the motor-driven 
feedwater pump”, of the Sentence ② using the Rules 1 and 2. 
(c) Relevance analysis 
This process searches the noun-phrases with the row of words partially in agreement to 
recognize the same kind of systems/components and parameters and the similar 
 Chapter II 
II-37 
occurrences.  The rules on partial agreement in row of words are; 
Rule 1: the rows of two or more consecutive words are in agreement or the row 
of synonymous words is used, and 
Rule 2: neither correspondence nor anaphoric relation is defined. 
In this analysis, for example, it is recognized that two noun-phrases, “turbine-driven 
feedwater pump” and “motor-driven feedwater pump”, represent the same kind of 
components and two noun-phrases, “manual reactor trip” and “reactor trip”, are similar 
occurrences. 
(d) Keyword and Sequence analysis 
After the identical systems/components, parameters and occurrences are recognized 
through the above processes, the sequential and causal relationships are deduced among 
the occurrences.  These relationships are determined by searching the words that 
represent the sequential order, such as “after” and “before”, and the causality, such as 
“cause” and “result in”.  Here, such words are called keywords.  Additionally, the 
appearance order of sentences representing occurrences is used to deduce the sequential 
relationships.  The analysis processes based on the keywords and the appearance order are 
described below. 
i) Keyword analysis 
The relationships between occurrences are often indicated using the keywords such as 
“before”, “after”, “cause”, “result in” and so on.  In this analysis process, the 
relationships are deduced by applying the keyword rules as shown in Table II.6.  In the 
rules, keywords are classified into two types; one representing a sequential relationship and 
the other representing a causal relationship.  In addition, each type is categorized into 
several groups and the relationship is specified for each group, according to their 
respective meanings and parts-of-speech of individual keywords. 
The keyword analysis firstly clarifies the relation between two phrases, a phrase and a 
clause, or two clauses located before and after a keyword.  Then, the sequential or causal 
relationship is deduced if the phrase(s) or clause(s) is recognized as an occurrence.  For 
example, the following sentence includes two the predicates, “close” and “decrease”, 
representing occurrences and the keyword “when” provides a link called REVERSE LINK, 
that is, the relation from the subordinate clause (or object) to the main one (or subject).  
 “The MSIV closed when reactor water level decreased.” 
Thus, the sequential relationship between the two clauses is deduced as follows. 
 “reactor water level decreased”  “MSIV closed” 
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Table II.6  Example of KEYWORD Rules 
Keyword type 
Relationship for 
E1 (Keyword) E2 
Keywords 
Sequential Conjunction E1 → E2 
(REGULAR LINK) 
before, until, till 
 Preposition before, until, till, prior to 
 Conjunction E2 → E1 
(REVERSE LINK) 
when, as, while, after 
 Preposition after, during 
 Verb 
E1 → E2 
(REGULAR LINK) 
(Active Voice) 
follow, ensue from, succeed 
(Passive Voice) 
precede 
  
E2 → E1 
(REVERSE LINK) 
(Active Voice) 
precede  
(Passive Voice) 
follow, ensue, succeed 
Causal Conjunction E2 → E1 
(REVERSE LINK) 
because, since 
 Preposition because of, due to, as a result of 
 Verb E1 → E2 
(REGULAR LINK) 
(Active Voice) 
cause, result in, lead to 
  
E2 → E1 
(REVERSE LINK) 
(Active Voice) 
result from  
(Passive Voice) 
cause 
E1, E2: sentence, clause or phrase representing occurrence. 
As well, in the sentences shown below, the two noun-phrases representing occurrences, 
“the MSIV closure” and “reactor water level decrease”, are linked by the keywords, 
“result from” and “cause”, respectively.   
 “The MSIV closure resulted from reactor water level decrease.” 
 “The reactor water level decrease caused the MSIV closure.” 
The keyword, “result from”, provides a REVERSE LINK and the other keyword, “cause”, 
provides a link called REGULAR LINK, that means the relation from the main clause (or 
subject) to the subordinate one (or object).  Hence, the above two sentences are converted 
to the following causal relationship. 
 “reactor water level decrease”  “MSIV closure” 
ii) Sequence analysis 
Although the keyword analysis deduces the sequential or causal relationship between 
phrase(s) and clause(s) in one sentence, the sequence analysis determines the sequential 
relationship among two or more sentences according to their appearance order.  Only the 
sentences written in the past or perfect tense are selected as those to be analyzed.  If the 
keyword is included in the sentence, the relationships between the sentence and the others 
in anteroposterior positions are defined in consideration of the relationship deduced by the 
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keyword, as shown below. 
- In the case that the sentence include the keyword with REVERSE LINK: 
anterior sentence  subordinate clause  main clause  posterior sentence  
- In the case that the sentence include the keyword with REGULAR LINK: 
anterior sentence  main clause  subordinate clause  posterior sentence 
Also, this analysis specifies their respective changes/variations of the identical systems, 
components or parameters according to the appearance order of sentences if the sentence(s) 
and/or clause(s) meet the following conditions. 
Condition 1: the respective main nouns of the subjects represent a component, 
system or parameter, 
Condition 2: the subjects have the correspondence or anaphoric relations, and 
Condition 3: the predicates are written in the past tense. 
For example, the subjects, “safety relief vale” and “SRV”, of two sentences shown below 
are determined to be the same by the correspondence analysis and their respective 
predicates, “opened” and “closed”, are regarded occurrences.  Thus, by linking these two 
sentences, it is recognized that the safety relief valve changed from the closed position to 
the open position and then, from the open position to the closed position. 
 “The safety relief valve opened.” 
 “The SRV closed successfully.” 
The results from the syntagmatic analysis are delineated in the form of event network as 
shown in Figure II.14.  In this figure, the occurrence expression is denoted in a box of 
the dotted lines.  For instance, the denotation, <<<#TRIP-N0000>>>, is a noun-phrase 
representing the occurrence and the actual expression, “THE TRIP”, is indicated in the 
field of “DESCRIPTION”.  The denotation, <<<#DECREASE0000>>>, is a sentence or 
clause representing the occurrence and its subject, predicate and prepositional phrase are 
indicated in the field of “SUBJECT”, “VERB”, and “PREP”, respectively.  The 
relationship between occurrences is denoted as a broken arrow (--->) and the reason of 
each relation is provided in the field of “FOLLOWED-BY”.  For example, “AFTER” or 
“WHEN” is the sequential or causal relation defined by keyword analysis, “SEQUENCE” 
is the temporal changes/variations of the identical items by sequence analysis and 
“CONTEXT” is the sequential relation by the appearance order.  In addition, the identical 
systems, components or parameters are given in the field of “COR-LINK” (by 
correspondence analysis) or “REF-LINK” (by anaphoric analysis).  In the Figure II.14, the 
denotations, <<<LEVEL0001>>>, <<<LEVEL0002>>> and <<<LEVEL0003>>, are 
defined as the identical parameter, “REACTOR WATER LEVEL”.  As well, it is 
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recognized that two occurrences, “the reactor trip” and “HPCI had started”, are identical 
with the occurrences previously identified by “the reactor tripped” and “HPCI started 
automatically”, respectively. 
DESCRPTION : (THE TRIP)
FOLLOWED-BY : AFTER
<<< #TRIP-N0000 >>>
(#DECREASE0000)
VERB : (DECREASED)
SUBJECT : #LEVEL0001
PREP : (TO #SETPOINT0000)
FOLLOWED-BY : SEQUENCE
<<< #DECREASE0000 >>> (#TRIP-N0000)
<<< #LEVEL0001 >>> : (REACTOR WATER LEVEL)
<<< #SETPOINT0000 >>>  : (THE LOW LEVEL SETPOINT)
(#CONTINUE0000)
VERB : (CONTINUED to DECREASE)
SUBJECT : #LEVEL0002
FOLLOWED-BY : SEQUENCE
<<< #LEVEL0002 >>> : (REACTOR WATER LEVEL)
COR-LINK       : #LEVEL0001
(#DECREASE0002)
<<< # CONTINUE0000 >>> (#DECREASE0000)
VERB : (DECREASED)
SUBJECT : #LEVEL0003
PREP : (TO #INCH0001)
FOLLOWED-BY : WHEN
<<< #DECREASE0002 >>> (#CONTINUE0000)
<<< #LEVEL0001 >>> : (REACTOR WATER LEVEL)
COR-LINK       : #LEVEL0001
<<< #INCH0001 >>>  : (-30 INCHES)
(#CLOSE0000)
VERB : (CLOSED)
SUBJECT : #VALVE0000
FOLLOWED-BY : CONTEXT
<<< #VALVE0000 >>> : (THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES)
ABRIDGMENT     : MSIV
(#START0000)
<<< # CLOSE0000 >>> (#DECREASE0002)
 
Figure II.14  Example of Event Network  
 
3. Application 
Using CESAS, several event descriptions were analyzed and the results were compared 
with the manually-extracted event sequences in terms of (i) occurrences extracted, (ii) the 
identical occurrences, systems/components or parameters, and (iii) the sequential and 
causal relationships between occurrences. 
Because it is difficult to prepare general rules needed for syntactically analyzing various 
styles of sentences, the styles which can be analyzed with CESAS are limited to the 
followings:  
- simple sentence which corresponds to either of the five sentence patterns, 
- compound sentence which consists of two or three simple sentences, and 
- complex sentence which includes one embedded sentence such as that-clause.  
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Before analyzing event descriptions with CESAS, manual preparatory modifications of 
some sentences are needed so that CESAS can syntactically analyze them.  For example, 
the event description was modified as shown in Figure II.15, where the modified 
sentences are provided with an asterisk.  In this example, a participial construction has to 
be modified by supplementing a subject, and a complex sentence has to be broken up into 
analyzable sentence styles shown above.  In addition, what a pronoun such as “this” or 
“them” refers to should be preliminarily defined in order to precisely recognize the 
identical occurrences or items.  Levels of manual preparations required are grouped into 
the followings; 
- Level 0: no modification (that is, the original sentence). 
- Level 1: routine modifications in syntax such as breakup of the sentence and 
nominalization of the gerund. 
- Level 2: partial changes in semantics such as supplementation of the subject for a 
participial construction and clarification of the pronoun, and 
- Level 3: sweeping changes of the sentence into an analyzable style. 
 
Figure II.15  Example of Event Description 
Table II.7 summarizes the number of modified sentences level by level.  By making the 
level 1 modification, the number of sentences which CESAS can analyze turned into 
70-80% of the total number of sentences in each description. 
While operating at 100% steady state power, a spurious reactor high pressure signal resulted in a reactor scram. 
*  While the unit was operating at 100% steady state power, ……... 
Reactor pressure was at 1005 psig and the high pressure trip setpoint was at 1035 psig. 
The variation in pressure with time is shown in Figure 1. 
The licensee speculated that workmen cleaning the floor near the pressure sensing instrumentation may have 
bumped the racks, causing the high pressure signal. 
*  The licensee speculated that ‘workmen who were cleaning the floor near the pressure sensing instrumentation 
may have bumped the racks.   The licensee speculated that ‘the bump caused the high pressure signal.’ 
The A and B reactor protection system channels are located on separate panels, but are physically close to each 
other. 
*  The A and B ………., but the A and B are physically close to each other. 
Reactor water level decreased to the low level setpoint of 15 inches soon after the trip and continued to decrease 
since the main turbine had not yet been tripped off. 
*  Reactor water level decreased ………. the trip, and reactor water level continued to decrease since ……... 
The main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) closed automatically when reactor water level decreased to -30 inches. 
The high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) started automatically. 
The recirculation pumps tripped off automatically. 
Reactor water quickly recovered and upon reaching the high level setpoints, the HPCI and RCIC tripped off. 
*  Reactor water quickly recovered, and the HPCI and RCIC tripped off when reactor water reached the high 
level setpoints. 
Reactor pressure began increasing with MSIVs closed. 
*  Reactor began increasing with MSIVs closure. 
 
  * Modified sentence for CESAS system 
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After the above modification, event description was analyzed with CESAS.  Based on the 
analytical result given in the form of event network, the event sequence diagram shown in 
Figure II.16 was prepared to delineate the CESAS-extracted event sequence more 
comprehensively and to compare it with manually-extracted one.  In this figure, the solid 
and dotted lines denote the CESAS- and manually-extracted sequences, respectively.  
Also, the relationships marked with (a) and (b) mean those by the keyword analysis and 
those by the sequence analysis.  For example, the two occurrences, “main turbine had not 
tripped” and “reactor water level continued to decrease”, are linked as a causal 
relationship by the keyword, “since”.  The following three occurrences are recognized as 
the temporal variation of the identical parameter, “reactor water level”. 
“reactor water level decreased to the low level setpoint” 
“reactor water level continued to decrease” 
“reactor water level decreased to -30 inches” 
Table II.7  Number of Modified Sentences 
Reference of Reports 
Modification Levels 
Total 
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Information Notice IN 85-50 21 10 5 0 36 
Information Notice IN 86-47 24 9 11 0 44 
NUREG-0909 (Executive Summary) 39 10 17 1 67 
LER 86-028 28 9 9 1 47 
Nuclear News, Sep. 1986 (P.24) 17 6 20 3 46 
Nuclear News, March 1985 (P.80) 13 12 11 0 36 
Nuclear News, May 1985 (P.70) 22 10 6 3 41 
IAEA/NEA-IRS 236 12 4 2 0 18 
IAEA/NEA-IRS 745-02 34 8 7 1 50 
IAEA/NEA-IRS 375 15 11 9 0 35 
IAEA/NEA-IRS 327 15 4 2 0 21 
NUREG/BR-0051 Vol.9, No.5 (P.4) 27 12 9 2 50 
 
By diagraming the narrative event description as shown in Figure II.16, the occurrences 
and their relationships can be more easily understood as follows; 
(i) the workmen cleaning the floor bumped the racks  a spurious reactor high pressure 
signal  reactor scram  
(ii) reactor scram  reactor water level decreased to low level setpoint  reactor water 
level continued to decrease  reactor water level decreased to -30 inches  HPCI 
and RCIC operation  reactor water level recovered  reactor water level reached 
to high level setpoint  HPCI and RCIC tripped 
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Comparing the analytical results with manually-extracted event sequences, the occurrences 
identified by CESAS are in good agreement with those obtained by manual work.  
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relationships recognized.  Although the two noun-phrases, “reactor water level” and 
“reactor water”, are identical in actual, the CESAS defines them similar parameters 
instead of the identical one because they have the same row of words but their respective 
main nouns are different from each other (“level” versus “water”).  Strictly speaking, 
however, the original description has an ambiguity on this matter, which results in such a 
difference.  As well, observed are the differences in the relationships as follows: that 
between the two occurrences, “reactor pressure began increasing” and “MSIVs closed”; 
that between the occurrence, “HPCI and RCIC started”, and its direct cause; and that 
between the occurrence, “reactor water recovered” and its direct cause.  The first 
difference is due to the difficulty in understanding accurately semantics of preposition, 
“with”.  The second and third differences stem from the lack of knowledge on nuclear 
power plant systems, that is, expertise.  Although, in other words, a human analyst can 
recognize that the occurrence, “HPCI and RCIC started”, was due to “reactor water level 
decrease”, and the occurrence, “reactor water recovered”, was a result of “HPCI and 
RCIC started” if he/she is familiar with nuclear power plant systems, the CESAS defines 
the relationships between them according to the appearance order of sentences because of 
these relations being not explicitly described.   
The comparative studies on several event descriptions are summarized in Table II.8.  
Depending on the individual event descriptions, the occurrences recognized by CESAS and 
manual work are in agreement 90% or more and for the identical items, the two results 
match to the extent of approximately 80%.  The CESAS-extracted event sequences are 
consistent with the manually-extracted ones about 80%.  The differences observed can be 
summarized as follows. 
Table II.8  Comparison of CESAS and Manually-Extracted Event Sequences 
Reference of Reports 
Comparison Results (Degree of Agreement) 
Occurrence 
Extraction 
Recognition of 
Identical Item  
Identification of 
Relationship 
Information Notice IN 85-50 90% ~ 70% ~ 80% 70% ~ 80% 
Information Notice IN 86-47 90% ~ 80% ~ 90% 80% ~ 90% 
NUREG-0909 (Executive Summary) ~ 90%  80% ~ 90% 80% ~ 90% 
LER 86-028 ~ 90%  70% ~ 80% 80% ~ 90% 
Nuclear News, Sep. 1986 (P.24) ~ 90%  80% ~ 90% 70% ~ 80% 
Nuclear News, March 1985 (P.80) ~ 90%  80% ~ 90% 70% ~ 80% 
Nuclear News, May 1985 (P.70) ~ 80%  70% ~ 80% 60% ~ 70% 
IAEA/NEA-IRS 236 90% ~ 90% ~ 80% ~ 90% 
IAEA/NEA-IRS 745-02 ~ 90%  80% ~ 90% 70% ~ 80% 
IAEA/NEA-IRS 375 ~ 90%  80% ~ 90% 80% ~ 90% 
IAEA/NEA-IRS 327 ~ 90%  80% ~ 90% 80% ~ 90% 
NUREG/BR-0051 Vol.9, No.5 (P.4) ~ 90%  80% ~ 90% 80% ~ 90% 
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- CESAS cannot recognize the occurrence expression with an adjective in the case that it 
represents an anomaly such as “high flux” and “an unavailable pump”.  In such cases, 
the noun-phrases are regarded as a parameter and component, respectively, according 
to the semantic model. 
- As for recognition of the identical occurrences, there are two major differences: one is 
due to the identification of occurrences repeated by several sentences in the past tense 
and the other is the interpretation of synonymous expressions.  For the former case, 
CESAS recognizes two sentences as independent occurrences because both of them are 
written in the past tense despite the identical occurrence.  The latter case stems from 
failure to identify the actual relationship between two or more synonymous phrases.  
Since the actual meaning of a noun-phrase such as "the actuation” or "the operation” 
depends on the context, for example, a noun-phrase, “the actuation”, may refer to 
"valve closure" in some cases and "pump start” in other cases.  As well, CESAS 
cannot define the correspondence relations between a single word and a noun-phrase, 
both of which are synonymous, such as “depressurization” and “pressure decrease”, 
and anaphoric relations between two noun-phrases where the past participle of verb is 
used as a premodifier and postmodifier such as “the failed valve” and “the valve 
failed”. 
- The inconsistencies in sequential and causal relationships are attributed to the lack of 
expertise and the differences in recognition of the identical occurrences as described 
above.  In addition, CESAS cannot identify the correct sequential or causal relations if 
a preposition conditionally plays a role of causal keyword or if there are ambiguous 
expressions stemming from syntactic or semantic vagueness in the description.  For 
example, the preposition, “on”, actually represents the causal relationship between the 
two occurrences, “reactor trip” and “high flux”, in the sentence, “the reactivity 
addition resulted in a reactor trip on high flux”, but these relationships cannot be 
defined by CESAS because it is very difficult to model semantics of such preposition.  
Also, the relation defined by a conjunction may be incorrectly recognized in the case 
that what the subordinate clause syntactically qualifies is inconsistent with the 
semantics as seen from the sentence as follows; "the plant was operating at 100% 
power with one main feedwater pump in manual control because problems in 
automatic had been experienced”.  This sentence includes three occurrence 
expressions underlined.  The conjunction, “because”, actually denotes a causal 
relationship between the two occurrences, "one main feedwater pump in manual 
control” and “problems had been experienced”.  In the syntactical point of view, 
however, the subordinate clause usually qualifies the main clause.  Therefore, CESAS 
recognizes that the occurrence, “problems had been experienced", causally relates to 
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the occurrence, “the plant was operating”.  Since syntactically vague statements and 
ambiguous meanings, as mentioned above, cannot be precisely analyzed, some 
modifications of sentences are needed in such cases.   
- Furthermore, it is assumed in the CESAS analysis that sentences are chronologically 
ordered in the event description.  This assumption may produce the differences from 
the actual relationship between occurrences. 
Through the analyses of event reports with CESAS, the suitable styles of event description 
for CESAS were examined.  Event descriptions written in the following styles can be 
easily and automatically analyzed with CESAS to extract event sequences. 
- The event description is written in a plain style without use of syntactically and 
semantically complicated expressions. 
- Each sentence is described without using any pronoun so that it could clearly represent 
occurrences or relations between occurrences, and 
- Sentences in the event description are chronologically arranged for plainly representing 
the sequential relations between occurrences. 
 
4. Summary 
For the purpose of efficient utilization of event information, a new computer software 
package, CESAS, was developed.  CESAS is to extract systematically the event sequence, 
which is sequential and causal relationship between occurrences, from the event 
description written in natural language of English.  This system is based on knowledge 
engineering technique utilized in the field of natural language treatment.  The analytical 
process in this system consists of following three steps: (i) to analyze each sentence 
syntactically and semantically, (ii) to identify sentences, clauses or phrases representing 
occurrences, (iii) to deduce the mutual relationship between occurrences.  An existing 
syntactic analysis approach was applied to the above the step (i).  As for the steps (ii) and 
(iii), a new analytical approach was developed.  
Main features of CESAS are summarized as follows:  
- Occurrences are systematically extracted from the event description through syntactic 
and semantic analyses.  
- The sequential and causal relationships between occurrences are systematically 
abstracted according to the expressions in the description.  
- Preparing event sequence diagram based on the analytical result makes it easier to 
understand plant system responses and operators’ actions during the event and to 
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identify the causes of occurrences.  
As well, comparative studies showed that CESAS-extracted event sequences generally 
agreed with manually-extracted ones but identified several difficulties as follows:  
- Extraction of occurrence expressions with an adjective such as "high pressure" and 
"low level".  
- Recognition of the identical occurrence which is repeatedly represented by several 
sentences in the past tense  
- Identification of the relation defined by a preposition such as "on" and "with" which 
conditionally plays a role of the sequential or causal keyword.  Additionally, CESAS 
requires manual modification of sentences to eliminate syntactic and semantic 
vagueness. 
Through the comparative studies, the effectiveness and feasibility of CESAS were 
demonstrated despite some technical difficulties to be overcome and the technological 
perspectives were obtained on establishing computer aid tool for analyzing event 
information. 
 
II.2.2 Development of Web-Based Database for 
Japanese Translation of INES Reports 
The International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) is a means designed for providing prompt, 
clear and consistent information related to nuclear or radiological events and facilitating 
communication between the nuclear community, the media and the public.  Aiming at 
achieving the main objectives of INES and utilizing more efficiently the event reports, the 
individual reports written in English have been promptly translated into Japanese and the 
Japanese translation versions have been accumulated and published through a world wide 
web (WWW) based database
(1)
.  This section briefly describes the information stored in 
the database and discusses technical use of the INES reports and the 
availability/effectiveness of the database. 
 
1. Information Stored in Database 
Until 2001, individual events are reported the INES in the form shown in Figure II.17.  
Although the form was changed in the end of 2001, the contents were basically the same as 
those in the previous form.  Therefore, the database was designed to store all the 
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information, except for “contact person”, provided in the previous form.  Specifically, the 
following items are stored in the database. 
 
・ THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENT SCALE (INES) 
EVENT RATING FORM (ERF) 
To be sent to INES coordinator, IAEA, WAGRAMERSTRASSE 5, P.O. BOX 100, A-1400 VIENNA, AUSTRIA 
FAX:             , E-MAIL:           , PHONE 
EVENT 
TITLE 
 EVENT DATE 
 
RATING 
 
RATING 
DATE 
OUT OF 
SCALE 
BELOW 
SCALE 
 ON SCALE SAFETY ATTRIBUTE 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Degr. Defence in Depth  
Provisional 
Final 
□ 
□ 
           On-site Impact  
Off-site Impact  
COUNTRY  FACILITY 
NAME 
 FACILITY 
TYPE 
 
ASPECT OF SIGNIFICANCE TO THE PUBLIC YES NO 
ACCIDENT □ INCIDENT □ DEVIATION □  
RADIOACTIVE RELEASE OFF-SITE □ □ 
RADIOACTIVE RELEASE ON-SITE □ □ 
WORKERS INJURED BY RADIATION □ □ 
WORKERS INJURED PHYSICALLY □ □ 
PLANT SAFETY IS UNDER CONTROL □ □ 
THE EVENT REPORTED IS DISCOVERY OF A DEFICIENCY 
BY ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE 
□ □ 
A PRESS RELEASE WAS MADE (IF YES, PLEASE ATTACH IT) □ □ 
SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUSTIFICATION OF THE RATING: 
 
 
 
 
CONTACT PERSON FOR 
FURTHER INFORMATION 
NAME  
ADDRESS  
PHONE  
FAX  
Please attach additional information on justification of the event rating and difficulties encountered, if needed. 
Figure II.17  Event Rating Form of INES 
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・ Event title 
・ Event date 
・ Rating type: provisional or final 
・ Rating date 
・ Rating scale: out of scale, below scale, on scale 1-7 
・ Safety attributes: degradation of defense in depth, onsite impact, offsite impact 
・ Country: the place where the event occurred 
・ Facility name: the facility where the event occurred 
・ Facility type: nuclear power plant (PWR, BWR, PHWR, GCR, etc.), research/test 
reactor, radwaste facility, irradiation facility, fuel fabrication facility, reprocessing 
facility, enrichment facility, mining/milling facility, research/experimental facility, 
transportation, radiation source  
・ Type of events: accident, incident, or deviation (below scale) 
・ Aspects of significance to the public: offsite radioactive releases, onsite radioactive 
releases, workers injured by radiation, workers injured physically, plant safety is under 
control, discovery of a deficiency by routine surveillance, a press release  
・ Short description of the event 
All the information above mentioned is retrievable in the database and the results are 
displayed in Japanese, including event title, country, facility name and type, event date, 
rating scale, rating criterion, and short description.   
 
2. Availability/Effectiveness of Database 
It is not appropriate to use the INES to compare safety performance between facilities, 
organizations or countries and the statistically small number of events at Level 2 and above, 
which also varies from year to year, makes it difficult to put forth meaningful international 
comparisons, according to the INES manual.  However, the INES is an international 
reporting system of events with safety significance or public concerns and places emphasis 
on the promptness of reporting.  Thus, it is useful for nuclear community to promptly 
grasp what type of event occurred.  The events reported can be categorized into those 
with safety concerns, those involving offsite radioactive release or those involving the 
overexposures and as well, overall trends in events reported can be examined as shown in 
Section II.1.  The database is an effective tool for doing such analyses.  Examples of 
such analyses are discussed below. 
Example 1: Categorization of Events by Level: The INES reports stored in the database 
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can be easily classified by specifying a scale as a search condition.  The search results can 
indicate the number of INES reports with Level 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 or 7, separately, leading to 
easy identification of events with safety concerns. 
Example 2: Categorization of Events by Rating Criteria: Using the safety attributes in the 
database, the reports can be categorized into 3 groups of events rated by degradation of 
defense in depth, onsite impact and offsite impact.  Such categorization is useful to 
identify the events involving actual or potential environmental impact, those with plant 
contaminated and those involving the safety system failures. 
Example 3: Categorization of Events by Aspects of Significance: By searching the 
database with use of the aspects of significance, the events can be grouped into those 
involving offsite radioactive releases, onsite radioactive releases, worker injured by 
radiation, and worker injured physically.  Such categorization is useful for identifying the 
events with actual or potential radioactive consequences. 
Example 4: Identification of Events by Keywords: Search by a keyword discriminates the 
specific events such as fire events, fatal accidents and events related to safety culture 
problems.  Although some events identified are not relevant, generally good results are 
obtained and thus, this search is helpful in identifying the specific events.  
 
3. Summary 
The INES is a means of promptly communicating nuclear or radiological events to the 
media and the public.  Aiming at more efficient utilization of the INES information, 
which is originally written in English, inside Japan, the author has translated the individual 
INES reports into Japanese, and developed the web-based database.  The database, which 
contains all of the INES reports translated into Japanese, is an effective tool for the media 
and public to grasp what type of event occurred in the world and as well, for the nuclear 
community to examine the overall trending of events by categorizing the reported events.  
In addition, the database may provide the information useful for identifying the event 
group to be analyzed in detail.    
 
II.3 Concluding Remarks 
The generic study analyzed approximately 500 event reports submitted to the INES during 
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the period 1990 to 2000 focusing on overall trends and characteristics of events rated at 
Level 2 or higher.  The results show that while the number of events reported to the INES 
indicates the decreasing trend, the number of events rated at Level 2 or higher has been 
10-20 events per year throughout the period.  Also, approximately 60 events were uprated 
due to additional factors such as common cause failure(s) or lack of safety culture, which 
included violations of operating/maintenance procedures or LCOs.  The characteristics of 
events observed are summarized as follows: two events rated at Level 4 involved fatalities 
due to overexposure to radiation and about half of 15 events at Level 3 were associated 
with overexposure resulting from lost sources or radiation devices in non-nuclear facilities; 
5 events rated on the “offsite consequence” criterion resulted in the deaths and/or physical 
damages of worker(s) or public member(s), the events on the “onsite consequence” 
criterion were dominated by overexposure and/or contamination events in fuel processing, 
experimental or non-nuclear facilities, and most of the events at NPPs were rated on the 
“defense-in-depth” criterion; the events at NPPs have different characteristics depending 
on the reactor types but the degraded functions of ECCS and electric power systems were 
common issues to all types of reactors.   
The comprehensive reviews covered more than 2000 IRS reports during the period 1988 
through 2012 and identified approximately 200 safety significant events.  These events 
can be roughly categorized into three groups of events: recurring events, events associated 
with external hazards and the events related to new phenomena or unexpected aggravating 
conditions.  Recurring events indicate that the previous corrective actions have not 
necessarily been effective to prevent the recurrences and thus, the event analysis should 
place more emphasis on why the actions taken after the first event have failed to prevent 
the recurrences.  As for the external hazards, more attention should be paid for ones 
beyond the design basis assumptions based on the previous events.  The new phenomena 
or unexpected aggravating conditions have a potential to threaten the plant safety but it 
seems difficult to detect them prior to their appearances.   
The generic studies including comprehensive reviews have provided the events with safety 
implications, which (might) have affected the facility, environment and public health and 
thus, should be further examined and discussed.  The results from these studies have been 
disseminated into the nuclear community so that the event information could have been 
shared and utilized more efficiently and effectively to improve the facility safety.  
Through these studies, the fundamental framework for the operating experience feedback 
process was established.  As well, these studies have provided inputs to the topical studies.  
The generic studies demonstrate described here that the systematic and comprehensive 
reviews are essential to identify and characterize the safety significant events and to share 
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the lessons learned from the individual events. 
For the purpose of efficient utilization of event information, a new computer software 
package, CESAS, was developed.  CESAS is to extract systematically the event sequence 
from the event description written in natural language of English.  This system is based 
on knowledge engineering technique utilized in the field of natural language treatment.  
The analytical process in this system consists of three steps: (i) to analyze each sentence 
syntactically and semantically, (ii) to identify sentences, clauses or phrases representing 
occurrences, (iii) to deduce the mutual relationship between occurrences.  Through the 
comparative studies, it was shown that CESAS-extracted event sequences generally agreed 
with manually-extracted ones, demonstrating the effectiveness and feasibility of CESAS, 
and the technological perspectives were obtained on establishing computer aid event 
analysis. 
The web-based database, which contains the INES reports translated into Japanese, was 
developed to provide an effective tool for the media and public as well as for the nuclear 
community.  The database may also provide the information useful for identifying the 
event group to be analyzed in detail.    
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Chapter III 
Topical Studies on Safety 
Significant Events 
 
III.1 Background 
Several topical studies were performed on safety significant events to examine the 
characteristics of events and to obtain the generic insights common to those events and/or 
the generic lessons which could be useful for improving safety regulations and enhancing 
the facility safety.  In these studies, topics to be analyzed were selected primarily based 
on the results from the generic studies/comprehensive reviews described in the previous 
chapter.  Selection of topics focused on the events with generic safety implications, such 
as similar events in several countries, and the events with the public/media interest.  
However, the IRS reports are restricted and thus, these studies have collected the event 
information on individual topics mainly from the United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission’s (USNRC) publications so that the results from the studies could be shared 
throughout the nuclear community more widely and utilized more effectively and 
efficiently. 
So far, the following topical studies have been carried out: 
- Loss of decay heat removal (DHR) during reactor shutdown at pressurized water 
reactors (PWRs)
(1-3)
: Many events had taken place in 1980s, particularly at PWRs in 
the United States.  Since 1990, similar events had been reported from several 
countries.  This topical study reviewed a total of 63 events during reactor shutdown 
with reactor cooling system (RCS) inventory reduced to identify the causes which 
could prolong the duration of DHR loss and evaluated the times to bulk boiling in the 
core and to core uncovery after losing DHR.  It was revealed that the prolonged loss 
of DHR was caused by mainly air entrainment into the pumps and the major 
contributor of air entrainment was the lowering the RCS water level too far, most of 
which resulted from inaccurate level indication.  The bulk boiling and core uncovery 
were estimated to take place within 1 h and several hours, respectively. 
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- Emergency core cooling system (ECCS) strainer clogging at boiling water 
reactors (BWRs)
(4)
: In 1992, the Swedish BWR experienced the ECCS strainer 
clogging due to the insulation material dislodged by steam from a safety/relief valve 
that spuriously opened.  After this event, similar or potential events occurred at 
BWRs, especially in the United States and therefore, the ECCS strainer clogging was 
recognized a safety significant issue worldwide.  The review of such events indicated 
that the strainer clogging would be caused by debris generated by LOCA such as 
insulation debris, those generated during normal operation such as corrosion products, 
those stemming from fibrous filters and labeling materials installed in the containment, 
those stemming from maintenance-type materials such as tools and plastic bags, etc.  
- Criticality accidents in fuel processing facilities(5,6): The JCO accident occurred in 
1999 and just before this accident, the previous criticality accidents were made public 
from the Russian Federation.  This topical study examined the overall trends 
observed in 21 criticality accidents, which had taken place in foreign countries, and 
analyzed the sequences and causes of the accidents in terms of similarities to the JCO 
accident.  The most of them took place when handling uranium or plutonium 
solutions in the vessels with unfavorable geometry.  The common issues identified 
were the problems related to the operating procedures.  
- Primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) at PWRs(7-9): The operating 
experience with Alloy 600 degradation in the United States was analyzed by reviewing 
a total of 45 licensee event reports (LERs) from 1999 to 2005 and the trends of these 
events were examined focusing on affected components, characteristics of cracking 
and inspection approaches for detecting PWSCC.  It was found that PWSCC was 
observed on the reactor coolant pressure boundary components exposed to the 
environment with high temperature such as the reactor vessel head penetration nozzles 
and pressurizer heater sleeves, and has a tendency to happen for specific manufactures 
and materials.  As well, it was shown that different repair techniques were applied 
depending on the components affected. 
- Safety or safety/relief valve setpoint drift(10, 11): This topical study analyzed the 
operating experience with setpoint drift in safety/relief valves (SRVs) at BWRs, 
pressurizer safety valves (PSVs), and main steam safety valves (MSSVs) at PWRs in 
the United States by reviewing approximately 90 LERs during the years from 2000 to 
2006 and examined the trend focusing on causes and drift ranges.  It was shown that 
for SRVs and MSSVs, valve disc-seat bonding was a dominant cause of the setpoint 
drift high and has a tendency to result in a relatively large deviation of the setpoint.  
For PSVs, the deviation of setpoints was generally small though its causes were not 
specified in many instances. 
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- Fire events(12): This topical study provided the results from analysis of the experience 
with fire at light water reactors (LWRs) in the United States and analyzed several 
major fire events in foreign countries focusing on turbine fires and cable fires.  This 
study showed that many fires took place in the turbine building and some of them 
involved turbine missile, hydrogen explosion and/or massive internal flooding, leading 
to the complicated events.  The cable fires have a tendency of spreading to multiple 
areas.  In some fire events, the main control room suffered from ingress of smoke 
and/or toxic gases.  These fire events highlighted the need to take adequate measures 
such as physical separation and use of flame-retardant materials for preventing the fire 
spread and mitigating their consequences.    
In the following, the topical studies on loss of decay heat removal, criticality accidents, 
and safety or safety/relief valve setpoint drift are described in detail. 
 
III.2 Analysis of Loss of Decay Heat Removal 
during Reactor Shutdown at PWRs 
The safety function of the DHR system, which is also referred to as residual heat removal 
(RHR) system or shutdown cooling (SDC) system, is to remove fission product decay 
heat from the reactor core so that the reactor can be maintained in a safe shutdown 
condition.  An extended loss of DHR could lead to core uncovery and resultant fuel 
damage.  
No serious damage has resulted from the total loss of DHR system.  Nevertheless, a 
large number of events involving loss of DHR during the reactor shutdown condition 
which occurred so far have increased safety concerns for past years.  In the United 
States, numerous studies have been performed on this subject.  For example,  
- In 1983, the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC) reviewed loss of DHR events 
during the years 1976 through 1981 and made recommendations to improve the DHR 
system reliability and reactor safety during shutdown
(13)
 . 
- In 1985, the Office of USNRC, Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD), 
analyzed loss of DHR events which occurred during the years 1976 through 1984 and 
recommended remedial actions
(14)
.  
Besides these studies, the USNRC and industry have issued numerous publications on 
loss of DHR events including recommendations for improving the situation
(15-19)
.  
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Though the licensees have been implementing recommendations made by the USNRC 
and industry, the continued occurrence of loss of DHR events has been experienced at 
U.S. PWRs and some events with RCS partially drained resulted in boiling in the core.  
At PWRs, RCS must be drained down to the mid-height of the hot leg piping during 
shutdown to allow maintenance and inspection activities on steam generators (SGs) and 
reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal and the DHR systems need to be operated for core 
cooling under such a reduced inventory condition, which is referred to as “mid-loop 
operation''.   
Loss of DHR in such a reduced inventory condition would lead to core boiling within a 
short time.  Should core boiling occur and any recovery actions be not taken, coolant 
boiloff and the subsequent RCS pressurization would lead to coolant inventory loss via 
unisolated paths and/or would not allow water flow from the refueling water storage tank 
(RWST) into RCS by gravity feed, and consequently the core would be uncovered.  
However, loss of DHR events with the RCS inventory reduced, especially in the early 
stage of shutdown, afford little time to correct the problem and restore DHR flow before 
boiling conditions are reached.  In addition, during shutdown operations, the operators 
are not necessarily provided with well thought out procedures for recovery from loss of 
DHR and may not be fully aware of equipment and/or time available for recovery.  
On the other hand, several studies on probabilistic risk/safety assessment showed that the 
core damage frequency for shutdown condition was estimated at the range of 5×10
-6
 - 
5×10
-5
 per reactor year, which was comparable to that for power operation
(20-22)
.  These 
studies also noted that a loss of DHR event during reduced inventory conditions was one 
of major contributors to the shutdown risks. 
In order to analyze the safety implications associated with total loss of DHR systems and 
provide information useful for improving the plant safety during shutdown operations, 
especially for preventing recurrence of such events, this topical study reviewed U.S. 
PWR operating experience involving total loss of DHR systems which occurred during 
the years 1976 through 1990 and analyzed direct and root causes leading to loss of DHR 
events.  A total of 197 1oss of DHR events were reported to have occurred at U.S. 
PWRs during this period, which was equivalent to a rate of several per year.  Out of 
these events, 63 loss of DHR events occurred when the RCS inventory was reduced and 
five events experienced boiling in the core.  Highlighting loss of DHR events during 
reduced inventory conditions, their trends and characteristics were identified for these 63 
events to clarify the major causes which could prolong the duration of the DHR loss.  In 
addition, the RCS water heatup rate during the DHR loss and times to bulk boiling in the 
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core and core uncovery after losing DHR were evaluated based on the data obtained from 
the actual events to examine time available for recovery of loss of DHR events.  
 
1. Outlines of Loss of Decay Heat Removal Events 
As shown in Figure III.1, a typical DHR system at PWRs is composed of two redundant 
trains
(14)
.  Generally, both trains take suction from the same RCS hot leg and the 
connecting piping is a “drop" line attached to either the bottom or a lower quadrant of the 
RCS hot leg.  The single suction design makes the DHR system susceptible to total loss 
of the DHR function due to a single failure of a suction line valve.  During reduced 
inventory conditions as illustrated in Figure III.2, lowering the RCS water level too far 
or increasing the DHR flow can cause vortexing in the hot leg at the nozzle of the suction 
drop line, air entrainment in the water flowing to the operating DHR pump, and 
subsequent air binding of the pump.  If the standby DHR pump is started in such cases, 
it will also become air bound, resulting in loss of DHR system.  Once air is entrained in 
the DHR system, it takes a long time for the trapped air to migrate back to RCS or to be 
vented from the DHR pumps because of long horizontal piping from RCS to the DHR 
pumps.  If any recovery actions of DHR flow would be prolonged, bulk boiling would 
occur in the core and the subsequent RCS pressurization would lead to coolant inventory 
loss and/or would not allow water addition by gravity feed, resulting in core uncovery. 
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Figure III.1  Schematic Diagram of DHR Systems at U. S. PWRs(14) 
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Figure III.2  Reduced Inventory Condition 
 
In this study, a loss of DHR event was defined as an event in which both trains of the 
DHR system were unable to perform their functions while operating or when required.  
Loss of DHR events reviewed in this study came from operating experience at U.S. 
PWRs from 1976 through 1990 (up to the first quarter of 1990).  The data sources 
referred were the following three groups:  
- Loss of DHR events from 1976 through 1981 were obtained from NSAC report, 
NSAC-52
(13)
, which contained 96 events. 
- Loss of DHR events from 1982 through 1984 were obtained from USNRC/AEOD 
report, AEOD-C503
(14)
,which contained approximately 140 events including about 90 
events identified in NSAC-52.  
- Operating experience for the last five years from 1985 to the first quarter of 1990 was 
obtained from LERs and USNRC reports. 
As a result, 197 1oss of DHR events were identified in this study.  This figure is 
equivalent to a frequency of 0.23 per reactor year, based on about 850 reactor years of 
commercial U.S. PWR operation.  About one-third (63 events) of 197 loss of DHR 
events occurred during reduced inventory conditions.  For these 63 events, Table III.1 
summarizes duration of a DHR loss, coolant heatup during an event, and event category 
which will be discussed in the following subsection. 
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Table III.1  Summary of 63 Loss of DHR Events during Reduced Inventory Conditions 
No Plant Date 
Duration 
(min) 
Heatup 
(°C, °F) 
Event Category and Causes Reference 
1 Trojan 05/21/1977 55 Unknown A1: Inaccurate level indication (Calibration error) NSAC-52 
2 Palisades 01/06/1978 45 47.2(85) B2: Isolation of RHR HX outlet valve (Controller failure) NSAC-52 
3 Trojan 03/25/1978 10 Unknown A1: Inaccurate level indication (RCS higher pressure) NSAC-52 
4 Trojan 03/25/1978 10 Unknown A1: Inaccurate level indication (RCS higher pressure) NSAC-52 
5 Trojan 04/17/1978 Unknown Unknown A1: Inaccurate level indication (Incompletely filled ref. leg) NSAC-52 
6 Trojan 04/25/1978 1 Unknown B3: Reducing RHR flow (Loss of coolant, drain valve opening) NSAC-52 
7 Beaver valley-1 09/04/1978 60 16.7(30) A4: not known NSAC-52 
8 St. Lucie-1 11/03/1978 222 Unknown A2: Misalignment of RHR discharge valves (Personnel error) NSAC-52 
9 Millstone-2 03/14/1979 Unknown 32.2(58) A1: Inaccurate level indication (not known) NSAC-52 
10 Salem-1 06/30/1979 34 Unknown A1: Inadequate level monitoring (Procedural/personnel error) NSAC-52 
11 Beaver valley-1 01/17/1980 Unknown Unknown A4: Inadvertent actuation vessel vent eductor system NSAC-52 
12 Beaver valley-1 04/08/1980 35 Unknown A3: Increasing RHR pump flow (Procedural error) NSAC-52 
13 Beaver valley-1 04/11/1980 70 3.9(7) A3: Increasing RHR HX flow (Procedural error) NSAC-52 
14 Davis Besse-1 04/18/1980 29 5.6(10) A2: Partially opening of RHR discharge valve (Personnel error) NSAC-52 
15 Davis Besse-1 04/19/1980 150 44.4(80) A4: Inadvertent pump suction transfer (Electrical fault) NSAC-52 
16 Beaver valley-1 03/05/1981 54 38.7(66) A1: Inaccurate level indication (Evaporation in ref. leg) NSAC-52 
17 Trojan 06/26/1981 72 5.6(10) A1: Inaccurate level indication (Inadequate check of system) NSAC-52 
18 Palisades 07/18/1981 90 41.4(74) B2: Isolation of RHR HX outlet valve (Positioner failure) NSAC-52 
19 Millstone-2 12/09/1981 30 – 60 65.6(118) B1: Spurious trip signal on the running pump (personnel error) NSAC-52 
20 McGuire-1 03/02/1982 50 13.9(25) A1: Inaccurate level indication (RCS higher pressure) NUREG-1410 
21 North Anna-2 05/20/1982 8 Unknown A1: Inaccurate level indication (Installation problem) LER-82026 
22 North Anna-2 05/20/1982 26 Unknown A1: Inaccurate level indication (Installation problem) LER-82026 
23 North Anna-2 05/20/1982 60 Unknown A1: Inaccurate level indication (Installation problem) LER-82026 
24 North Anna-2 07/17/1982 Unknown Unknown A3: Actuation of standby pump (Procedural error) NUREG-1410 
25 North Anna-2 07/30/1982 46 Unknown A2: RHR pump seal leakage NUREG-1410 
26 North Anna-2 08/02/1982 Unknown Unknown B3: Reducing RHR flow (Loss of coolant, pump seal leakage) NUREG-1410 
27 North Anna-1 10/19/1982 36 Unknown A1: Inaccurate level indication (Installation problem) LER-82067 
28 North Anna-1 10/20/1982 33 Unknown A1: Inaccurate level indication (Installation problem) LER-82067 
29 McGuire-1 04/05/1983 Unknown 15.6(28) A1: Inaccurate level indication (Inadequate check of system) NUREG-1410 
30 R.E.Ginna 04/12/1983 12 8.3(15) A4: Pressurization of SG plenum and nozzle dam leakage LER-83015 
31 North Anna-2 05/03/1983 Unknown Unknown A1: Inadequate level monitoring (Personnel error) LER-83038 
32 Surry-1 05/17/1983 81 Unknown A1: Inaccurate level indication (Inadequate check of system) NUREG-1410 
33 Sequoyah-2 08/06/1983 77 51.1(92) A1: Inaccurate level indication (Inadequate check of system) LER-83101 
34 Calvert Cliffs-1 10/23/1983 40 36.1(65) B2: Auto-closure of suction valve (Personnel error) NUREG-1410 
35 McGuire-2 12/31/1983 43 Unknown A1: Inaccurate level indication (Installation problem) LER-84001 
36 McGuire-2 01/09/1984 62 Unknown A1: Inaccurate level indication (Installation problem) LER-84001 
37 R.E.Ginna 03/07/1984 Unknown 8.3(15) A2: Inadequate valve lineup (Personnel error) NUREG-1410 
38 Trojan 05/04/1984 40 53.3(96) A1: Inaccurate level indication (Blockage in indicating system) LER-84010 
39 D.C.Cook-2 05/21/1984 25 Unknown A3: Actuation of standby pump (Procedural error) LER-84014 
40 ANO-2 08/29/1984 60 66.1(119) A1: Inaccurate level indication (RCS higher pressure) LER-84023 
41 Zion-1 09/14/1984 45 20.6(37) A1: Inaccurate level indication (RCS higher pressure) LER-84031 
42 North Anna-2 10/16/1984 120 19.4(35) A1: Inaccurate level indication (Clogging in indicating system) LER-84008 
43 Catawba-1 04/22/1985 81 20.6(37) A1: Inaccurate level indication (Inadequate check of system) NUREG-1410 
44 Sequoyah-1 10/09/1985 43 0.06(0.1) A3: Actuation of standby pump (Procedural error) LER-85040 
45 Zion-2 12/14/1985 75 8.3(15) A1: Inaccurate level indication (Inadequate check of system) NUREG-1410 
46 Crystal River-3 02/02/1986 24 18.3(33) B1: Sheared pump shaft LER-86003 
47 San Onofre-2 03/26/1986 70 53.3(96) A1: Inaccurate level indication (Installation problem) LER-86007 
48 Waterford-3 07/14/1986 220 52.2(94) A2: Inadvertent opening of mini-flow valve (Procedural error) LER-86015 
49 Sequoyah-1 01/28/1987 90 11.1(20) A1: Inaccurate level indication (Blockage in indicating system) LER-87012 
50 Ft. Calhoun-1 03/21/1987 5 Unknown B1: Loss of power to the running pump (Personnel error) LER-87008 
51 Diablo Canyon-2 04/10/1987 88 73.9(133) A2: Valve leakage NUREG-1269 
52 McGuire-1 09/16/1987 6 26.1(47) B1: Loss of power to the running pump (Personnel error) NUREG-1410 
53 Palisades 10/15/1987 29 16.6(30) B2: Cyclic actuation of flow control valve (Personnel error) LER-87035 
54 Waterford-3 05/12/1988 Unknown Unknown A1: Inaccurate level indication (Loop seal in indicating system) NUREG-1410 
55 Sequoyah-1 05/23/1988 Unknown Unknown A2: Inadvertent opening of isolation valves (Personnel error) LER-88021 
56 D.C.Cook-2 06/16/1988 Unknown Unknown A1: Inadequate level monitoring (Procedural/Personnel error) NUREG-1410 
57 San Onofre-3 09/11/1988 Unknown Unknown A1: Inaccurate level indication (not known) NUREG-1410 
58 Oconee-3 09/18/1988 15 8.3(15) B1: Loss of power to the running pump (Personnel error) LER-88005 
59 Byron-1 09/19/1988 14 Unknown A1: Inadequate level monitoring (Procedural/personnel error) LER-88007 
60 ANO-1 10/26/1988 23 10.6(19) B2: Inadvertent closure of flow control valve (Personnel error) LER-88014 
61 Salem-1 05/20/1989 53 16.7(30) A1: Inadequate level monitoring (Procedural/ Personnel error) LER-88019 
62 Comanche Peak-1 07/18/1989 Unknown Unknown B2: Inadvertent opening of flow control valve (Electrical fault) NUREG-1410 
63 Vogtle-1 03/20/1990 36 25.6(48) B1: Loss of power to the running pump (Personnel error) NUREG-1410 
Note)  A1: lowering RCS level too far, A2: loss of coolant inventory, A3: vortexing in RHR pump suction, A4: others,  
B1: inadvertent trip of running RHR pump, B2: malfunction of RHR valves, B3: manual pump trip due to decreased flow 
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2. Analysis of Loss of Decay Heat Removal Events 
2.1 Trend Analysis 
The loss of DHR events were analyzed to examine if there were any significant trends. 
One measure of significance of loss of DHR events is the duration that the DHR function 
was lost.  The duration of DHR loss was reported in 149 of 197 events.  Figure III.3 
presents a summary of the time durations of DHR losses for these 149 events, 
discriminating the events during reduced inventory conditions from ones with RCS filled.  
There were 50 events during reduced inventory conditions, 18 events of which lasted for 
more than 1 h and 17 events lasted for from 30 min to 1 h.  Most of the events with the 
durations of more than 1 h (17 of 18 events) were caused by air entrainment in the DHR 
system.  As for 99 loss of DHR events which occurred with RCS filled, there were 79 
events in which the DHR function was recovered within 30 min.  These facts indicate 
that the DHR losses, especially resulting from air entrainment, during reduced inventory 
conditions tend to prolong the duration of the DHR loss while it takes a relatively short 
time to recover the DHR function in the events with RCS filled. 
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Figure III.3  Duration Times of DHR Losses 
Another measurement of significance is the temperature rise in RCS during the DHR 
losses.  Of 50 events in which the temperature rise was reported, there were 34 events 
during reduced inventory conditions and 16 events with RCS filled.  Figure III.4 
provides the number of events in several ranges of the temperature rise by shutdown 
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condition (that is, reduced inventory condition or filled RCS condition).  As shown in 
this figure, all of ten events in which the RCS temperature increased more than 40°C 
(72°F) occurred during reduced inventory conditions.  At least five events listed in 
Table III.2 were reported to have experienced bulk or local boiling in the core.  
Although it was not specified whether or not boiling in the core would have occurred 
during the events, the RCS temperature was reported to have increased to near or more 
93.3°C (200°F) in five events during reduced inventory conditions (this temperature, 
93.3°C, is the upper limit for cold shutdown conditions defined in U.S. PWR vendors' 
standard technical specifications
(14)
).  Since the RCS temperatures were often observed 
on hot legs or RHR pump exit, as seen in Table III.2, these five events could have 
experienced core boiling even though the observed temperature was below 93.3°C. 
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Figure III.4  RCS Temperature Rises during DHR Losses 
Table III.2  Core Boiling Events 
Plant Name Event Date RCS Heatup 
Observation 
Location 
Duration 
Time (min) 
Millstone-2 12/09/1981 32.2°C(90°F) → 97.8°C(208°F) RHR pump exit 30 - 60 
ANO-2 08/29/1984 
60.0°C(140°F) → 96.1°C(205°F) 
60.0°C(140°F) → 126.1°C(259°F) 
(RCS bulk average) 
core exit 
30 - 40*1 
San Onofre-2 03/26/1986 45.6°C(114°F) → 96.9°C(210°F) hot leg 70 (49) *2 
Waterford-3 07/14/1986 
58.9°C(138°F) → 111.1°C(232°F) 
58.9°C(138°F) → 112.2°C(234°F) 
hot leg 
core exit 
220 
Diablo Canyon-2 04/10/1987 30.6°C(87°F) → 104.4°C(220°F) RHR pump exit 88 
*
1
: The loss of DHR is reported to have lasted for 50-60 min, but during the first 20 min, water has been added 
to the RCS by gravity feed from RWST and by oscillatory RHR system flow [Ref. 14]. 
*
2
: According to LER-86007, the duration of 70 min is represented as a period from the initiation of RHR 
pump motor current oscillation to the restoration of the DHR flow.  However, during the first 21 min, the 
RHR pump flow has not been lost. 
 Chapter III 
III-10 
2.2 Categorization of DHR Losses during Reduced Inventory 
Conditions 
As mentioned above, the DHR losses during reduced inventory conditions may have 
relatively high possibilities of lasting for a long time and/or resulting in boiling in the 
core.  Focusing on events with RCS reduced, this study analyzed direct or root causes 
leading to the DHR losses and categorized events.  As presented in Figure III.5, the 63 
loss of DHR events which occurred in reduced inventory conditions were grouped into 
two general categories: one for events involving the cavitation or air binding of DHR 
pumps due to vortexing or air entrainment and the other for events involving the forced 
trip of DHR pumps with neither leading to cavitation nor air binding. 
A3 (5 events)
A1 (33 events)
A2 (7 events)
A4 (4 events)
B1 (6 events)
B2 
(6 events)
B3 (2 events)
A: Events Involving Cavitation or Air Binding of Pumps
A1: Lowering RCS water level too far
A2: Loss of coolant
A3: Vortexing due to increased DHR flow
A4: Others
■ B: Events Involving Forced DHR Pump Trip
B1: Inadvertent trip of the running DHR pump
B2: Malfunctions of valves
B3: Decreased DHR flow
  
Figure III.5  Categorization of Events during Reduced Inventory Conditions 
 
Category A: Events involving the cavitation or air binding 
Forty-nine events included in the first category are further divided into four subcategories. 
The first subcategory (Al) contains 33 events which resulted from lowering the RCS 
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water level too far.  Five events in this subcategory were caused by inadequate RCS 
level monitoring during drain-down operations.  However, most events (28 events) in 
this subcategory were caused by inaccurate RCS water level indications due to:  
- incompletely filled reference legs, or loss of level in reference leg due to leakage or 
evaporation (two events, e.g. the Beaver Valley-1 event in 1981) 
- problems on level indicating system installation (eight events, e.g. the San Onofre-2 
event in 1986) 
- higher than intended pressure on RCS (five events, e.g. the ANO-2 event in 1984) 
- calibration errors or inadequate checks of level indicating system (seven events, e.g. 
the Sequoyah-2 event in 1983), and  
- malfunctions of level indicating system, such as blockage and clogging (four events, 
e.g. the North Anna-2 event in 1984).  
For the other two events (at Millstone-2 in 1979 and San Onofre-3 in 1988), causes of 
inaccurate level indications were not reported.  There were 21 events in which the DHR 
losses lasted for more than 30 min, including 11 events with the duration of more than 1 h, 
two of which led to boiling in the core (the ANO-2 and the San Onofre-2 events). 
The second subcategory (A2) contains seven events in which loss of coolant inventory 
caused insufficient pump suction head.  In five of these events, loss of coolant inventory 
was caused by misalignment of valves due to an operator error or procedural deficiencies 
(e.g. the Waterford-3 event in 1986).  The other two events (at Diablo Canyon-2 in 1987 
and at North Anna-2 in 1982) in this subcategory resulted from leakage of a valve and a 
pump seal, respectively.  The DHR losses lasted for more than 1 h in three events and 
boiling in the core occurred in two events (the Waterford-3 and Diablo Canyon-2 events).  
The third subcategory (A3) contains five events which involved vortexing in pump 
suction due to the increased DHR flow.  In three events (e.g. the Cook-2 event in 1984), 
the DHR flow increased when the standby pump was started, resulting in vortexing.  
The root causes for these events were procedural deficiencies.  For the other two events 
(at Beaver Valley-1 in 1980), causes of the increased DHR flow were unknown.  In four 
events, the durations of DHR losses was reported to be 25-70 min.  
The fourth subcategory (A4) contains four events which do not fit in any of the above 
subcategories.  One was caused by automatic transfer of pump suction to the empty 
emergency sump due to a spurious signal generated by loss of vital instrument buses (at 
Davis Besse-1 in 1980).  In this event, the DHR loss lasted for 2.5 h.  The second event 
(at Beaver Valley-1, 1980) was caused by inadvertent actuation of the vessel vent eductor 
system, which excessively drew the water from SGs and entrained air into loops.  The 
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third event (at Ginna in 1983) was caused by inadvertent SG plenum pressurization and 
leaky nozzle dam allowing air in SG to pass through the hot leg.  The last event (at 
Beaver Valley-1 in 1978) involved indication of no DHR flow, the cause of which was 
unknown.  
Category B: Events involving forced DHR pump trip 
Fourteen events included in this category are further divided into three subcategories.  
The first subcategory (Bl) contains six events involving inadvertent trip of the running 
DHR pump due to electrical problems or mechanical failures.  Four events were caused 
by loss of electrical power to the running pump due to personnel errors (e.g. the Vogtle-1 
event in 1990), one event by a spurious trip signal due to procedural deficiencies (at 
Millstone-2 in 1982), and one event by a sheared pump shaft (at Crystal River-3 in 1986).  
There were two events lasting for more than 30 min, one of which resulted in core boiling 
(the Minstone-2 event).  
The second subcategory (B2) contains six events which were caused by malfunctions of 
valves.  In all cases, the DHR pumps were manually tripped prior to cavitation or air 
entrainment.  Out of these events, four involved loss of DHR flow: one was caused by 
automatic closure of the suction valves due to a spurious signal during testing (at Calvert 
Cliffs-1 in 1983), one was caused by inadvertent closure of the flow control valve due to 
a personnel error (at ANO-1 in 1988), and two resulted from the isolation of the heat 
exchanger outlet air operated valve because of water accumulation in its control air 
system (at Palisades in 1978 and 1981).  The other two events involved manual trip of 
DHR systems.  In one event (at Comanche Peak-1 in 1989), the flow control valve failed 
open due to inverter failure and thus the DHR flow exceeded the limit in technical 
specifications.  The other resulted from cyclic actuation of flow control valve due to a 
personnel error, which caused fluctuation of DHR flow (at Palisades in 1987).  In three 
events in this subcategory, the DHR losses lasted for 20-40 min. 
The third subcategory (B3) contains two events involving decreased DHR flow which 
was caused by loss of coolant inventory.  The root causes were leakage from a pump 
seal for one event (at North Anna-2 in 1982) and effluence due to valve misalignment for 
the other (at Trojan in 1978).  In these events, the running DHR pumps were secured 
prior to cavitation or air entrainment and hence the DHR losses were recovered within a 
few minutes. 
It should be noted that the DHR losses lasted for 30 min in 30 of 49 events involving 
cavitation or air binding.  As for 14 events not involving air entrainment, on the other 
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hand, only five lasted for more than 30 min.  These facts manifest the difficulties in 
recovery actions, such as removal of trapped air from the DHR system, which may 
prolong the duration of DHR loss and consequently produce relatively high possibilities 
of core uncovery. 
 
3.  Estimation of Reactor Coolant Heatup and Time to 
Core Boiling  
3.1 Approach 
Boiling in the core and the subsequent RCS pressurization would lead to coolant 
inventory loss via unisolated paths and/or prevent water addition to RCS by gravity feed 
from RWST, making it more difficult to reestablish the DHR flow.  Therefore, the plant 
personnel should notice the time to boiling following the DHR loss and take some timely 
actions to restore the DHR flow.  However, in boiling events, the plant personnel did not 
know the time when boiling took place in the core during the event or they were not 
aware even that boiling had occurred. 
In the analysis of the Diablo Canyon-2 event on April 10, 1987
(23)
, the time to boiling was 
estimated with the following heat balance equation on the assumption that the water 
involved in heatup process would be heated uniformly: 
pef CV
Q
ΔT





 , 
where T:  coolant temperature rise during event (°C) 
Q:  decay heat generation rate during event (W)  
τ:  time after DHR loss (min) 
Veff: water volume involved in heatup process (hereinafter, effective water 
volume) (m
3
) 
ρ:  water density (kg/m3) 
Cp:  specific heat at constant pressure of water (kcal/kg°C)  
However, that approach might have some difficulties in determining the effective water 
volume which stemmed from complex and uncertain behavior in RCS during heatup 
process, for example, how the natural convection would be developed in RCS and how 
the water in each region of RCS would be heated, and insufficient information on the 
RCS coolant inventory.  Because of these difficulties, such an analysis has not been 
carried out for most of the events and the time to boiling was simply extrapolated with 
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use of the observed RCS coolant heatup rate for some of them such as the Vogtle-1 event 
on March 20, 1990
(19)
. 
For the calculations of coolant heatup rates and times to boiling with the above equation, 
the data on the initial RCS coolant temperature, the duration of the DHR loss and the time 
elapsed from the reactor shutdown are needed.  Out of 63 events, identified were the 12 
events, including four boiling events, for which these data were described.  The data 
obtained from event reports are summarized in Table III.3.  Applying the approach used 
in the analysis of the Diablo Canyon-2 event, the heatup rates of primary system and the 
times to boiling for these 12 events were evaluated to examine if boiling could have 
actually occurred and/or when boiling would have occurred. 
Table III.3  Summary of Data Obtained from Actual Events 
 
No
. 
Plant Name (vendor) Event Date 
Rated 
Power 
(MWt) 
RCS Temperature Duration of 
DHR Loss:  
(min) 
Time after 
Shutdown Ti (before) 
°C(°F) 
Te (after) 
°C(°F) 
1 Diablo Canyon-2 (WH) 04/10/1987 3411 30.8 (87) 104.4 (220) 88 (33.8)*1 7 d 
2 ANO-2 (CE) 08/29/1984 2815 60.0 (140) 128.1 (259) 60 (30-40)*2 36 h 
3 Millstone-2 (CE) 12/09/1981 2700 32.2 (90) 97.8 (208) 30-60 4 d 
4 
Sequoyah-2 (WH) 08/06/1983 3411 
39.4 (103) 
60.0 (140) 
90.6 (195) 
90.6 (195) 
77  
35 
18 d 
5 Davis Besse-1 (B&W) 04/19/1980 2772 32.2 (90) 76.7 (170) 150 12 d 
6 Beaver Valley-1 (WH) 03/05/1981 2652 38.9 (102) 75.6 (168) 54 14 d 
7 McGuire-1 (WH) 09/16/1987 3411 38.3 (101) 64.4 (148) 6 5 d 
8 Vogtle-1 (WH) 03/20/1990 3411 32.2 (90) 57.8 (136) 36 25 d*4 
9 Beaver Valley-1 (WH) 09/14/1978 2652 62.8 (145) 79.4 (175) 60 38 d 
10 San Onofre-2 (CE) 03/26/1986 3390 45.6 (114) 98.8 (210) 70 (49)*3 11 d 
11 Ocinee-3 (B&W) 09/11/1988 2568 32.2 (90) 40.6 (105) 15 32 d*4 
12 Palisades (CE) 01/08/1978 2530 
54.4 (130) 
54.4 (130) 
93.3 (200) 
101.7 (215) 
20 
 45 
7 d 
*
1
: The time to bulk boiling has been estimated by USNRC [Ref.23]. 
*
2
: During the first 20 min, water was added to the RCS by gravity feed from RWST and by oscillatory 
RHR flow [Ref.14]. 
*
3
: During the first 21 min, water was added to the RCS by gravity feed from RWST and by oscillatory 
RHR flow [LER-86007]. 
*
4
: The DHR loss occurred after the refueling completed. 
 
In addition, to provide information useful in taking some timely actions to restore the 
DHR system, the time to boiling was evaluated as a function of the time elapsed from the 
reactor shutdown to the DHR loss for a typical Westinghouse 4-loop PWR. 
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In the calculations, the decay heat generation rates Q were estimated for the individual 
events based on representations of the ANSI/ANS (American Nuclear Society/American 
Nuclear Standards Institute) 5.1 standard of 1979
(24)
.  The decay heat power presented 
here was the combined energy release from fission product decay of 
235
U, 
238
U and 
239
Pu, 
and actinide decay of 
239
U and 
239
Np using the energy release per fission (that is, 200 
MeV) and the distribution of fission product sources (that is, 0.8 for 
235
U, 0.13 for 
239
Pu, 
0.06 for 
238
U and 0.01 for 
241
Pu) described in Ref. (24).  The calculations used the actual 
data on the time elapsed from the reactor shutdown, and assumed that the reactors had 
been operated at rated power for about 10,000 h because of lack of information.  
As for the effective water volume Veff, it might be specific to the event and depends on the 
reactor design and as well the RCS conditions such as water level prior to the event and 
the water addition during the event.  In some events, however, the initial RCS water 
level was not accurately reported or the amount of water added to RCS during the DHR 
loss was not known.  Such insufficient information makes it impossible to estimate the 
effective water volume for each event with much accuracy.  Therefore, this study aimed 
at rough estimation of the coolant heatup rates and the time to boiling rather than precise 
prediction and used 50 m
3
 as the effective water volume, which was estimated in the 
analysis of the Diablo Canyon-2 event
(23)
, in the calculations for the 12 events, neglecting 
the difference in geometrical volume due to the reactor design.  Nevertheless, in order to 
represent ambiguity in the effective water volume stemming from inaccurate water level, 
its range was defined on the assumption that the RCS water level would have been at the 
elevations between the top and the mid-loop of the hot leg pipings.  The effective water 
volume used here was in the range of 50-60 m
3
.  It was considered that the difference in 
geometrical volume due to the reactor design could not be so large in comparison to this 
range.  The following paragraph describes the estimation of the effective water volume 
in Ref. (23). 
In the analysis of the Diablo Canyon-2 event, the effective water volume was evaluated 
based on the following assumptions: 
- All water inside the core barrel from the elevation at the bottom of the core to the 
mid-loop level, including the upper plenum water, would be involved, 
- 30% of the hot leg water would be involved in the heatup process, taking the distance 
from the core region into consideration, 
- 10% of the downcomer water would be involved in the heatup process, which would 
cover heat transfer from inside the core barrel to downcomer water,  
- The cold leg water would not be involved because the cold legs were far removed 
from any flow path, 
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- The lower plenum water would not be involved because there were no direct driving 
force which caused it to flow into the core region, and  
- The internal structure including fuel and cladding would be affected in the heatup 
process and its heat capacity was about 10,000 Kca1/°C (21,700 Btu/°F).  
Consequently, the effective water volume was presented as follows:  
Veff  =  Vcore + Vup + 0.1Vdc +0.3Vhl + Vst ≒50 m
3
,  
where  Vcore :  water volume in active core (18.5 m
3
)  
Vup:  water volume in upper plenum from the elevation at the top of the core to 
the mid-loop level (18.3 m
3
)  
Vdc: water volume in downcomer below the mid-loop level (13.6 m
3
) 
Vhl:  water volume in hot legs (4.3 m
3
)  
Vst:  water volume equivalent to heat capacity of internal structure (10 m
3
: 
heat capacity of which corresponds to 21,700 Btu/°F). 
Water volume in each region is illustrated in Figure III.6. 
Hot Leg
Mid-loop Elevation
(1.1 m3 = 38.0 ft3)
Upper Plenum-A
(12.8 m3 = 453 ft3)
Upper Plenum-B
(11.8 m3 = 418 ft3)
Annular Region
(2.3 m3 = 80 ft3)
Downcomer-A
(3.4 m3 = 120 ft3)
Cold Leg
(1.5 m3 = 51.5 ft3)
Downcomer-B
(7.4 m3 = 260 ft3)
Downcomer-C
(5.1 m3 = 180 ft3)
Downcomer-A: Above Top of Cold Leg
Downcomer-B: Bottom of Cold Leg to Middle of the Core
Downcomer-C: Middle of the Core to Bottom of the Core
Upper Plenum-A: Bottom of Nozzle to Top of Nozzle
Upper Plenum-B: Top of the Core to Bottom of Nozzle
Core Region
(18.5 m3 = 654 ft3)
Lower Plenum
(29.0 m3 = 1024 ft3)
Upper Head
(45.3 m3 = 1600 ft3)
 
Figure III.6  Water Volume in RCS (All the data are taken from Ref.23)  
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3.2 Calculated Results and Discussion 
For the 12 events listed in Table III.3, the calculated coolant heatup rates are summarized 
in Table III.4 and are also shown in Figure III.7 in comparison with those actually 
reported.   
Table III.4  Summary of Calculated Results 
No. 
Plant Name     
(Event Year) 
Decay Heat 
Power 
(MWt) 
Duration of 
DHR Loss: 
 (min) 
Coolant Heatup Rate (°C/min) Ratio of 
Heatup Rates 
R=TcTo 
Reported* 
(To/) 
Calculated* 
(Tc/) 
1 Diablo Canyon-2 (1987) 9.745 33.8 2.18 2.32 – 2.78 1.06 – 1.27 
2 ANO-2 (1984) 14.695 30.0 2.21 3.50 – 4.20 1.59 – 1.90 
3 Millstone-2 (1981) 9.899 30.0 2.18 2.35 – 2.83 1.08 – 1.29 
4 Sequoyah-2 (1983) 6.326 35.0 0.87 1.51 – 1.81 1.73 – 2.07 
5 Davis Besse-1 (1980) 6.222 150.0 0.29 1.48 – 1.78 5.00 – 6.00 
6 Beaver Valley-1 (1981) 5.539 54.0 0.68 1.32 – 1.58 1.94 – 2.33 
7 McGuire-1 (1987) 11.393 6.0 4.35 2.71 – 3.26 0.62 – 0.75 
8 Vogtle-1 (1990) 3.071 36.0 0.71 0.73 – 0.88 1.03 – 1.24 
9 Beaver Valley-1 (1978) 3.334 60.0 0.28 0.79 – 0.95 2.86 – 3.43 
10 San Onofre-2 (1986) 7.922 49.0 1.09 1.89 – 2.26 1.73 – 2.08 
11 Ocinee-3 (1988) 1.778 15.0 0.56 0.42 – 0.51 0.76 – 0.91 
12 Palisades (1978) 7.228 20.0 1.94 1.72 – 2.07 0.89 – 1.06 
*:  To denotes the coolant heatup actually reported. 
 Tc denotes the coolant heatup calculated in this analysis. 
 
In the three boiling events, the calculations used the durations of DHR losses reported as 
the times to boiling since they were not specified.  For the Diablo Canyon-2 event, on 
the other hand, the heatup rate were calculated with use of the time to boiling estimated 
by the USNRC
(23)
.  As shown in this figure, the calculated coolant heatup rates were in 
relatively good agreement with the observed ones in the range of factor 2 except for two 
events (the Davis Besse-1 event in 1980 and the Beaver Valley-l event in 1978).  
Differences between the calculated and observed heatup rates are considered to stem from 
the following major uncertainties: uncertainty in the effective water volume, inaccuracy 
in the reported duration of DHR loss or the time to boiling, and inconsistency of the RCS 
temperature observation measures.  In some events, the loss durations were reported as 
the time from the initiation of DHR pump motor current oscillation to the DHR flow 
restoration, while this analysis assumed the DHR flow was completely lost during the 
durations without any water addition.  For example, in the ANO-2 event, it was reported 
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that the DHR was lost for 50-60 min but actually for the first 20 min the water addition to 
RCS was conducted by gravity feed and by oscillatory DHR pump flow.  In some events, 
core thermocouples were disconnected and thus the RCS temperature rises reported were 
based on temperatures observed on hot legs or DHR pump exit after the DHR flow 
restoration.  These indications are not representative of temperature rise in the core 
region when the DHR flow is lost. 
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Figure III.7  Comparison of Calculated and Observed Heatup Rates 
Figure III.8 shows the predicted times to bulk boiling, along with the reported ones 
which were simply extrapolated with use of the observed coolant heatup rates.  From 
this figure, it is noted that bulk boiling could have occurred in seven events, including 
four events which have actually involved core boiling (at Diablo Canyon-2, ANO-2, 
Millstone-2 and San Onofre-2).  For the other three events (one at Davis Besse-1 and 
two at Beaver Valley-1), core boiling was not identified and/or reported.  As for the 
Beaver Valley-1 event in 1981, it was reported that some makeup water was added to 
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RCS during 54 min while the DHR lost.  Since the amount of the added water was not 
specified, this calculation neglected the water addition, resulting in higher heatup rate.  
The causes of discrepancies for the other two events, the Davis Besse-1 event in 1980 and 
the Beaver Valley-1 event in 1978, remain indeterminate because of lack of information.  
In Ref. (13), NSAC’s calculations of heatup rate in the former event showed that bulk 
boiling could have taken place even if the water volume being heated was assumed to be 
all water in the core volume, inside the core barrel, above the core (upper plenum), and in 
RHR, but the reason of this inconsistency was not referred at all.  The latter event 
occurred 38 d after the reactor shutdown and the RCS temperature increased from 62.8°C 
(145°F) to 79.4°C (175°F) during 60 min, which was equivalent to the heatup rate of 
0.28°C/min (0.5°F/min).  It is hard to understand that this value is less than half of the 
heatup rate of about 0.71°C/min (1.3°F/min) actually observed in the Vogtle-1 event 
which occurred 25 d after the shutdown with the refueling completed. 
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Figure III.8  Comparison of Predicted Time to Bulk Boiling with Actual Duration  
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Figure III.9 illustrates the calculated time curves, which show how the time to bulk 
boiling varies as a function of the time elapsed from the reactor trip to the DHR loss.  
This calculation assumed that the average coolant temperature was 32.2°C (90°F) at the 
initiation of DHR loss and that the reactor had been operated at the rated power of 3,411 
MW thermal (typically, Westinghouse 4-loop PWRs) for 10,000 h prior to DHR loss. 
As seen in this figure, bulk boiling in the core could begin within 1 h, in the absence of 
successful operator action, even if the DHR loss would take place 30 d after the shutdown.  
In the condition with RCS intact and the reactor vessel head on, RCS would be 
pressurized, preventing the water addition to RCS by gravity feed, and thus operators 
should take any corrective actions such as restoration of DHR function, manual actuation 
of HPI (high pressure injection) and feed and bleed operation with use of HPI and PORVs 
(power operated relief valves).  In addition, the time to core uncovery was also 
calculated to examine the time margin available to recover the DHR function prior to 
core uncovery assuming that the water volumes in RCS and above the core were in the 
range of 100-118 m
3
 and 32-50 m
3
, respectively (see Figure III.6).  The calculated time 
to core uncovery is shown in Figure III.9, and indicates that in the Diablo Canyon-2 event 
which occurred 7 d after reactor trip, core uncovery could have begun if any action would 
not be taken within 3 h although this event actually terminated for about 1.5 h. 
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Figure III.9  Time Curves to Bulk Boiling and Core Uncovery 
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4. Summary 
This section describes the analysis of loss of DHR events during reactor shutdown 
conditions which occurred at U.S. PWRs and estimated the RCS water heatup rates and 
the times to bulk boiling in the core and core uncovery in reduced inventory conditions. 
Between 1976 and 1990, 197 loss of DHR events were reported to have occurred during 
approximately 850 reactor years of operation and one-third (63 events) occurred in 
reduced inventory conditions.  Analysis of these events indicates that four-fifths (49 
events) of DHR losses in reduced inventory conditions were caused by cavitation or air 
binding of DHR pumps, that is, air entrainment into the DHR pumps.  The major 
contributor of air entrainment (33 of 49 events) is found to be the lowering the RCS water 
level too far, most of which resulted from inaccurate level indication.  Other causes 
include loss of coolant inventory and increased DHR pump flow. 
In many events involving air entrainment, the DHR loss lasted for more than 1 h and the 
remarkable coolant heatup was observed.  Applying the analytical approach used in the 
Diablo Canyon-2 analysis, the coolant heatup rates and the time to bulk boiling in the 
core are estimated for 12 events with use of the data obtained from their respective event 
reports.  Although the data used here are not necessarily enough for the analysis, the 
calculated heatup rates are in reasonably good agreement with the observed ones.  As 
for the four boiling events, it is confirmed that core boiling could have occurred during 
the DHR losses.  The calculated results also show that in the absence of successful 
operator action, bulk boiling in the core and the subsequent core uncovery would take 
place within 1 h and several hours, respectively, even if the DHR loss would occur in the 
late stages of shutdown (for example, 30 d after the reactor trip).  Therefore, restoring 
the DHR function should be required in a short term. 
 
III.3 Analysis of Criticality Accidents in Nuclear 
Fuel Processing Facilities  
On September 30, 1999, a criticality accident occurred at the Tokai-mura uranium 
processing plant operated by JCO Co. Ltd., which resulted in the first nuclear accident 
involving fatalities in Japan, and forced the residents in the vicinity of the site to be 
evacuated and be sheltered indoors.  Considering the gravity of the accident, the Nuclear 
Safety Commission of Japan (NSC) set up the accident investigation committee to 
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identify the causes of the accident and examine the measures for preventing recurrence 
and its report of the investigation was issued on December 24, 1999
(25)
.  The report 
concluded that the direct cause of the accident was the injection of uranyl nitrate solution 
with uranium exceeding the critical mass limit into the precipitation tank with 
unfavorable geometry.  As well, the report identified the root causes and contributing 
factors, and proposed countermeasures.  
On the other hand, at least 21 criticality accidents had taken place in foreign fuel 
processing facilities before the JCO accident.  As seen from Figure III.10, most of them 
occurred in 1950’s to 1960’s.  The accidents in the United States and the United 
Kingdom were described in the reports published by the U.S. Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL)
(26,27)
, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
(28)
 and the 
Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI)
(29,30)
.  However, the accidents in 
Russia had not necessarily been reported in a timely manner.  In 1995, twelve accidents 
were published in the International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety 
(ICNC-95)
(31)
.  In 1999, a Russian accident in 1997 was additionally reported and more 
detailed information on the four accidents was provided in the subsequent ICNC-99
 (32-34)
. 
These 21 accidents were analyzed in terms of similarities to the JCO accident, focusing 
on the accident sequences and causes of accidents, to identify the lessons learned from 
foreign accidents which should have been fed back
(5,6)
. 
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Figure III.10  Number of Criticality Accidents Year by Year 
1. Outlines of JCO Accident 
1.1 Chronology of Accident 
At about 10:35 am, on September 30, 1999, when the volume of uranyl nitrate solution in 
the precipitation tank (volume: 100 l, diameter: 450 mm, height: 600 mm) reached 
approximately 45 l, equivalent to about 16.6 kg of 18.8% enriched uranium, a criticality 
accident occurred.  The nuclear fission reaction in the precipitation tank produced an 
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initial burst of radiation, both neutron and gamma rays.  The area gamma monitors 
detected a high level of radiation and the area alarms sounded.  The three workers 
involved in the operation were evacuated from the building.  After the first few minutes, 
a quasi-steady state fission reaction set in and the radiation emission rates of neutron and 
gamma rays became essentially stable.  As a result, the quasi-steady state fission 
reaction lasted for more than 20 h until water was drained from the cooling jacket 
surrounding the precipitation tank.  The first attempt to drain water was made by 
opening the drain valve at about 2:30 am on October 1, 1999, but only a small volume of 
water was drained, decreasing neutron dose rate somewhat.  The water pipe was then 
broken and cut and finally, at about 6:15 am, argon gas was pumped into the pipe to force 
out water, terminating the fission reaction.  To ensure that the subcritical condition 
would be maintained, about 17 l of borated water with concentration of 25 g/l was 
injected into the tank.  At about 8:50 am, the termination of criticality condition was 
declared.  The total number of fissions during the reaction was estimated to be 2.5×10
18
 
based on the analysis results of samples from the precipitation tank. 
Two of the three workers in that area, that is, one holding the funnel and the other pouring 
the solution into the funnel, had suffered from severe radiation sickness, resulting in loss 
of their lives about three and seven months later, respectively.  Based on the radiation 
doses measured by whole body counters, radiation exposures were observed to 56 JCO 
employees, three firefighters (rescue crews), 24 workers for terminating the criticality, 
seven public members near the site, and 57 emergency preparedness staff members.  In 
addition, approximately 300 people were supposed to have been exposed to radiation
 (35)
. 
During the accident, evacuation of residents within 350 m of the facility was initiated at 
about 15:00 on September 30, 1999 and residents within a 10 km radius of the facility 
were advised to stay indoors at about 22:30 on the same day as a precautionary measure.  
While the latter recommendation (to stay indoors) was rescinded at about 16:40 on 
October 1, the evacuation lasted until the next evening (at about 18:30 on October 2). 
1.2 Accident Causes 
According to the committee’s report(25), the direct cause of the accident is that uranyl 
nitrate solution with uranium exceeding the critical mass limit was poured into the 
precipitation tank with unfavorable geometry, contrary to its originally intended use.  
The precipitation tank was designed to be used in the process for dissolving, refining and 
purifying crude U3O8 but was not intended for use in the process for redissolving the 
purified U3O8, homogenizing uranyl nitrate solution and producing the final product.  
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Although the mass limit for criticality safety of the precipitation tank was specified as 2.4 
kgU for uranium with enrichment of 16-20%, the amount of actually loaded uranium 
reached approximately 16.6 kgU.  Any concentration limit for criticality safety was not 
specified in addition to the mass limit.  In the previous operations, furthermore, the 
storage tower with favorable geometry had been used in the process for homogenizing the 
uranyl nitrate solution with the mass limit being exceeded and no criticality accident had 
occurred.  These might have caused the workers to misunderstand that the precipitation 
tank could be safely used for the same purpose.  The root causes and contribution 
factors were identified inadequacies/deficiencies in operating process, operation 
management, technical management, and management control, and problems in licensing 
process and safety regulations (see Table III.5). 
Table III.5  Issues Pointed out by JCO Accident Investigation Committee(1) 
Issues Pointed out  Description 
Issues on Work Processes: 
- Inadequate work process to 
redissolve the purified U3O8 in 
nitric acid and to homogenize 
uranyl nitrate solution 
- In the process of producing uranyl nitrate solution, a 10-l stainless steel container 
was used instead of the dissolving tank which was supposed to be used.  
- The homogenizing process carried out for producing the final product had been 
unreviewed and unapproved by the competent authority.  In order to improve 
workability for pursuing the efficiency, the homogenizing process had been 
changed from a cross-blending method with use of 10 containers of 4-l capacity to 
an alternative method by using the storage tower with a favorable geometry, and 
then, use of the precipitation tank with an unfavorable geometry was introduced 
instead of the storage tower. 
Issues on Operational Control 
- Exceeded critical mass limit 
- The uranium exceeding the critical mass limit was loaded into the precipitation 
tank in violation of the licensing conditions and technical specifications of facility.  
- The homogenization of 6-7 batches of uranly nitrate solution was a deviation from 
the license conditions.  
Issues on Technological Control: 
- No appropriate procedure 
defined for obtaining the 
approval of the relevant person 
when preparing or revising work 
procedures/instructions. 
- There was no system to check whether or not a proposal of using the precipitation 
tank was valid for homogenization process. 
- Although the work instruction had not provided any description on use of the 
precipitation tank and the operating procedures had specified that the storage 
tower be used for homogenization, the precipitation tank was applied with no 
approval of a person in charge etc. 
Issues on Administrative Control: 
- Lack of due consideration on 
characteristics of the work 
concerned which was the 
small-scale, non-routine and 
unique operation compared with 
the main business 
- Since the work to produce uranyl nitrate solution requires several days and has 
been executed on an infrequent basis, the operators had been inexperienced in 
the work.  
- Although there were essential differences in criticality control between the work 
concerned and the main business with 5% or less enriched uranium being 
handled, special attention had not been paid to production process and 
equipment.  
Issues on Licensing: 
- Insufficient description on 
dissolving process during safety 
review and design & 
construction permission review 
- The license application did not specify any reason why the dissolving tank was 
designed and managed based on both mass control and geometry control. 
- Neither the license application nor the design & construction application had 
provided any description on the homogenization process.  If this process had 
been added to the work processes after these applications, this change should 
have been applied at that time as an amendment.  
Issues on Safety Regulations: 
- Ineffective regulatory inspection 
on compliance with technical 
specifications 
- The competent authority had examined whether or not operations had been 
conducted in compliance with the technical specifications, by dispatching its 
inspectors.  However, the facility had been operated on an infrequent basis and 
thus, these inspections had been performed during the facility shutdown.  
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2.  Overall Trends of Criticality Accidents in Foreign 
Countries 
This subsection discusses the 21 criticality accidents in foreign countries on the type of 
nuclear materials handled, the geometry of vessels/tanks used, the extent of criticality 
(duration time, fission number), occurrence of recriticality, the mechanism of criticality 
termination, and the consequence of radiation exposures, in comparison with those of the 
JCO accident.  Table III.6 summarizes the individual accidents and their respective 
detailed event descriptions are provided in the Ref.(6). 
Table III.6  Summary of 21 Criticality Accidents 
No. Site and Date Features of Accident Total Fissions Duration 
1 Mayak Enterprise (Russia) 
March 15, 1953 
plutonium nitrate solution in a receiver tanks; 
single spike; two significant exposures (1000 
rad, 100 rad)  
2.5 x 1017 unknown 
2 Mayak Enterprise (Russia) 
April 21, 1957 
uranium precipitate in an oxalate purification 
chamber; one fatality and five workers with 
radiation sickness 
2 x 1017 10 min 
3 Mayak Enterprise (Russia) 
January 2, 1958 
uranium nitrate solution in a critical 
parameters measurement tank; single spike; 
three fatalities and one with loss of eyesight 
2.3 x 1017 short period 
4 Mayak Enterprise (Russia) 
December 5, 1960 
plutonium carbonate solution in a vessel with 
unfavorable geometry; two spikes; several 
exposures of lower than 5 rad 
1 x 1017 short period 
5 Siberian Chemical Combine 
(Russia) July 14, 1961 
uranium hexafluoride accumulation in a 
vacuum pump oil vessel; two spikes; one 
significant exposure (approx.200 rad) 
1.2 x 1016 short period 
6 Mayak Enterprise (Russia) 
September 7, 1962 
plutonium nitrate solution in a dissolving tank; 
three spikes; no significant exposure 
2 x 1017 40-50 min 
7 Siberian Chemical Combine 
January 30, 1963 
uranium nitrate solution in a tank with 
unfavorable geometry; eight spikes; four 
insignificant exposures (6-17 rad) 
7.9 x 1017 10 h 
8 Siberian Chemical Combine 
(Russia) December 2, 1963 
uranium nitrate solution accumulation in a 
trap; sixteen spikes; no significant exposures 
1.6 x 1016 16 h 
9 Electrostal Fuel Fabrication 
Plant (Russia) 
November 3, 1965 
uranium oxide slurry in a vacuum supply 
tank; single spike; no significant exposure 
1 x 1016 unknown 
10 Mayak Enterprise (Russia) 
December 16, 1965 
uranyl nitrate solution in a dissolving tank; 
eleven spikes; no significant exposure 
7 x 1017 7 h 
11 Mayak Enterprise (Russia) 
December 10, 1968 
plutonium nitrate solution in a 60 l vessel; 
two spikes; one fatality and one with both 
legs amputated 
6 x 1016 unknown 
12 Siberian Chemical Combine 
(Russia) December 13, 1978 
plutonium ingots in a storage container; 
single spike; one significant exposure (250 
rad for whole body and 2000 rad for hands) 
and seven exposures (5-60 rad) 
3 x 1015 short period 
13 Novosibirsk Chemical 
Concentration Plant (Russia) 
May 15, 1997 
uranium dioxide deposition in receiver 
vessels; six spikes; no significant exposure 
5.5 x 1015 27 h 
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Table III.6  Summary of 21 Criticality Accidents (continued) 
No. Site and Date Features of Accident  Total Fissions  Duration  
14 Oak Ridge Y-12 Chemical 
Processing Plant (USA) 
June 16, 1958 
uranyl nitrate solution in a drum for 
receiving water; two spikes; eight 
significant exposures (28.8-461 rem) 
1.3 x 1018 18 min 
15 Los Alamos Scientific 
Laboratory (USA) 
December 30, 1958 
plutonium organic solution in a large 
process vessel; one spike; one fatality and 
two significant exposures (134 and 53 rem) 
1.7 x 1017 2 sec 
16 Idaho Chemical Processing 
Plant (USA) 
October 16, 1959 
uranyl nitrate solution in a waste receiving 
tank; one spike; two significant exposures 
(50 and 32 rem) 
4 x 1019 20 min 
17 Idaho Chemical Processing 
Plant (USA) 
January 25, 1961 
uranyl nitrate solution in a vapor 
disengagement cylinder; one spike; no 
significant exposure 
6 x 1017 2-3 min 
18 Hanford Works (USA) 
April 7, 1962 
plutonium solution in a transfer tank; 
multiple spikes; three significant exposures 
(19, 43 and 110 rem) 
8 x 1017 37.5 h 
19 Wood River Junction (USA) 
July 24, 1964 
uranyl nitrate solution in a sodium 
carbonate makeup tank; two spikes; one 
fatality and two significant exposures 
(60-100 rad) 
1.5 x 1017 unknown 
20 Windscale Works (UK) 
August 24, 1970 
plutonium solution in a transfer tank; one 
spike; no significant exposure 
1 x 1015 10 sec 
21 Idaho Chemical Processing 
Plant (USA) 
October 17, 1978 
Uranyl nitrate solution in a lower section of 
scrubbing column; one spike; no significant 
exposure 
2.7 x 1018 1.5 h 
Note: 100 rad = 1 Gy, 100 rem = 1 Sv 
 
2.1 Type of Nuclear Materials 
The nuclear material which was being handled at the time of accident is uranium in 13 of 
the 21 events and plutonium in 8 events, as shown in Figure III.11.  In 11 events, 
uranium enriched to about 90% of 
235
U was handled and in the other two events, uranium 
enrichment is 22.6% and 6.5%, respectively.  However, in the accident at the Electrostal 
Fuel Fabrication Plant in 1965, the processing stream had been operated with 2% 
enriched uranium for one year and then, it was reconfigured and restarted using 6.5% 
enriched uranium, resulting in criticality accident 12 d after its restart
(33)
.  
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Figure III.11  Types of Nuclear Materials Handled 
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As for the form of nuclear materials, 20 criticality accidents took place with the fissile 
material in a liquid and one occurred with metal ingots.  However, in one accident (at 
the Siberian Chemical Combine in 1961), the criticality took place in the tank of vacuum 
pump because of uncontrollable accumulation of gaseous uranium hexafluoride (HFU) 
due to the equipment malfunction combined with a human error
(32)
.  Also, the 
Electrostal accident in 1965 was caused by the UO2 powder having entered the water 
circuit of the vacuum system and accumulated there due to two operational mistakes 
associated with filters.  The criticality accident at the Siberian plant in 1978 occurred 
during the loading of one of the plutonium ingots from one container into the other 
one
(31)
.   
The JCO accident took place while processing the unranyl nitrate solution with 18.8% 
enriched uranium.  However, this process stream was essentially different from that for 
handling low-enriched (4.5-5%) uranium solution.  Thus, it can be said that the JCO 
workers had not been versed in handling of high-enriched uranium solution, similar to the 
accident at the Electrostal plant in 1965. 
2.2 Geometry of Vessels/Tanks 
Twenty of the 21 accidents occurred in the cylindrical vessels/tanks with unfavorable 
geometry.  However, the criticality took place in a slab vessel designed as favorable 
geometry at the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentration Plant in 1997
(34)
.  Over many 
years, a large amount of UO2 was deposited on the vessel walls and as a result, the walls 
were deformed from the original shape, eventually leading to the criticality.  This 
accident implies that the criticality may not be avoided if a vessel is designed as a 
favorable geometry. 
As mentioned above, in two accidents (at Siberian in 1961 and Electrostal in 1965), the 
criticality condition was reached in the tank of vacuum system.  In addition, at the 
Siberian plant in 1963, the chain reaction took place in a vacuum trap which had been 
installed to prevent the uranium solutions from entering the vacuum system
(32)
.  As well, 
the criticality accidents at the Mayak Enterprise in 1958
(31)
 and the Y-12 Chemical 
Processing Plant in 1958
(27)
 occurred in a tank installed for experimental purpose and a 
drum intended to receive water for leak test, respectively.  It should be noted that in 
these five accidents, the power excursion took place in the tank/drum, which was not 
used in the normal process stream.    
Two criticality accidents occurred in the vessels, use of which was not expected in the 
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design (at Novosibirsk in 1997 and the Wood River Junction Scrap Recovery Plant in 
1964
(27,29)
).  In the JCO accident, the precipitation tank was designed to be used in the 
refining process of U3O8 but was not intended for use in the process for redissolving the 
purified U3O8 and producing the final product.   In this point, the JCO accident is 
similar to these two accidents. 
2.3 Duration Time and Fission Number 
The duration time is defined, in this study, as the period from the time when the first 
power excursion/spike was observed to the time when the subcritical condition was 
confirmed.  While the duration time ranges from several seconds to less than 1 h in eight 
accidents, the critical condition was maintained intermittently or continuously over 
several hours in five accidents (Figure III.12).  In the accident at the Hanford Works in 
1962, the critical condition continued over 37 h intermittently
(27)
.  Also, six power 
excursions occurred during 27 h in the Novosibirsk accident in 1997 and 16 power spikes 
were observed during 16 h in the Siberian accident in 1963.  In the JCO accident, the 
critical condition continued for about 20 h, that is the second longest.  Since most of the 
accidents with the duration time not being specified were terminated due to the solution 
flowing out of or being splashed from the vessel, it can be assumed that the subcritical 
condition was reached in a short time for them. 
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Figure III.12  Duration Time of Criticality 
The total fission number ranges from 10
17
 to 10
18
 in 11 accidents, less than 10
17
 in 7 
accidents and larger than 10
18
 in three accidents as shown in Figure III.13.  Compared 
with these accidents, that in the JCO accident is relatively large (2.5×10
18
).  The largest 
three fission numbers (4×10
19
, 2.7×10
18
, 1.3×10
18
) were estimated for the accidents at the 
Idaho Chemical Processing Plant in 1959 and 1978
(27)
 and the Y-12 plant in 1958.  In 
these accidents, the duration times were relatively short (20 min, 18 min and 1.5 h, 
respectively) and, particularly two of them involved power oscillations in a few minutes 
shortly after the initial spikes, resulting in the larger number of fissions.  On the other 
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hand, in the JCO accident, the critical condition was maintained for a long time because 
water had been held in the cooling jacket surrounding the precipitation tank.  As a 
consequence, a large number of fissions were produced but the reason of the large fission 
number is different from the other accidents.  
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Figure III.13  Fission Number 
 
2.4 Recriticality 
Although the first power excursion stopped due to the solution surging into the 
connecting lines, in the accident at the Mayak Enterprise in 1960, the vacuum system was 
switched off, resulting in the solution flowing back into the vessel and the subsequent 
second excursion
(31)
.  Also, in another Mayak accident in 1968, the shift supervisor 
re-entered the processing area and tipped the vessel in order to pour some liquid into the 
drain, leading to the second spike, after the area was evacuated due to the first 
criticality
(31)
.  In the Wood River Junction accident in 1964, two workers entered the 
area and turned off the stirrer, creating the geometry change and the subsequent second 
excursion.  It is considered that recriticality in these accidents was caused by lack of 
workers’ knowledge on the criticality.  In particular, the second and third accidents 
mentioned above involved a death of the supervisor/worker.  However, the death might 
have been avoided if he would have enough been trained and understood the hazard and 
characteristics of criticality well.   
As well, in the Novosibirsk accident in 1997, the first critical condition was terminated 
by injecting the boron solution.  After that, nevertheless, several excursions occurred.  
Finally, lithium chloride solution with much higher solubility was injected into the vessel.  
This accident implies that the boron solution might not ensure the criticality is terminated 
completely.  Thus, it is necessary to take its solubility into account when selecting the 
poison to be injected. 
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2.5 Mechanism of Criticality Termination 
Mechanisms to terminate the criticality can be divided into two categories; one is a 
passive aspect and the other is an active aspect as shown in Figure III.14.  The former 
includes the solution flowing/spattering out of the vessel, the solution boiling and the 
sediment formation, and did not need to take any human action.  Eleven accidents were 
terminated by such mechanisms.  The latter consists of injecting the poison, transferring 
or draining the solution and diluting or stirring the solution, and required taking human 
actions actually.  Three accidents were terminated by injecting the poison: the cadmium 
solution was used in two of these accidents (at Siberian in 1963 and Mayak in 1965
(31)
) 
and the lithium chloride solution was used finally after the boron solution was injected in 
the Novosibirsk accident in 1997.  As well, in other four accidents, uranium solution 
was drained from the vessel, stopping the chain reaction.  However, in two of them, the 
workers were overexposed, indicating lack of the workers’ knowledge on the criticality 
and inadequacies of the decision making when taking actions for terminating the accident.  
In addition, three accidents were terminated by the solution being stirred and diluted due 
to the continuous operation of equipment after the criticality occurred.   In the JCO 
accident, applied were the different approach, that is, draining of water from the cooling 
jacket surrounding the precipitation tank.  The boron solution was also injected but this 
aimed at ensuring the subcritical condition. 
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Figure III.14  Mechanism of Stopping Criticality 
2.6 Radiation Exposures 
Five criticality accidents involved a total of 7 fatalities.  In particular, three workers died 
and one lost his eyesight in the Mayak accident in 1958, resulting in the worst accident 
from the viewpoint of human damage.  Another accident at the Mayak Enterprise in 
1968 involved one death and one with both legs being amputated.  In the JCO accident, 
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two workers died and one worker was overexposed.  Considering that approximately 
440 people including general public received radiation doses, it can be said that this 
accident was the most serious one.  Accidents in shielded facilities did not result in 
direct exposures in excess of occupational limits.  
 
3.  Causes of Criticality Accidents in Foreign 
Countries 
In order to understand why or how the criticality accidents took place, their causes of 
individual accidents were analyzed and organized from the generic point of view.  
Figure III.15 shows the number of accidents by causes.  Most of the accidents were 
caused by several factors and thus, a total number exceeds the number of occurrences. 
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Figure III.15  Causes of Criticality Accidents 
 
(1) Insufficient Communication among Workers/Operators 
Lack of sufficient communications among workers/operators was a major contributing 
factor in six accidents.  For example, in the Y12 plant accident in 1958, the operators 
did not document the fact that the uranium solution had leaked and thus, the coming shift 
did not notice it and drained the testing water containing the accumulated uranium in 
order to execute the leak test of process equipment, resulting in the criticality.  The 
Wood River Junction accident in 1964 stemmed from lack of communication between 
shifts.  Concretely, the concentrated uranium solution was drained into bottles identical 
to those that normally held the very-low-concentration uranium-contaminated 
trichloroethane (TCE) solution.  Since this fact was not transferred to the next shift, a 
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bottle of the concentrated solution was mistaken for the TCE solution and the operator 
poured it into the tank, resulting in the criticality and his death due to overexposure.  
Other three accidents were attributable to miscommunication of solution sample 
concentrations (at Siberian in 1963, Mayak in 1965 and 1968).  Particularly, one of them 
was attributed to the worker having misunderstood the unit on uranium content and 
underestimated uranium mass (at Siberian in 1963).  In the sixth accident (at Idaho in 
1961
(27)
), a worker started the pump and opened the suction valve prior to its associated 
valve being closed by another worker, allowing the high-pressure air to enter the tank and 
resulting in the criticality.  Such communication issues should be disseminated more 
widely to establish the robust human performance tools. 
(2) Lack of Recognition on Upset Conditions  
Some of the accidents might have been avoided if the workers involved would have been 
familiar with and/or have well understood the criticality and the operating processes.  
For example, in the Mayak accident in 1953
(31)
, the operator saw foam when 
disconnecting the hose from the vessel and thus, he reconnected the hose; however, he 
did not notice that the criticality took place, resulting in his overexposure.  Another 
accident at the Mayak Enterprise in 1957
(31)
 involved a death of worker because he did 
not notice that the criticality occurred though he observed the gases having been released 
from the oxalate precipitate.  In the third accident at the Mayak Enterprise in 1960, a 
technician found a discrepancy in the plutonium mass analysis but transferred the 
solution with no check of the results, leading to the criticality.  In the Siberian accident 
in 1978, an operator extracted ingots manually from the container after the excursion 
occurred, causing him to receive an excessive dose.  
(3) Inadequate Mass/Concentration Control 
Twelve accidents were attributed to inadequate mass and/or concentration control.  Out 
of them, six accidents were associated with precipitates or deposits having not been 
monitored in the facility (at Mayak in 1957, Y-12 in 1958, Siberian in 1961, Electrostal in 
1965, Windscale in 1970
(27)
, and Novosibirsk in 1997), two cases with no device having 
been installed for measuring the concentration of solution (both at Siberian in 1963
(31,32)
), 
and one with the plutonium mass measurement having not been recorded adequately (at 
Mayak in 1958).  In another accident at the Siberian plant in 1978, as well, the ingots 
were loaded without using instrument to monitor plutonium mass, resulting in the 
criticality.  It can be said that these accidents occurred as a result of inadequate process 
control.  The other two accidents resulted from scrap material having been stored 
without measurement of its plutonium content and scrap with different uranium content 
having been stored in one spot, respectively (at Mayak in 1962
(31)
 and 1965).  These 
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accidents reveal the problems in accounting and storage control. 
(4) Inappropriate Response to Equipment Malfunctions 
Inappropriate responses to process malfunctions led to the criticality.  In the Idaho 
accident in 1959, the inadvertent initiation of a syphoning action during an air-sparging 
operation resulted in the transfer of solution from a tank with favorable geometry to 
another one with unfavorable geometry, leading to the criticality.  The air-sparging 
operation was carried out because the pump normally used for stirring the solution had 
been inoperable.  Another accident at the Idaho plant in 1961 is thought to have been 
caused by a bubble of high-pressure air forcing uranyl nitrate solution into a cylinder with 
unfavorable geometry.  The high-pressure air was used to correct the line plugged. 
(5) Lack of Knowledge on Criticality Hazards 
Several accidents were associated with the workers having not been aware of criticality 
hazards.  In the accident at the Siberian plant in 1961, the automatic supply of liquid 
nitrogen to the main cylinder for condensing gaseous uranium hexafluoride (HFU) was 
stopped to restrict consumption of liquid nitrogen and also, the manual supply was not 
performed.  The resultant insufficient cooling, combined with processing parameters 
having not been observed, made a portion of HFU to get into and the uranium to 
intensively accumulate in the vacuum system, causing the criticality.  In the Mayak 
accident in 1968, although the chief operator and the operator noticed that the liquid was 
dark-brown indicating high plutonium content, the chief operator poured the first portion 
of liquid into the vessel.  After that, he gave the order to repeat the operation and left the 
area.  When the operator poured the second portion of liquid into the vessel, the 
criticality condition was reached and all personnel were evacuated.  However, the shift 
supervisor re-entered the area and tipped the vessel to drain the liquid.  As a result, the 
second criticality occurred and the supervisor died.  It can be said that lack of 
knowledge and/or low level of recognition on criticality hazards might have led to the 
criticality and/or the fatality.  These accidents imply the importance of operator training.   
For the JCO accident, it was pointed out that the operators had not enough been aware of 
criticality hazards.  For example, the operators might have mistakenly assumed that the 
precipitation tank with unfavorable geometry could be used for homogenizing uranyl 
nitrate solution without any problem because the storage tower with favorable geometry 
had been previously used for homogenization and nothing had happened even though the 
critical mass limits had been exceeded.  The reconversion process at the time of accident 
was being executed by a special team which had usually been involved in the liquid waste 
treatment and had lacked the knowledge and experience on the process.   
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(6) Deviations/Violations of Operating Procedures/Rules 
Deviations and/or violations of operating procedures and/or rules contributed to 10 
criticality accidents.  These can be divided into the cases that operators did not follow 
the requirements specified and the cases that they took actions deviating or violating the 
rules and regulations.  The former cases include 4 accidents, in which the uranium had 
gradually accumulated, leading to the criticality, because of failure to conduct periodic 
cleaning of equipment, sampling of solution, checking of filters, or manual supplying of 
liquid nitrogen (at Windscale in 1970, Electrostal in 1965, Mayak in 1957, Siberian in 
1961).  The latter cases contain 6 accidents.  The Mayak accident in 1960 was caused 
by transferring the solution with plutonium mass which exceeded the acceptable error for 
loading product stipulated in the procedures, and the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory 
accident in 1958
(27)
 was due to unexpected plutonium-rich solids being washed into a 
vessel of dilute aqueous and organic solutions.  In addition to these two accidents, the 
rules and regulations were violated as a result of taking actions to improve the work 
efficiency, leading to four accidents.  Of these, the Mayak accident in 1958 resulted 
from the tank being tipped to drain the solution faster and the resultant criticality caused 
three fatalities and one with loss of eyesight.  In another accident at the Mayak plant in 
1965, the time specified for dissolving scraps were shorten because of a scheduled 
chamber cleanup.  The Wood River Junction accident in 1964 was attributable to the 
operation being shifted from small bottles with favorable geometry to a sodium carbonate 
makeup tank with unfavorable geometry, which was not expected in the area.  This shift 
proposed and implemented the processing of an unexpectedly large amount of 
uranium-contaminated solution without any approval from plant management.  The 
makeup tank was not intended to use for processing the solution.  Also, in the 
Novosibirsk accident in 1997, a total of 6 power excursions occurred in two receiver 
vessels but the receiver vessels had been used in the process for 13 years without 
approval from the regulatory authority.  These accidents demonstrate that placing a 
priority on the improvement of work efficiency and/or productivity would lead to less 
safety consciousness and subsequent violations of rules. 
In the JCO accident, the use of precipitation tank was proposed and implemented to 
improve the work efficiency because a lot of time had been required for homogenizing 
the solution with use of the storage tower and it was not easy to extract the solution from 
the tower.  However, the homogenization with use of the tower had also been carried out 
without approval from the regulatory authority.  Additionally, the maximum allowable 
mass for the tower and the critical mass limit for the precipitation tank had been exceeded, 
and the stainless steel container, the storage tower and the precipitation tank had been 
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used for different purposes from their respective design intention.  All of these were also 
violations of rules and regulations. 
(7) Complacency/Mindset on Criticality 
The complacency or mindset on criticality is observed in the Novosibirsk accident in 
1997.  Since all of the vessels used were of favorable geometry (according to design and 
records), the facility did not have the ability to determine uranium concentration of the 
solutions generated.  The possibility of precipitate formation and uranium deposition in 
the service piping was also not monitored.  Despite the discovery of a solid UO2 deposit, 
therefore, the logical search for similar deposits in the service piping, receiver and 
holding vessels was not initiated.  However, the receiver vessels were not favorable 
geometry for the conditions encountered and the actual internal thickness of receiver 
vessels was larger than the designed one, significantly affecting the criticality safety 
margin.  Thus, the uranium has gradually accumulated in the vessels, resulting in the 
criticality. 
Also, in the JCO accident, the workers had performed the system/process changes and 
used the storage tower for homogenizing the solution since the tower was of favorable 
geometry and the critical condition had not been reached even though 6 or 7 batches were 
loaded.  It was also revealed that the chief engineer for criticality control, who had 
initially been stationed, was abolished and the licensed chief engineer for handling 
nuclear fuels had not been involved in the process for developing criticality control 
criteria and operating procedures.  These facts seem associated with complacency/ 
mindset on criticality in the management level as well as the operators. 
(8) Safety Regulatory Issues 
The Novosibirsk accident in 1997 was associated with the long term operation without 
any approval of the competent authority.  Although, in this plant, the vessels with 
favorable geometry had been used in the process different from their original purposes for 
13 years, the licensee had not made the application on their use and thus, the regulatory 
body had not recognized the fact.  As well, the JCO plant had used the stainless steel 
vessel in the dissolving process, implemented the homogenizing process, used the storage 
tower in the homogenizing process and made the associated system/process modifications 
for a long time without any approval from the regulatory authority.  The authority had 
not recognized such processes and modifications at all. 
 
4. Summary 
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The analysis of 21 criticality accidents in foreign countries shows that the most of them 
took place when handling uranium or plutonium solutions in the vessels with unfavorable 
geometry and some common issues were identified in the accident scenarios and causes.  
For example, the operating procedures are proposed and implemented to improve the 
work efficiency, the vessels were used for the different purpose from their original one, 
the operating procedures and/or rules were violated due to the priority being given to 
production and the operating procedures/processes were changed and implemented 
without any application to the regulatory authority.  Lack of understanding of criticality 
hazards and/or the complacency on criticality contributed to accidents and to exacerbated 
consequences.  It can be said that these are the results from the administrative issues in 
the company. 
While the accidents in the United States and the United Kingdom had been reported at the 
time of their occurrences, those in Russia had not been published for a long time and thus, 
any insights from the Russian accidents had not been available.  If the lessons learned 
from the past accidents would have been prevailed worldwide and as a result, for example, 
the mass and concentration controls would have adequately been performed and the 
operating rules and regulations have been adhered, similar accidents including the JCO 
accidents would have not been repeated.  Finally, this study points out the need to 
analyze the past experience and to disseminate the insights obtained from the analysis 
into the nuclear community worldwide in a timely manner. 
 
III.4  Trend Analysis of Sepoint Drift in Safety or 
Safety/Relief Valves at U. S. LWRs 
Safety valves or safety/relief valves are used to prevent overpressurization of RCS at 
LWRs.  For example, SRVs are installed on the main steam lines between the reactor 
and inboard main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) at BWRs and the safety valves are on 
the top of pressurizer at PWRs to relieve pressure by lifting at the required setpoint in the 
event of load rejection, loss of feedwater and so on.  On the other hand, these valves 
play a role of maintaining the RCS pressure boundary integrity by seating tightly without 
leakage during the normal operation.  At PWRs, MSSVs are also installed on the 
secondary system to prevent its overpressurization, provide cooling to RCS in the event 
of MSIV closure prior to reactor scram and remove post-scram decay heat by lifting at 
the appropriate setpoint, thereby assisting in prevention of the RCS overpressurization.  
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As well, MSSVs preserve the steam line integrity by seating tightly without leaking. 
The setpoints for opening the safety valves or safety/relief valves are determined to have 
allowable tolerances, taking into account the setpoint drift of valves in service and thus, 
the in-service testing of valves are carried out routinely.  While the setpoint drift low 
may result in a premature lift of the valve, leading to plant transient, for example, the 
setpoint drift high may cause the RCS overpressurization, threatening the integrity of 
pressure boundary.  Since the beginning of 1980s, in the United States, there have been 
many LERs describing setpoint drift in safety or safety/relief valves.  The USNRC has 
issued a lot of generic communications on this issue and the industry has made its efforts 
to resolve the issue.  In the first half of 1990s, the analysis of operating experience 
involving the safety or safety/relief valve malfunctions was performed and pointed out 
the importance of feeding such experience back to the testing and maintenance 
practices
(36)
.  As well, the nuclear power industry in United States has analyzed the 
causes of setpoint drift events and based on the analysis, several corrective actions have 
been implemented.  For example, the guidelines have been prepared for conducting the 
testing and maintenance of valves and the design modifications have been made to 
eliminate the causes
(37)
.  In the period from January 2001 to August 2006, however, 
there have been over 70 LERs addressing setpoint drift of safety or safety/relief valves 
and therefore, the USNRC issued the information notice to alert addressees of operating 
experience associated with PSVs, MSSVs and SRVs exceeding the lift setpoint tolerance 
required by technical specifications
(38)
.   
As mentioned above, the setpoint drift of these valves has been observed at many plants 
over the years and corrective actions have been taken but this issue has not yet been 
resolved.  This study examines the trend of the U.S. experience with setpoint drift by 
reviewing approximately 90 LERs from 2000 to 2006 focusing on causes and setpoint 
deviation ranges to provide the insights useful for improving the reliability of these 
valves 
(10, 11)
.   
 
1. General Description of Safety and Safety/Relief 
Valve 
1.1 Safety/Relief Valves at BWRs 
SRVs can actuate by either of two modes, the safety mode and the relief mode, to provide 
the RCS overpressure protection and as well, some of them are used by the automatic 
depressurization system (ADS), one of emergency core cooling systems, and can be 
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manually operated.  To provide adequate protection, 11-16 SRVs are mounted 
depending on the rated power.  The design capacity of an SRV is capable of maintaining 
reactor pressure below 110% of the vessel design pressure at the most severe 
pressurization transient
(39)
.   In the following, brief descriptions are provided on the 
structure, operation mechanism, environment and surveillance requirements of the 
two-stage pilot actuated SRVs generally used at U.S. BWRs.  
(1) Structure(36) 
SRV consists of a main stage assembly and a pilot stage assembly which causes the main 
valve disc to move as shown in Figure III.16.  Principle parts of the main stage are a 
bonnet, a main disc, a main piston, a main spring, and internal porting for the pilot stage.  
The pilot stage assembly is composed of a bonnet, a stabilizer disc, a pilot disc, a set 
pressure spring, and a pneumatic operator.  
(2) Operation Mechanism(36) 
When the pressure under the stabilizer disc reaches the setpoint of the valve, it will push 
the pilot disc upward, releasing the pressure behind the main piston into the discharge of 
SRV.  The differential pressure across the piston will lift the main disc, relieving the 
RCS pressure.  The ADS and the manual operation modes are initiated by the pneumatic 
actuator raising the pilot stem. 
(3) Environment(36) 
SRV operates in a saturated steam environment at a setpoint pressure which ranges from 
7.548 MPa to 8.085 MPa.  At the plant equipped with 11 SRVs, for example, these are 
divided into 3 groups (4 SRVs, 4 SRVs and 3 SRVs), for each of which the lift pressure is 
set to 7.617 MPa, 7.686 MPa or 7.754 MPa, respectively.  The operating pressure at a 
BWR is about 7.272 MPa. 
(4) Surveillance Requirements(39) 
The surveillance requirements specify that any SRV lift at the setpoint pressure assumed 
in the safety analysis.  The bench test, which is to be conducted in accordance with the 
in-service testing program, shall demonstrate that the safety mode lift setpoints of SRVs 
are maintained within their allowable tolerance during plant shutdown.  The allowable 
tolerance for lift setpoints generally is ±3% for the operability but the valves are reset to 
±1% during the surveillance to allow for drift.  The surveillance test is to be carried out 
during plant shutdown and thus, the 18 or 24 month frequency is selected based on the 
time between refuelings. 
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Figure III.16  Structure of Safety/Relief Valve (Two-Stage SRV) (36) 
 
1.2 Pressurizer Safety Valves and Main Steam Safety Valves at 
PWRs 
The number of PSVs is different depending on plant designers.  In general, a Babcock 
and Wilcox (B&W) PWR is equipped with 2 PSVs, a Combustion Engineering (CE) 
PWR is with 2-4 PSVs and a Westinghouse (WH) PWR is with 3 PSVs
(40-42)
.  PSVs are 
designed to prevent the RCS pressure from exceeding 110% of the design pressure based 
on postulated overpressure transient conditions resulting from a complete loss of steam 
flow to the turbine.  The number of MSSVs is dependent on plant designers; in general, 
9 at the B&W plant, 8 at the CE plant, and 5 at the WH plant
(40-42)
.  The capacity of 
MSSV also depends on plant designers.  While at the B&W and CE PWRs, the rated 
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capacity of MSSV passes the full steam flow at 112% and 102% rated thermal power 
with a valve fully opened, at WH PWRs, MSSVs are designed to have sufficient capacity 
to limit the secondary pressure to 110% or less of the steam generator design 
pressure
(40-42)
.  MSSVs provide overpressure protection for the secondary system and as 
well, play a role of protecting RCS against overpressurization by providing a heat sink for 
the removal of energy from RCS if the preferred heat sink, provided by the condenser and 
circulating water system, is not available.  In the following, brief descriptions are 
provided on the structure, operation mechanism, environment and surveillance 
requirements of the spring-actuated safety valves generally used as PSVs and MSSVs at 
U.S. PWRs. 
(1) Structure(36) 
The spring-actuated safety valves consists of a body, a bonnet (or yoke), a spring, a 
spindle (or stem), and a disc as shown in Figure III.17.  The spring is connected to the 
spindle by the setpoint nut and the spindle rests on the disc.  The disc sits on the seat 
which is the upper surface of the nozzle welded or screwed into the body inlet flange.  
The disc and seat materials in PSV are usually both Stellite or stainless steel to Stellite 
and those in MSSV are both stainless steel.  The disc-seat interface is flat and the 
pressure boundary 
(2) Operation Mechanism(36) 
The spring force is transmitted to the disc by the spindle and is equal to the system 
pressure at which the valve is expected to lift (i.e. the lift setpoint).  When the pressure 
under the disc equals to the setpoint, the disc will begin to lift and the escaping steam 
assists the lift.  The disc will quickly attain full lift at a pressure no greater than 3% 
above the setpoint and reseat when the system pressure has been reduced to 95% of the 
setpoint.  The characteristics of valve lift and reseat, sharp or tentative, are determined 
by the guide ring and nozzle ring settings. 
(3) Environment(36) 
Both PSVs and MSSVs operate in a saturated steam at valve inlet.  Operating pressure 
in the primary system is usually about 15.51 MPa and the setpoint pressure for PSVs is 
established at 17.23 MPa.  Operating pressure in the secondary system is usually about 
6.651 MPa and the MSSV setpoints vary from 6.996 MPa to 9.064 MPa.   
(4) Surveillance Requirements(40-42) 
The surveillance requirements for PSVs are specified in the in-service testing program, in 
which the frequency and contents of the testing are set forth.  PSVs are generally set to 
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open at the RCS design pressure (about 17.33 PMa) with an allowable tolerance of ±1%.  
At least one PSV is to be tested during every refueling outage and if the test results show 
that the allowable tolerance was exceeded, it is required that the scope be extended.  
Since PSVs are removed for testing, the 18 or 24 month frequency is selected.  As well, 
MSSVs shall be tested to verify their respective lift setpoints in accordance with the 
in-service testing program.  It is required that all valves be tested every 5 years and a 
minimum of 20% of the valves be tested every 24 months according to the ANSI/ASME 
(American National Standards Institution/American Society of Mechanical Engineers) 
standard.  The allowable tolerance for MSSV setpoints generally is ±3% for the 
operability but the valves are reset to ±1% during the surveillance to allow for drift.  
While the test for MSSVs is to be carried out during power operation, the plant is allowed 
to be brought into a hot standby prior to the testing.  MSSVs may be either bench tested 
or tested in situ at hot conditions using an assist device to simulate lift pressure.  If 
MSSVs are not tested at hot conditions, the lift pressure shall be corrected to ambient 
conditions of the valves at operating temperature and pressure.  
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Figure III.17  Structure of Spring-Actuated Safety Valve(36) 
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2. Trending Analysis 
2.1 Overall Trends Observed 
This study reviewed 93 events involving the setpoint drift of SRVs, PSVs and MSSVs 
described in 87 LERs from 54 U.S. Plants during the years 2000 to 2006.  Figure III.18 
shows the number of such events year by year.  Except the year 2004, more than 10 
LERs were submitted every year.  While the setpoint drifts of PSVs were observed 
mainly during the first four years (2000 to 2003), those of SRVs occurred mainly during 
the last four years (2003 to 2006).     
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Figure III.18  Number of Setpoint Drift Events Year by Year 
Thirty-five BWRs had been in operation during the 7-year period, 18 of which 
experienced the setpoint drift of SRVs and submitted a total of 31 LERs.  At nine BWRs, 
the setpoint drift events recurred and in particular, two BWRs (Hope Creek and Pilgrim) 
experienced 5 events and 4 events, respectively.  As well, the setpoint drift of PSVs or 
MSSVs was observed at 36 of 69 operating PWRs (22 of 48 WH plants, 8 of 14 CE 
plants and 6 of 7 B&W plants) and a total of 56 LERS were submitted (32 LERs at WH 
plants, 17 at CE plants and 7 at B&W plants).  Three WH plants (Byron-1, Salem-1 and 
Turkey Point-3) experienced three events involving the setpoint drift of MSSVs and also, 
the PSV setpoint drift occurred at two of them (Byron-1 and Salem-1).  The setpoint 
drift of MSSVs was observed at 6 CE plants, at 4 of which, such events occurred 
repeatedly.  Particularly, the Palo Verde-2 submitted 4 LERs for years 2000 to 2002.  
Two CE plants (Palo Verde-2 and St Lucie-2) have an experience with the setpoint drift of 
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both PSVs and MSSVs.  As for the B&W plants, only one plant (Davis Besse) 
experienced the recurrence of MSSV setpoint drift. 
Ninety-three LERs address the setpoint drift observed in a total of 277 valves, 189 of 
which involved the setpoint drift high and the rest involved the setpoint drift low.  
Figure III.19 indicates the number of affected valves year by year.  More than 17 valves 
experienced the setpoint drift high in every year and particularly, in 2000 and 2006, more 
than 30 valves were affected.  For the setpoint drift low, more than 10 valves were 
affected in every year except for 2004 and 2006 and in particular, 25 valves experienced 
setpoint drift low in 2000. 
In the following, the trends observed for SRVs, PSVs and MSSVs, respectively, focusing 
on either the setpoint drift high or low.  
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Figure III.19  Number of Valves Affected 
2.2 Safety/Relief Valves at BWRs 
Thirty-one LERs address thirty-five events involving the setpoint drift of SRVs.  A total 
of 125 SRVs were affected.  As seen from Figure III.20, more than 10 SRVs were 
affected in each year except 2002.  In the years, 2000, 2003 and 2005, more than 20 
SRVs experienced setpoit drift.  In 2005, the numbers of such events and of the affected 
valves are larger than those in other years.  Although the number of such events in the 
year 2000 or 2003 is comparable to that in 2001 or 2004, the number of the affected 
valves in 2000 or 2003 is twice as much as that in 2001 or 2004. 
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Figure III.20 Number of SRVs Affected 
 
More than 70% of the affected SRVs (91 of 125 SRVs) experienced the setpoint drift high.  
As seen from Figure III.20, the number of the affected SRVs is more than 10 in every 
year except for 2001 and 2002 but a slightly decreasing trend is observed since 2000.  
Analyzing the causes of setpoint drift high, as shown in Table III.7, it is revealed that the 
setpoint drift high in 71 of 91 SRVs was due to disc-to-seat corrosion bonding in the pilot 
valve.  The disc-to-seat corrosion bonding is thought to occur when oxygen in the steam 
corrodes the disc.  More specifically speaking, the radiolytic breakdown of water and/or 
steam condensation may create the oxygen-rich environment in the pilot assembly, 
causing the oxygen to combine with the exposed internal metal surface and then forming 
the metal oxide film, that is, corrosion bonding, during normal operation.  With 
corrosion bonding between the pilot disc and seat, more pressure is needed to lift the pilot 
disc off the seat and the lift pressure becomes higher.  Actually, the resulting setpoint 
drift due to corrosion bonding ranged from several percent to greater than 10 percent.  
However, once the valve lifts, the corrosion bonding would be broken and the subsequent 
lifts would not or less be affected by the corrosion bonding.  In many events, the SRVs 
that failed the initial lift test had successful lift tests within an allowable tolerance 
subsequently.  This phenomenon had been recognized since the beginning of 1980s and 
the industry had made efforts such as the revision of maintenance procedures and the 
design modification of valve materials.  Although the performance of SRVs had been 
improved as a result of actions which had taken by the industry until 2000, it can be said 
that any final resolution to eliminate this problem has not been attained because the 
corrosion bonding has occurred repeatedly after that.  Other causes of setpoint drift high 
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include erroneous settings of pressure switches (4 SRVs in 2 events), poorly controlled 
maintenance leading to friction on the sliding surface, excessive lapping of pilot disc or 
misalignment of internal parts of valves (7 SRVs in 4 events), and design deficiencies 
such as insufficient pressure adjusting spring tolerance specifications and lack of chamfer 
(2 SRVs in 2 events).  The setpoint drift ranges are summarized in Figure III.21 for the 
79 affected SRVs, thirty and twenty-nine of which had the deviations of 3% to 5% and 
5% to 10%, respectively.  At some plants, the allowable tolerance has been specified as 
±1% and thus, the setpoint drift ranges were 1% to 3% in 14 SRVs.  Four of them 
involved the pressure switch problems.  The deviations of greater than 10% were 
observed in 6 SRVs, all of which were caused by the corrosion bonding.  The number of 
SRVs affected by the corrosion bonding was 6, 24, and 23 for the setpoint deviation of 
1-3%, 3-5% and 5-10%, respectively, implying that the setpoint drift caused by the 
corrosion bonding tends to result in a higher deviation from the specified value.    
The setpoint drift low was observed for 11 SRVs in 2005 but in the other years, it was for 
only a few SRVs (see Figure III.20).  While the apparent causes of drift low were not 
identified for 20 of the 34 affected SRVs (8 of 14 events), one of the major causes was 
the seat leakage of pilot valve due to steam cutting.  As seen from Table III.7, the 
setpoint drift low resulted from the steam cutting for 10 SRVs (4 events).  The steam 
cutting can occur when system pressure reaches greater than 90% of set pressure, which 
typically occurs during a unit startup.  At this point, system pressure is sufficient to 
allow the relief valve to simmer.  If this simmering condition is allowed to exist for an 
extended period, the steam flow has the potential to erode small grooves into the seating 
surface.  These small grooves create a permanent leak path by which steam continues to 
erode the disc and nozzle, leading to the seat leakage.  As well, the steam cutting may be 
caused by foreign material lodged between the valve seat and disc, creating flaws on the 
seating surface and then leading to leakage.  Many efforts had also been made to 
eliminate the seat leak problem but any final solution might have not been found.  For 
the 20 SRVs with no cause being identified, the as-found setpoints were outside technical 
specifications acceptance criteria of ±1% but most of them (19 SRVs) were within the 
allowable tolerance of ±3% specified in the ASME standard.  Other causes include the 
inherent characteristics of the valve hardware in conjunction with heating/cooling cycles 
and the vibration on the valves during service (2 SRVs in 1 event), sticking of air actuator 
stem preventing the pilot set spring from fully extending (1 SRV in 1 event), and a 
misalignment of internal parts (1 SRV in 1 event).  The air actuator stem sticking was 
considered a unique case as there was no industry evidence of a previous occurrence.  
For 24 of the 34 affected SRVs, the drift ranged from -1% to -3% and such deviations are 
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smaller compared with the drift high as shown in Figure III.21.  However, in the case of 
drift low due to seat leakage, 7 of 10 SRVs experienced the drift low of -3% to -5%, 
indicating that the seat leakage may result in a greater deviation compared with the other 
cases.    
Table III.7  Causes of SRV Setpoint Drift 
Causes No. of Valves (Events) 
- SRVs: Drift High - 
Pilot Disc-Seat Corrosion Bonding 71 (20) 
Maintenance Problems (ex. misalignment of internal components):  7 (4) 
Design or Specification Problems (ex. lack of chamfer) 2 (2) 
Pilot Seat Leakage 2 (1) 
Error in Changing Pressure Switch Settings 4 (2) 
Not Specified 5 (4) 
- SRVs: Drift Low - 
Pilot Seat Leakage (ex. due to Steam Cutting) 10 (4) 
Heating/Cooling Cycle & Vibration 2 (1) 
Misalignment of Internal Components 1 (1) 
Air Operator Stem Sticking 1 (1) 
Not Specified 20 (8) 
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Figure III.21  Number of SRVs by Setpoint Drift Ranges 
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2.3 Pressurizer Safety Valves at PWRs 
A total of 45 PSVs have an experience with setpoint drift, which were reported in 22 
LERs.  Considering that only 2 to 4 PSVs are mounted on a reactor while 11 to 16 SRVs 
and 15 to 20 MSSVs are on a reactor, it can be said that the number of the affected PSVs 
is comparable to that for SRVs or MSSVs.  As shown in Figure III.22, the setpoint drift 
low was observed in 12 PSVs (6 events) and 16 PSVs (8 events) in 2000 and 2002, 
respectively, corresponding to approximately 60% of the total number of occurrences.  
In addition, during the last three years, only two events were reported in 2005, both of 
which describe the setpoint drift low observed in four PSVs.  This implies that the 
setpoint drift of PSVs has a decreasing trend. 
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Figure III.22  Number of PSVs Affected 
 
Twenty-seven of the 45 affected PSVs (14 of 22 events) involved the setpoint drift low 
and the remaining 18 PSVs (15 events) involved the drift high.  Figure III.23 shows the 
number of PSVs by setpoint drift ranges.  As seen from this figure, the deviation range 
of ±1% to ±2% was observed in more than half of the affected PSVs (drift high in 9 PSVs 
and drift low in 15 PSVs).  The 11 PSVs experienced the deviation of greater than ±3% 
(drift high in 5 PSVs and low in 6 PSVs) but the greatest deviation was +3.8% for drift 
high and -4.4% for drift low.  Many LERs did not identify a root cause of setpoint drift, 
some of which defined the random spread as a root cause and the others provided no 
information on the root cause.  As seen from Table III.8, apparent root causes of 
setpoint drift were provided for only 7 of the 45 affected PSVs (4 of 27 PSVs with 
setpoint drift low and 3 of 18 PSVs with setpoint drift high).  The apparent causes of 
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drift low were inadequate lapping of internal parts and the nozzle loading effects (the 
variation in thermal growth of the valve inlet and outlet piping) inducing stresses and 
misalignments in the valve (1 PSV in 1 event, 3 PSVs in 1 event, respectively).  The 
setpoint drift high was caused by the spring performance problems such as degradation 
due to aging and insufficient contact area between spring and washer.  However, the 
deviation range observed in these events was relatively large, exceeding 3% for the drift 
high (+3.8, +3.7, +3.66) and -2.5% for the drift low (-3.5, -3.18, -2.98, -2.53).   Many 
plants specify an allowable tolerance of ±1% in the technical specifications but some 
plants specify the value of ±2% or ±3%.  As well, the ASME standard defines the 
tolerance of ±3% for the PSV lift setpoint.  Therefore, some plants will apply for the 
change of the technical specifications allowable tolerance from ±1% to ±3%. 
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Figure III.23  Number of PSVs by Setpoint Drift Ranges 
 
Table III.8  Causes of PSV Setpoint Drift 
Causes No. of Valves (Events) 
- PSVs: Drift High - 
Random Spread 2 (2) 
Spring Performance Problems (ex. aging) 3 (3) 
Not Specified 13 (10) 
- PSVs: Drift Low - 
Random Spread 7 (4) 
Nozzle Loading Effects 3 (1) 
Manufacturing Problem (Inadequate Lapping) 1 (1) 
Not Specified 16 (9) 
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2.4 Main Steam Safety Valves at PWRs 
Thirty-six events involved the setpoint drift of totally 107 MSSVs.  Figure III.24 shows 
the number of the MSSVs with setpoint drift high and low year by year.  The number of 
the affected MSSVs varies significantly for individual years.  While, particularly, 31 
MSSVs were affected in 2002 (8 events), there were only 4 MSSVs with setpoint drift in 
2005 (2 events).   
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Figure III.24  Number of MSSVs Affected 
Eighty of the 107 affected MSSVs (27 of 36 events) have an experience with setpoint 
drift high.  As seen from Figure III.24, there were more than half of the affected MSSVs 
in two years, 2002 and 2004 (24 MSSVs and 19 MSSVs, respectively) but only several 
MSSVs were affected in for years, 2000, 2001, 2003, and 2005.  The root causes of 
setpoint drift high were identified for the 70 affected MSSVs (see Table III.9).  The 
dominant contributor was the disc/nozzle-seat oxide bonding, which was observed for the 
54 MSSVs.  The oxide bonding is defined as the physical surface bonding of the disc 
seating surface and the nozzle or the disc and seating surfaces.  During power operations, 
an aqueous, somewhat alkaline, condition exists between the disc seating surface and the 
nozzle and promotes buildup of oxide films which over time grow together and form a 
mechanical bonding.  As well, the fusion of the martensitic stainless steel disc to the 
austenitic stainless steel seat occurs by an oxide film and results in a bonding mechanism.  
Once any oxide bonds are broken, the valve seat and nozzle do not tend to bond again as 
long as the oxide layers remain in-place, regardless of the valve materials.  This 
phenomenon had been observed at many plants since the mid-1990s.  Hence, the disc 
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material had been changed from stainless steel to Inconel X-750 and a pre-oxidation 
treatment of the disc/seat had been conducted prior to re-assembly in order to avoid the 
oxide bonding.  These efforts were considered to have mitigated the bonding conditions 
but did not lead to the final solution.  In addition, another bonding mechanism has been 
recognized as a cause of setpoint drift high.  Micro-bonding of nozzle and disc can 
occur when the harder disc causes microscopic galling of the softer nozzle during heatup, 
because of the differential thermal expansion between the contact surfaces.  These small 
gall beads cause the disc and nozzle to fuse to a limited degree.  This phenomenon was 
determined for five MSSVs in three events (two in 2003 and one in 2006), all of which 
occurred at Turkey Point.  Although the licensee lapped the valve seats and changed the 
seat and disc surface finish as corrective actions to address the micro-bonding after the 
2002 events, the micro-bonding recurred in 2006.  This indicates that the previous 
corrective actions was helpful in improving resistance to galling but did not eliminate the 
micro-bonding.  As a result, Turley Point replaced all the MSSV stainless steel discs 
with Inconel discs.  The other causes include a buildup of corrosion between the spring 
and spring washer increasing the compression of the spring (2 MSSVs in 2 events), the 
aging of valve internals (2 MSSVs in 2 events), mechanical component failure due to the 
spindle binding (4 MSSVs in 1 event), and inherent test methodology inaccuracies (1 
MSSV in 1 event).   
Table III.9  Causes of MSSV Setpoint Drift 
Causes No. of Valves (Events) 
- MSSVs: Drift High - 
Disc-Nozzle Seat Oxide Bonding 54 (15) 
Disc-Nozzle Seat Bonding due to Differential Thermal Expansion  5 (3) 
Ageing, Damage or Corrosion of Internal Components 8 (5) 
Design Problem: Incorrect Dimension of Spring Washer 1 (1) 
Misalignment of Internal Components 1 (1) 
Incorrect Test Method 1 (1) 
Not Specified 10 (6) 
- MSSVs: Drift Low - 
Spring Problems (Relaxation, Insufficient Contact of Spring Caps) 6 (2) 
Seat Leakage due to Steam Cutting 3 (2) 
Differences in Results by Using Two Test Methods/Devices 5 (2) 
Not Specified 13 (4) 
 
The setpoint drift ranges were specified for the 76 affected MSSVs.  As shown in 
Figure III.25, the deviations of 3% to 5% were observed for the 46 MSSVs.  The 19 
MSSVs exhibited the deviations of greater than 5%, for 16 of which the disc bonding was 
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determined to be a cause of drift high (14 MSSVs: oxide bonding, 2 MSSVs: 
micro-bonding).  As a small number of plants specified the allowable tolerance of ±1% 
for the MSSV setpoints, the drift ranged from 1% to 3% for the 11 MSSVs, 4 of which 
involved the oxide bonding. 
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Figure III.25  Number of MSSVs by Setpoint Drift Ranges 
 
The setpoint drift low was observed for 14 MSSVs in 2000 but after that, a decreasing 
trend was indicated; one in 2001, seven in 2002, four in 2003, one in 2004, and zero in 
2005 and 2006, as seen from Figure III.24.  For the 14 MSSVs with setpoint drift low, 
the root causes identified can be classified into three groups.  One was associated with 
the spring problems such as relaxation (5 MSSVs in 1 event) and insufficient contact of 
spring caps (1 MSSV in 1 event).  Another was the different test methodologies applied 
in the setpoint verification in situ and at the vendor facility (5 MSSVs in 2 events).  The 
other was excessive seat leakage due to steam cutting (3 MSSVs in 2 events, both of 
which occurred at Salem).  As seen from Figure III.25, the setpoint drift ranged from 
-1% to -3% for 6 MSSVs, from -3% to -5% for 17 MSSVs and from -5% to -10% for 4 
MSSVs.  Three MSSVs with excessive seat leakage exhibited a relatively slight 
deviation of -1.2 to -1.3% and were identified at Salem, where the allowable tolerance 
was specified as ±1% of nominal setpoint in technical specifications.  Thus, this plant 
applied for the change of allowable tolerance to ±3%.  The MSSVs with deviations of 
-3% to -5% include 5 MSSVs with drift low resulting from the different test 
methodologies and 4 MSSVs associated with the spring problems.  For the other 8 
MSSVs, the cause of drift low was unknown.   Two of the 4 MSSVs with a deviation of 
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-5% to -10% were stemming from the spring relaxation.   
 
3. Summary 
The U. S. nuclear power plants have experienced the setpoint drift of SRVs, PSVs and 
MSSVs for many years and thus, the USNRC has issued a lot of generic communications 
to alert the licensees of operating experience involving setpoint drift and insights on this 
matter.  The nuclear industry has also conducted the root cause analyses and 
implemented corrective actions such as disc material change to avoid this problem.  
Nevertheless, the setpoint drift has been observed continuously, implying that the definite 
solution has not been achieved.  
SRVs have a tendency of the setpoint drift high due to corrosion bonding of pilot disc and 
seat and the deviation is relatively large and may exceed 10% of the nominal setpoint, 
resulting in a potential safety significant issue for overpressure protection.  On the other 
hand, in the case of drift low due to seat leakage, the deviation of setpoint ranges from 
-3% to -5% and in the cases with cause unknown, the as-found setpoints are outside 
technical specifications acceptance criteria but are within the allowable tolerance 
specified in the ASME standard.  The deviations due to the drift low are smaller 
compared with those due to the drift high. 
While in many events involving setpoint drift of PSVs, the root causes are unknown, the 
deviation ranges from 1% to 3%.  On the other hand, the drift high due to the spring 
problem indicates a tendency of relatively large deviations exceeding 3% although there 
are a small number of affected valves.  Many plants specify an allowable tolerance of 
±1% in the technical specifications, resulting in a lot of reportable events.  The root 
causes have not been identified for such small deviations in many cases and it is 
considered difficult to keep the setpoint within a narrow range.  Furthermore, the ASME 
standard defines the tolerance of ±3% for the PSV lift setpoint.  Therefore, some plants 
attempted to apply for the change of the technical specifications allowable tolerance. 
The setpoint drift high of MSSVs due to disc/nozzle-seat oxide bonding tends to result in 
a relatively large deviation with some cases exceeding 10% and may challenge 
overpressure protection.  To cope with the oxide bonding, valve materials had been 
changed but any final resolution has not been reached.  The setpoint drift low indicates a 
decreasing trend and the deviation range are relatively small.  Since many event reports 
had not identified the root causes of drift low, no apparent trend on causes is observed.  
However, there is one case with its cause unknown involving a relatively large deviation.  
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This implies the safety significance of the setpoint drift low with a large deviation 
because it may lead to premature or spurious lift.   
 
III.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter discusses three topical studies on loss of decay heat removal during reactor 
shutdown at PWRs, criticality accidents at nuclear fuel processing facilities, and setpoint 
drift in safety or safety/relief valves at U.S. LWRs. 
Between 1976 and 1990, 197 loss of DHR events were reported to have occurred at U. S. 
PWRs and one-third (63 events) occurred in reduced inventory conditions.  Analysis of 
these events indicates that four-fifths (49 events) of DHR losses in reduced inventory 
conditions were caused by air entrainment into the DHR pumps due to lowering the RCS 
water level too far, loss of coolant inventory, increased DHR pump flow, and so on.  In 
particular, the lowering RCS water level too far resulted from mainly inaccurate level 
indications, highlighting the need to improve the reliability of water level instruments.  
In many events involving air entrainment, the DHR loss lasted for more than 1 h and the 
remarkable coolant heatup was observed.  The coolant heatup rates and the times to bulk 
boiling in the core were estimated for 12 events with use of the data obtained from their 
respective event reports.  As well, the time to core uncovery was estimated.  The 
calculated heatup rates are in reasonably good agreement with the observed ones and it is 
shown that bulk boiling and core uncovery would take place within 1 h and several hours 
respectively even if the DHR loss would occur in the late stages of shutdown (for 
example, 30 d after the reactor trip).  This implies that the recovery actions need to be 
prepared in advance against loss of DHR pumps. 
Twenty-one criticality accidents which occurred in foreign countries prior to the JCO 
accident were analyzed to examine the overall trends and to identify common issues on 
the sequences and causes of accidents in terms of similarities to the JCO accident.  
Almost all of them occurred when handling uranium or plutonium solution in 
vessels/tanks with unfavorable geometry.  In some cases the problems similar to those 
observed in the JCO accident were identified: violations of procedures and/or technical 
specifications for improving work efficiency and/or productivity, procedural changes 
without any application to and permission from the regulatory body, lack of 
understanding of criticality hazards, and complacency that a criticality accident would not 
occur.  In addition, particular attention should be paid to the fact that most of accidents 
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occurred in 1950s to 1960s which might have contributed to the JCO accident.  This 
study underscores the importance of making the lessons learned from the past similar 
events permeate throughout the workers. 
Since the beginning of 1980's, in the United States, there have been many events 
involving setpoint drift in safety or safety/relief valves.  The U.S. experience with 
setpoint drift in SRVs at BWRs, PSVs and MSSVs at PWRs was analyzed by reviewing 
approximately 90 LERs from 2000 to 2006 and the trend was examined focusing on 
causes and setpoint deviation ranges.  The results show that for SRVs and MSSVs, 
disc-seat bonding is a dominant cause of the setpoint drift high and has a tendency to 
result in a relatively large deviation of the setpoint.  This means that disc-seat bonding 
might be a safety concern from the viewpoint of overpressure protection.  To cope with 
the oxide bonding, valve materials had been changed but any final resolution has not been 
reached.  For PSVs, the deviation of setpoint is generally small, although its causes are 
not specified in many events.  However, the drift high due to the spring problem 
indicates a tendency of relatively large deviations.  This study points out the importance 
of sharing the insights obtained from the analysis of events involving setpoint drift from 
the viewpoint of overpressure protection and pressure boundary integrity. 
These topical studies identify the common issues such as the same/similar causes 
applicable to a lot of events and indicate that the lessons learned from past events or 
accidents have not sufficiently been employed and/or effective measures have not taken.  
If previous similar events had been recognized throughout the nuclear community, their 
recurrence might have been avoided.  Sharing and exchange of information on operating 
experience should be enhanced on national and international basis and in particular, the 
lessons and insights in common should be disseminated into the nuclear community.  
Also, the licensees or operating organizations should improve their surveillance or testing 
programs, perform root cause analysis and then, implement effective corrective actions, 
in particular paying more attention to past events which have the potential risks.  The 
topical studies described here indicate that it is essential to perform such studies focusing 
on the recurring events in order to derive the generic safety implications. 
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IV.1  Background 
The Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Program was established by the United States 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) in 1979 to provide a structured, 
probabilistic method of analyzing operational events at light water reactors (LWRs) to 
determine and assess both known and unrecognized vulnerabilities that could lead to 
core damage
(1)
.  The ASP Program systematically evaluates operating experience at 
LWRs, using the probabilistic risk/safety assessment (PRA/PSA) technique, to identify, 
document and rank the operational events most likely to lead to inadequate core 
cooling and severe core damage, that is, precursors if additional failures had occurred.   
Therefore, the primary objective of the ASP Program is to identify precursors to 
potential severe core damage accident sequences at nuclear power plants in terms of 
the core damage risks.  The secondary objectives of the ASP Program are to 
categorize the precursors by their plant-specific and generic implications, to provide a 
measure for trending risk at nuclear power plants and to provide a partial check on 
PSA-predicted dominant core damage scenarios.  The significance of a precursor is 
evaluated by calculating the probability of postulated core damage accident sequences 
given the failed equipment associated with the particular event, applying the event 
trees and fault trees generally used in PSA.  This probability is called a conditional 
core damage probability (CCDP).  The events with a CCDP of 1×10
-6
 or higher are 
identified as precursors and in particular, those with a CCDP of 1×10
-4
 or higher are 
considered significant in the ASP Program
(2)
. 
So far, the ASP analysis methods and results were applied to draw generic implications 
related to nuclear power plant risks by examining the risk significant trends, to 
characterize risk insights useful for identifying plant vulnerabilities, to feed the lessons 
learned from the study back to plant operations, and to establish risk indicators for 
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examining the overall trends of precursors.  For example, the ASP analyses were 
carried out for a specific event, that is, steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), with use 
of the consistent ASP model to identify the risk significant anomalies found during the 
events and to obtain generic insights useful for enhancing the safety of nuclear power 
plant operations for SGTR
(3)
.  Also, the risk information was derived by reviewing the 
ASP documents published by the USNRC, aiming at obtaining risk significant trends 
and characterizing risk-related insights
(4-7)
 and the development of event tree models 
for providing a more realistic ASP analyses
(8)
.  
In this chapter, the ASP analysis of SGTR events
(3)
 and the trending analysis of 
precursors with newly proposed risk indicators
(7)
 are described. 
 
IV.2  What is Precursor Study 
The ASP Program has used an event tree analysis method since the program was initiated.  
However, the ASP models had been improved several times to reflect the state of the art in 
PSA techniques and/or plant design changes
(9-26)
.   Therefore, different models had been 
used in the event analyses over the years and may have affected the analysis results.  
Firstly described are the major changes in the models as background information for better 
understanding of discussions. 
 
1. Evolution in of Accident Sequence Precursor 
Models 
In the ASP Program, the first phase analysis for 1969-81 events used simplified, 
standardized event trees to model potential core damage sequences.  One set of event 
trees was used for pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and a separate set was used for 
boiling water reactors (BWRs).  These event trees were developed for four initiating 
events: loss of feedwater (LOFW), loss of offsite power (LOOP), small break loss of 
coolant accident (LOCA), and main steam line break (MSLB).  They were functional 
event trees, where only mitigation systems were functionally represented.  Success 
criteria for the mitigation systems varied from plant to plant but these variations were 
addressed in the probabilities assigned to branches in the event trees.   
In 1985, the event tree models were improved to reflect the design differences among the 
U. S. nuclear power plants.  This improvement incorporated eight plant classes, five for 
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PWRs and three for BWRs.  Systemic event trees were reconstructed for three initiating 
events - a nonspecific reactor trip (TRIP) including LOFW, LOOP and small break LOCA - 
for each plant class.  These systemic event trees were employed in the analysis of 
1984-87 events.  In these models, in addition to two ordinary end states, “success” and 
“core damage”, another end state, “core vulnerability” was assigned to sequences in which 
core protection was expected to be provided, but for which no specific analytical basis was 
available or which involved non-proceduralized operator actions.      
In 1989, two modeling changes were made to the event trees: reassignment of core 
vulnerability sequences as success or core damage, and explicit representations of electric 
power recovery and PWR seal LOCA.  Other two changes were also made to simplify the 
BWR event trees: elimination of the top event for standby liquid control (SLC), resulting 
in assignment of reactor trip failure to the anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) end 
state, and consideration of the condensate system as a recovery action instead of low 
pressure systems.  Although the revised event tree models were used in the analysis of 
1988-93 events, supplemental and plant-specific mitigation systems and/or procedures 
beyond those included in the basic models were considered in the analysis of 1992-93 
events.  These models were also employed in the analysis of 1982-83 events.    
In 1995, the ASP models were significantly changed by applying the fault tree linking 
technique to the modeling of safety-related systems on the event trees.  In addition, an 
event tree for SGTR was developed for each PWR plant class.  The event trees for the 
other initiating events were basically the same as those used in the 1988-93 analyses.  
After that, the fault trees were updated based on the plant design and procedural changes, 
and has been used in the ASP analysis.  The integrated models of fault trees and event 
trees are called the standardized plant analysis risk (SPAR) models which were prepared 
for 72 plant types(27). 
 
2.  Analytical Approach 
As mentioned above, the ASP analysis had been carried out with use of event tree models 
for several initiating events before 1995.  On the other hand, the fault tree linking 
approach has been used since 1995.  In the following, these two analytical approaches are 
described through the anaysis of an actual event
(28)
.   
2.1 Description of Event to Be Analyzed 
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The event to be analyzed took place at South Texas Project Unit 1 (STP-1) in Janualy 1993, 
the ASP analysis of which was provided in Ref. (20).  In this event, the unit had operated 
with one of three emergency diesel generators (EDGs) inoperable for approximately 25 d, 
during 61 h of which a second EDG was removed from service for maintenance.  As well, 
the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump was inoperable for about 40 d, 
which encompassed the time period when EDGs were inoperable.  Consequently, only 
one EDG remained available and three trains of motor-driven auxiliary feedwater system 
(MDAFW) were operable. 
2.2 Analysis with Event Tree Model 
In the ASP analysis perforemed by the USNRC
(20)
, the event was modeled as a potential 
LOOP for approximately 25 d (a total of 597 h).  It was assumed that one EDG and the 
TDAFW pump were inoperable during this period and a second EDG was inoperable for 
61 h of this period.  The model was revised to reflect this condition by disabling one or 
two trains of equipment dependent on emergency power.  However, the recovery 
probability for the AFW was not changed because the failures related to the TDAFW pump 
were considered recoverable regardless of power availability.  For this event, the 
USNRC’s ASP analysis defined two cases: one was analyzed as a LOOP with one EDG 
and the TDAFW pump inoperable for 536 h (597–61 h) and the other was as a LOOP with 
two EDGs and the TDAFW pump inoperable for 61 h.  In addition, each of the two cases 
was further decomposed considering that the battery lifetime may be extended by shedding 
unnecessary loads (cases with and without battery load shedding).  Eventually, a total of 
four cases were calculated in the ASP analysis for this event. 
Figure IV.1 shows the event tree used in the USNRC’s ASP analysis and Table IV.1 lists 
the branch probabilities used for the calculation of conditional core damage probabilities.  
As seen from this table, it was needed to change the branch probabilities for the initiating 
event (LOOP) and the safety systems such as electrical power supply (EP), auxiliary 
feedwater system (AFW), high pressure injection system (HPI) and high pressure 
recirculation system (HPR), which were inoperable during the event.  For example, the 
occurrence probability of initiating event, P (IE), was obtained by the following equation; 
 P(IE) = [1-exp(-Tevent)] Prec(IE)     (1) 
where,  initiating event occurrence probability per hour 
 Tevent : duration time of event 
 Prec(IE): probability of failure to recover the offsite power 
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Next, the branch probabilities, P(EP), P(AFW), P(HPI) and P(HPR), were calculated as 
follows; 
 P(EP) = P1(EP)P2(EP)P3(EP)Prec(EP)    (2) 
 P(AFW) =[P1(MDAFW)P2(MDAFW)P3(MDAFW)P4(TDAFW) 
 +Pc(AFW)]Prec(AFW)  (3) 
 P(HPI) = P1(HPI)P2(HPI)P3(HPI)Prec(HPI)   (4) 
 P(HPR) = P1(HPR)P2(HPR)P3(HPR)Prec(HPR)+Po(HPR)  (5) 
where, Pn:  unavailability of train n 
 Pc:  unavailability of shared portion of AFW trains 
 Prec:  probability of failure to recover the system 
 Po:  probability of operator error 
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Figure IV.1  Event Tree Model Used for USNRC’s ASP Analysis of STP-1 Event(20) 
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Table IV.1  Branch Probabilities Used in USNRS’s ASP Analysis 
Branch 
System unavailability 
(Pn) 
Nonrecovery 
prob. (Prec) 
Operator fail 
prob. (Po) 
Branch prob. 
(P) 
LOOP 2.0×10-5 → 1.2×10-3 4.3×10-4  5.2×10-4 
RT/LOOP 0.0 1.0  0.0 
EP 5.4×10-4 → 5.0×10-2 8.0×10-1  4.0×10-2 
EP-1 (EDG-1) 5.0×10-2    
EP-2 (EDG-2) 5.7×10-2 → 1.0    
EP-3 (EDG-3) 1.9×10-1 → 1.0    
AFW 3.1×10-4 → 2.0×10-2 2.6×10-1  5.2×10-3 
MDAFW-1 2.0×10-2    
MDAFW-2 1.0×10-1 → 1.0    
MDAFW-3 3.0×10-1 → 1.0    
TDAFW 5.0×10-2 → 1.0    
Shared Components 2.8×10-4    
AFW/EP 5.0×10-2 → 1.0 3.4×10-1  3.4×10-1 
PORV Challenge 4.0×10-2 1.0  4.0×10-2 
PORV Reseat 2.0×10-2 1.1×10-2  2.2×10-4 
PORV Reseat/EP 2.0×10-2 1.0  2.0×10-2 
Seal LOCA 3.1×10-4 → 5.0×10-2 1.0  5.0×10-2 
EP Rec/Seal LOCA 7.0×10-1 1.0  7.0×10-1 
EP Rec/-Seal LOCA 1.1×10-1 1.0  1.1×10-1 
HPI 3.0×10-4 → 1.0×10-2 8.4×10-1  8.4×10-3 
HPI-1 1.0×10-2    
HPI-2 1.0×10-1 → 1.0    
HPI-3 3.0×10-1 → 1.0    
HPI (F&B) 3.0×10-4 → 1.0×10-2 8.4×10-1 1.0×10-2 1.8×10-2 
HPR 1.5×10-5 → 1.0×10-2 1.0 1.0×10-3 1.1×10-3 
HPI-1 1.0×10-2    
HPI-2 1.5×10-2 → 1.0    
HPI-3 1.0×10-1 → 1.0    
PORV Open 1.0×10-2 1.0 4.0×10-4 1.0×10-2 
Because two of three EDGs were inoperable in the event, the unavailabilities of them were 
changed from their respective nominal probabilities to 1.0 but the unavailability of 
operable EDG was not changed, as shown in Table IV.1.  Then, the branch probability for 
EP was obtained by multiplying the changed EDG unavailability by the probability of 
failure to recover.   
The branch probability for AFW was determined in consideration of relation between 
AFW and EP.  Specifically, two trains of AFW were assumed unavailable because their 
respective EDGs were inoperable and hence, the calculated branch probabilities for AFW 
were different depending on the availability of electrical power supply.  In the same way, 
the branch probabilities for HPI and HPR were calculated taking into account the relation 
between the respective systems and electrical power supply.  The event tree in Figure 
IV.1 was quantified using the calculated branch probabilities.  As a result, the CCDP of 
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this event was estimated at 9.1×10
-6
 and the sequence with station blackout (SBO) 
followed by AFW failure was identified dominant (Sequence No.55 in Figure IV.1) . 
2.3 Analysis with Fault Tree Linking Approach 
The fault tree linking approach utilizes fault trees as well as event trees.  The event trees 
are reconstructed by modeling the accident management such as containment venting at 
BWRs and the recovery actions of secondary system at PWRs.  An example of the event 
tree models is illustrated in Figure IV.2
(29)
.  The fault trees are constructed for individual 
safety systems and their support systems and model the component failures, failure of 
backup and recovery actions, common cause failures and dependent failures.  An example 
of fault trees is displayed in Figure IV.3
(19)
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Figure IV.2  Example of ASP Event Tree Models Reconstructed 
In this appoarch, the initiating event occurrence probability is calculated in the same way 
as the conventional event tree models mentioned in Subsection 2.2.  The event trees are 
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quantified by linking fault trees according to individual sequences delineated in the event 
trees instead of calculating the branch probabilities.  For example, the sequence with SBO 
followed by AFW failure (Sequence No.239 in Figure IV.2) is quantified by linking fault 
trees for EP and AFW and multiplying the occurrence probability of LOOP to obtain the 
CCDP for this sequence.  In this process, the failure probabilities of components 
represented in fault trees are changed to reflect the plant system conditions during the 
event.  For the STP-1 event, the failure probabilities of two EDGs and TDAFW pump are 
changed from their respective nominal values to 1.0.  In addition, the probablities of 
common cause failures are changed to 0.0 because only one EDG and one AFW train were 
operable.  The similar changes are applied to the fault trees for HPI and HPR.  In such a 
way, the CCDPs for the other sequences are calculated. 
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Figure IV.3  Example of ASP Fault Tree Models(19)  
 
IV.3 Accident Sequence Precursor Analyses for 
Steam Generator Tube Rupture Events 
The steam generators (SGs) at PWRs are shell- and -tube heat exchangers, each of which 
contains several thousand thin-walled tubes.  These tubes are designed to confine 
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radioactivity to the primary coolant during normal operation.  However, the primary 
pressure is higher than the secondary pressure, so rupture of the tube can result in 
radioactivity release to the environment through relief valves in the secondary system. 
The PRA/PSA studies for PWRs have shown that, even though SGTRs are small 
contributors to the total core damage frequency, they are risk significant because 
radionuclides are likely to bypass the containment through relief valves in the secondary 
system
(30,31)
.  In addition, operating experience indicates that a significant number of the 
defective tubes have been found and removed from service or repaired each year.  Despite 
appropriate countermeasures and inspections taken, the tube degradation has been still a 
continuous important issue to nuclear power plant safety.  The previous study by 
MacDonald
(31)
, which integrates and evaluates the relevant information on SG tube failures, 
indicates that ten tube rupture events have occurred at the rate of about one every two years 
during 20 years.  These rupture events resulted in leak rates ranging from 425 l/min to 
2,900 l/min and complex plant transients, in some of which the operators took a relatively 
long time to recognize that SGTR had occurred and consequently, isolation of the affected 
SG was delayed and/or the primary pressure was held higher than the secondary pressure 
in the affected SG for a relatively long period.  Also, some events involved additional 
malfunctions. 
On the other hand, the USNRC’s ASP Program analyzed four actual SGTRs and one 
potential SGTR
(9,14,16,20)
.  Direct comparison of the results is not possible, however, 
because ASP analyses have been performed on a yearly basis and the models used were 
different from year to year.  Therefore, any discussion on the results has not been done so 
far from the generic point of view.  
In this study, all of the ten actual SGTR events identified in Ref. (31) and the potential 
SGTR event identified in Ref. (16) are systematically analyzed within the framework of 
the ASP methodology.  The primary objectives of the study are to identify risk significant 
anomalies observed during the events in terms of the potential for core damage and to 
obtain generic insights useful for examining alternative mitigation measures for SGTR.  
In order to meet these objectives, this study prepares an ASP model consistently applicable 
to the above events, which is called the consistent ASP model, based on the latest version 
of the USNRC’s ASP models and evaluates their respective risk significance of the SGTR 
events on a common basis.  The latest ASP models consist of standardized event trees and 
plant-specific fault trees
(22)
.  Although the event trees are available, the fault trees have 
not been open.  This study modifies the standardized event trees to represent 
proceduralized recovery actions that have not been considered in the USNRC’s models, 
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and estimates the branch probabilities needed for the event tree quantification by 
constructing simplified fault trees.  The fault trees are composed of failures of pump 
trains and/or valves and operator errors in consideration of the plant system configurations 
based on the USNRC’s plant information book(32) and so on.  This section describes the 
model applied and the results obtained, and discusses the significant anomalies observed 
during the SGTR events from the point of CCDPs.  
 
1.  ASP Model and Method Applied 
1.1 Event Tree Models 
The standardized event trees for the ASP analysis are provided for eight plant classes to 
reflect the design differences among commercial nuclear power plants in the United 
States
(21)
.  As shown in Table IV.2, PWRs are separated into five plant classes: Classes A, 
B, E, G and H.  Classes A and B address Westinghouse plants, Class D represents 
Babcock & Wilcox plants, and Classes G and H include Combustion Engineering plants.  
Event trees for each plant class depict core damage sequences for four initiating events: 
nonspecific reactor trip, LOOP, small break LOCA and SGTR.  The SGTR event trees 
constructed for all the plant classes except for Class H, which are identical to each other, 
do not model the primary feed and bleed (F&B) operation though it can be utilized as an 
alternative method for secondary cooling.  In this study, the SGTR event tree was 
reconstructed by incorporating the F&B capability in order to evaluate more realistically 
their respective significance of the SGTR events as shown in Figure IV.4.  As for Class H, 
the event tree provided in Ref. (21), shown in Figure IV.5, was applied without any 
modification. 
Table IV.2  PWR Plant Classification in ASP 
PWR 
Class A 
Westinghouse plants which require the use of      
containment spray system for decay heat removal 
7 plants: (Ex)  North Anna-1&2, 
Surry-1&2 
PWR 
Class B 
Westinghouse plants which can utilize high and       
low pressure recirculation for decay heat removal 
44 plants: (Ex)  Davis Besse
a
, Ginna, 
Maine Yankee
b
, McGuire-1&2, Point 
Beach-1&2, Prairie Island-1&2  
PWR 
Class D 
Babcock & Wilcox plants which have the capability 
of the primary feed and bleed without PORVs 
6 plants: (Ex)  Oconee-1,2&3, TMI-1 
PWR 
Class G 
Combustion Engineering plants which have the      
capability of the primary feed and bleed 
8 plants: (Ex)  Fort Calhoun, 
Millstone-2  
PWR 
Class H 
Combustion Engineering plants which can utilize      
the condensate system as an alternative method 
6 plants: (Ex)  Palo Verde-1,2&3 
a
 Davis Besse is a Babcock and Wilcox plant.   
b
 Maine Yankee is a Combustion Engineering plant. 
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Figure IV.4  SGTR Event Tree Model for PWR Classes A, B, D and G 
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Figure IV.5  SGTR Event Tree Model for PWR Class H 
 
1.2 Fault Tree Models  
In this study, simplified train-based fault trees were developed for branches on the event 
trees by incorporating only failures of major active components, such as pumps, and 
operator errors including recovery failures.  In developing fault trees, system 
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configurations were taken into account by modeling the number of pump trains and 
pressurizer power-operated relief valves (PORVs) installed in a particular plant.  An 
example of the simplified fault trees is shown in Figure IV.6.  As indicated in this figure, 
a likelihood of recovering from system failures was considered for some systems.  The 
probabilities for component failures and operator errors were referred to the USNRC’s 
document, ‘Daily Events Evaluation Manual’(29), that provides the event trees and the 
probabilities of major component failures and operator errors for typical plants to prepare 
the ASP models.  
Insufficient
Flow from HPI
HPI System
Failure
Operator Fails
to Recover
HPI Pump
Train Failure
Pump Common
Cause Failures
Failures of
Trains A & B
Train B
Failures
Train A
Failures
Failures of
Discharge Lines
RPV Injection
Line Failures
Boron Tank
Line Failures
 
Figure IV.6  Example of Train-based Simplified Fault Tree Models 
 
1.3 Evaluation Method of Event Significance 
The method for evaluating risk significance in this study followed the approach used in the 
USNRC’s ASP program, where the risk significance is evaluated by calculating a CCDP of 
subsequent core damage given the failures observed during a particular event.  In the 
processes of this calculation, the observed failures or unavailabilities are reflected on 
simplified fault trees by setting their corresponding failure probabilities to 1.0 (failed).  
On the contrary, a likelihood that the component(s) operable during the event would fail is 
expressed as the failure probability preset on simplified fault trees, that is called the preset 
value hereafter.  Therefore, branch probabilities for systems/functions observed to be 
unchallenged or successful during the event are estimated without any change of the preset 
values. 
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2.  Description of SGTR Events  
2.1 Typical Plant Response to SGTR  
Typically, following SGTR, automatic reactor trip could occur on either low pressurizer 
pressure or over-temperature delta-T and subsequently, safety injection (SI) signal would 
be generated on low pressurizer pressure.  Reactor coolant system (RCS) makeup would 
be performed by high pressure injection (HPI).  For smaller tube failures, reactor trip 
and/or HPI actuation may be done manually.  Main feedwater (MFW) is tripped on SI 
signal and auxiliary feedwater (AFW) is automatically actuated to supply coolant to all 
SGs.  The operators are required to identify the ruptured SG and isolate it by closing the 
main steam isolation valve (MSIV) and other potential leak paths.  In addition, the 
operators should perform depressurization of RCS by secondary cooling with use of 
AFW/MFW and steam dump or PORVs to minimize the leak flow.  After the RCS 
depressurization is completed, the operators should secure HPI to prevent or limit the RCS 
repressurization.  Long-term decay heat removal is carried out by secondary cooling, high 
pressure recirculation (HPR) or residual heat removal (RHR).  Prior to the RHR operation, 
RCS should be cooled down to the RHR initiation pressure.  
2.2 Description of Actual Events  
To provide easier comparison of the ten actual events and one potential event to be 
analyzed, plant transient information is summarized in Table IV.3.  In the following, a 
brief description of each event is provided. 
(1)  Point Beach-1 event (26/2/1975)(31,33)  
SGTR occurred while operating at full power with one charging pump (CHP) running.  
The other two CHPs started at 2 and 19 min.  The operators determined the leak in SG- B 
at 28 min and initiated power reduction at 30 min.  The reactor was manually tripped at 
47 min from 25% power.  SI did not occur and was blocked at 54 min.  MSIV for SG-B 
was closed at 48 min but the feedwater to SG-B was not stopped until 58 min.  At 51 min, 
the RCS cooldown was begun by dumping steam from the intact SG to the condenser and 
was continued.  At 108 min, the RCS pressure was reduced to below the SG relief valve 
setpoint.  However, the primary pressure remained slightly above the secondary pressure 
for 6-7 h.  During the cooldown, the RCS inventory was controlled by the intermittent 
HPI operation. 
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(2)  Surry-2 event (15/9/1976) (31,33) 
While operating at full power, the maximum charging flow alarm and a sudden decrease in 
the RCS pressure were indicated.  At 5 min, the operators started the second CHP but 2 
min later, the CHP suction automatically switched to the refueling water storage tank 
(RWST) and then, power reduction was commenced.  At 10-11 min, the operators tripped 
the turbine, resulting in automatic reactor trip from 70% power, two AFW pumps started 
and manual SI was initiated.  At 15-16 min, one HPI pump (HPI-A) was stopped and one 
HPI pump discharge was realigned to the normal charging flow path.  At 17-18 min, 
SGTR was determined to be in SG-A and SG-A was isolated.  AFW was automatically 
tripped and one MFW pump was initiated for the RCS cooldown.  At 21 min, HPI-A 
restarted and the HPI discharge lines were realigned to the SI flow paths.  The plant 
cooldown was done by dumping steam from the intact SGs to the condenser and the RCS 
pressure was reduced to below the SG relief valve setpoint at 60 min.  
(3)  Doel-2 event (25/6/1979) (31,33) 
While the plant was heated to normal operating condition with the reactor not critical, a 
rapid decrease of the RCS pressure was indicated.  The second CHP was manually started 
at 1.8 min.  At 9.4 min, the operators isolated the ruptured SG (SG-B) and then, the third 
CHP was started and the CHP suction was aligned to RWST.  At 19 min, HPI 
automatically started on low pressurizer pressure.  In attempt to decrease the RCS 
pressure, at 28 min, pressurizer spray was manually initiated.  At 41 min, AFW was 
automatically actuated and at 50 min, the AFW flow to SG-B was terminated.  The RCS 
cooldown was commenced at 68-88 min and the HPI was stopped.  
(4)  Prairie Island-1 (2/10/1979) (9,31,33)  
SGTR occurred while operating at full power.  At 7-8 min, low pressurizer pressure and 
level were alarmed and power reduction was initiated.  The other two CHPs were 
manually started at 9-10 min.  Immediately after that, the reactor was automatically 
tripped and SI occurred.  The operators identified tube rupture in SG-A at 18.5 min and 
closed its MSIV at 27 min.  MSIV for the intact SG was also automatically closed but 
manually opened immediately.  At 42-43 min, one HPI was secured and one PORV was 
opened intermittently to reduce the RCS pressure.  The operators secured the remaining 
HPI at 52 min since the pressurizer level reached the high level setpoint, but the pressurizer 
relief tank rupture disk burst.  At 61 min, the primary and secondary pressures were 
equalized.  At 96 min, normal cooldown was started. 
(5)  Ginna (25/1/1982) (31,34,35)  
While operating at full power, several alarms indicating low pressurizer pressure and SG-B 
 Chapter IV 
IV-16 
steam/feedwater flow mismatch were received.  At 1.5-2.5 min, power reduction was 
commenced, the other two CHPs were manually started, and the condenser steam dump 
automatically initiated.  At 3-5 min, the reactor tripped automatically, HPI was actuated, 
two motor-driven AFW pumps (MDAFWs) and turbine-driven AFW pump (TDAFW) 
started automatically, and the steam dump stopped.  At 7 min, MDAFW feeding SG-B 
was secured and steam supply to TDAFW from SG-B was terminated.  At 15 min, tube 
rupture was determined to be in SG-B and its MSIV was closed.  At 21 min, TDAFW was 
secured but the SG-B water level continued to rise.  At 42 min, the operators opened and 
closed one PORV in attempt to equalize the primary and secondary pressures, but at 44 min, 
the PORV stuck open and the operators closed its block valve immediately.  At 54 and 63 
min, an SG-B safety valve cycled and at 72 min, HPI was secured.  Condensate pump 
was also secured, causing the condenser steam dump unavailable, and the operators began 
steam dump using an atmospheric relief valve of the intact SG.  One HPI was restarted at 
102 min.  At 132 min, a fifth lift of the SG-B safety valve occurred and HPI was stopped.  
The safety valve closed but continued to leak water (probably after 55 min).  At 167 min, 
HPI was switched from continuous to intermittent operation.  The primary and secondary 
pressures were equalized at 182 min.  
(6)  Fort Calhoun Event (16/5/1984) (31) 
During plant startup with the reactor being pressurized, the operators noted that the 
pressurizer level was no longer increasing and the pressurizer pressure was slowly 
decreasing.  The other two CHPs were manually started immediately.  At 18 min, the 
operators switched the CHP suction to the volume control tank (VCT) and increased the 
charging flow.  At 27 min, two CHPs were secured because the VCT level reached 0%.  
A continuing increase in the SG-B level was indicated at 32 min and then the AFW pump 
feeding SG-B was secured.  At 40 min, MSIV for SG-B was closed and then, the RCS 
cooldown was commenced using the intact SG and its atmospheric dump valve. 
(7)  North Anna-1 event (15/7/1987) (14,31,36)  
Shortly after the plant reached full power, the pressurizer level and pressure began to 
rapidly decrease.  At 5 min, the reactor was manually tripped and automatic SI occurred 
due to a low-low pressurizer pressure.  At 16-18 min, SG-C was determined to be 
defected and isolated.  At 19 min, the RCS cooldown was commenced by dumping steam 
from the intact SGs, resulting in the pressurizer level off scale.  By controlling the 
pressurizer spray, the pressurizer level was recovered at 28 min.  In order to enhance the 
depressurization, one PORV was opened at 34 min and then, the primary and secondary 
pressures in SG-C were roughly equalized.  At 48 min, an orderly plant shutdown was 
initiated.  During this event, two relief valves in the MFW system failed to reseat but 
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were manually closed approximately 30 min into the event. 
(8)  McGuire-1 (7/3/1989) (16,31,37) 
While operating at full power, the operators observed decrease in the SG-B feedwater flow 
and the pressurizer level and immediately recognized SGTR.  At 4-5 min, power 
reduction was initiated and the second CHP was manually started.  At 8-9 min, the 
operators initiated a reactor trip and swapped the CHP suction to RWST.  At that time, 
relief valves for the intact SGs cycled.  The operators began immediately to isolate SG-B 
and initiate the RCS cooldown at 11 min.  Turbine bypass valves (TBVs) were opened to 
dump steam to the condenser at 14 and 25 min.  At 21-25 min, SI was manually blocked.  
At 47 min, the primary and secondary pressures in SG-B were equalized and the break 
flow was temporarily terminated.  However, the SG-B secondary pressure continued to 
decrease and the break flow resumed.  At 3.5 h, further cooldown began using TBVs but 
the primary pressure remained above the secondary pressure until 10 h.  The post-trip 
review identified several anomalies on SG-B relief valve, letdown isolation valve, SG 
blowdown sample line monitor and so forth. 
(9)  Mihama-2 event (9/2/1991)(31,38,39) 
SGTR occurred while operating at full power.  At 5-7 min, the operators started the third 
CHP and commenced power reduction.  At 10 min, the reactor scrammed automatically 
on low pressurizer pressure and subsequently, automatic SI occurred on low pressurizer 
pressure and level.  At 12 min, an MDAFW discharge valve to the ruptured SG (SG-A) 
was closed and at 15 min, the operators attempted to close MSIV for SG-A but it failed to 
close completely (an operator closed it at the failed valve at 22 min).  At 30 min, the 
operators attempted to open two PORVs for depressurizing RCS but they failed because an 
air supply valve for both PORVs had been erroneously closed (PORVs were declared 
inoperable at 45 min).  At 39, 49 and 59 min, an SG-A relief valve cycled.  During this 
period, the operators opened a locked closed pressurizer auxiliary spray valve to 
depressurize RCS and then, HPI were secured after confirming that the pressurizer level 
was recovered.  At 68 min, the primary and secondary pressures were equalized.  At 
93-94 min, the operators initiated steam dump using TBVs. 
(10) Palo Verde-2 event (14/3/1993)(20,31,40)  
SGTR occurred while operating at 98% power.  At 2 min, the operators started the third 
CHP.  At 13 min, the reactor was manually tripped and then, automatic SI occurred due to 
low pressurizer pressure.  Even though the operators suspected SGTR, a reactor trip was 
diagnosed using the diagnostic logic tree.  However, the entry conditions for reactor trip 
recovery procedure could not be met because of low pressurizer level.  So, the operators 
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entered the functional recovery procedure (FRP) and continued recovery actions per FRP 
until 114 min although SGTR was confirmed at 57 min.  These actions included 
switchover of the CHP suction from VCT to RWST and restoration of the SG blowdown 
lines at 46 min.  According to the SGTR recovery procedure which was entered at 131 
min, the RCS cooldown was restarted at 167 min and the ruptured SG was isolated 7 min 
later.  The use of FRP resulted in significantly delayed isolation of the ruptured SG and 
depressurization of RCS.  In addition, three primary indicator alarms for SGTR were not 
available, which confused the operators. 
(11) Potential SGTR at North Anna-1 (25/2/1989)(16, 41)  
The plant automatically tripped from 76% power on SG-C steam/feedwater flow mismatch, 
caused by closure of the MFW regulating valve, coincident with low SG level.  Following 
the reactor trip, the RCS pressure and temperature decreased and the AFW pumps started 
automatically.  At 20 min, primary to secondary leakage was indicated and after locating 
the leak, the SG-C steam supply valve to TDAFW was manually isolated.  The leak rate 
was within the capacity of one CHP flow.  The RCS cooldown commenced at 79 min and 
the RCS pressure was reduced to below SG-C pressure at about 2 h.  While placing the 
RHR system in service, its suction isolation valve failed to remain open.  RHR could not 
be placed in operation for more than 3 h. 
 
3. Modelling Assumptions 
3.1 Success Criteria for Fault Trees  
In constructing simplified fault trees for systems represented on the ASP event tree models 
for SGTR, the success criteria should be defined in consideration of the plant system 
configurations.  As shown in Figures IV.4 and IV.5 the event trees for SGTR consist of 
nine top events excluding the initiating event.  For four of them (MFW, RCS 
depressurization to below SG relief valve, ruptured SG isolation and RCS cooldown to 
below RHR initiation pressure), generic simplified fault trees applicable to all the plants of 
interest here were constructed because their functionabilities should be heavily dependent 
on the operators' actions and the contributions due to differences in hardware appeared 
small.  The fault trees for these top events constructed in this study can be represented in 
the Boolean algebra equations as follows: 
Top(MFW)=(MFW hardware failures) 
∩(failure to recover MFW), 
Top(RCS Depress.)=(hardware failures) 
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∪(failure to initiate depressurization), 
Top(RCS Cooldown)=(hardware failures)  
           ∪(failure to initiate cooldown), 
Top(SG Isolation)=(failure to timely isolate due to valve failures/operator error) 
           ∩(failure to recover before RWST depletion) 
where ‘∩’ and ‘∪’ denote ‘AND-gate’ and ‘OR-gate’ in the fault tree, respectively. 
Also, as seen in many PSA studies
(30)
, the fault tree for reactor trip expressed by the 
following Boolean algebra equation was applied in common to all the plants. 
Top(Reactor Trip)=(trip system failure) ∩(manual trip failure). 
For the top event ‘condensate water to SG’ on the event tree for Palo Verde (Class H), the 
branch probability was derived from Ref. (29) instead of constructing a fault tree. 
As for the other top events (AFW, HPI, F&B and RHR/HPR), their success criteria were 
defined for individual plants.  Table IV.4 summarizes the success criteria defined in this 
study.  Along with this table, the success criteria are described below. 
(1) Auxiliary feedwater (AFW) 
Five of the ten plants (Surry, Doel, North Anna, McGuire and Mihama) have the three-train 
system which consists of two MDAFWs and one TDAFW and thus, their success criteria 
were defined as one-out-of-three trains.  Although other two plants, Point Beach and 
Prairie Island, also have the three-train system, one MDAFW is shared by their respective 
adjacent units and additional operators’ actions were needed for using this train.  
Therefore, the success criteria of AFW for these plants were defined as one-out-of-two 
trains.  The two plants, Fort Calhoun and Palo Verde, have the two-train system (one 
MDAFW and one TDAFW) and their success criteria were defined as one-out-of-two 
trains.  The Ginna plant has the uniquely designed system which consists of a main 
three-train system and a standby two-train system.  The main system has two MDAFWs 
and one TDAFW, and the standby system has two MDAFWs with 50% capacity per each.  
Hence, the success criteria were defined as one-out-of-three main AFW trains or 
two-out-of-two standby AFW trains. 
(2) High pressure injection (HPI) 
The four plants (Point Beach, Prairie Island, Mihama and Palo Verde) have the two-train 
system and thus, their success criteria were defined as one-out-of-two trains.  At the two 
3-loop plants (Surry and North Anna), all of three HPI pumps are used as charging pumps.  
The success criteria of HPI were defined as one-out-of-three trains in consideration with 
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one charging pump operating.  Ginna and Fort Calhoun have the three-train system and it 
was assumed that one-out-of-three trains was needed for SGTR.  At McGuire, in addition 
to two-train HPI system, two charging pumps can be used as the SI pumps.  The success 
criteria were defined as one-out-of-two HPI trains or two-out-of-two charging pump trains.  
Doel has the four-train HPI system and two-out-of-four trains were assumed as success 
criteria. 
(3) Primary feed and bleed (F&B) 
The F&B Operation requires the HPI operation in conjunction with opening of PORVs.  
The success criteria of HPI were as mentioned above.  For all the plants except Palo 
Verde which has no capability of this function, it was assumed that opening of all PORVs 
was required even though there is a difference in the number of PORVs installed. 
(4) Residual heat removal (RHR) 
The success criteria of RHR were defined as one-out-of-two trains for all the plants that 
have the two-train RHR system installed.  Because only limited information on Doel is 
available, as well, the two-train RHR system was assumed and the above success criteria 
were used.  In the event where the F&B operation would be used, HPR in conjunction 
with RHR is required for long-term decay heat removal at Class B plants such as Point 
Beach, and HPR and containment spray recirculation (CSR) are required at Class A plants 
such as Surry and at Class G plant (Fort Calhoun).  Therefore, the success criteria for 
such an event were assumed as follows: One HPI train and one RHR train including a heat 
exchanger for Class B plants, one HPI train and one CSR train including a heat exchanger 
for Class A and G plants. 
3.2 Failure Probabilities Applied 
The respective branch probabilities for top events were obtained from the simplified fault 
trees constructed based on the above assumptions.  In calculating branch probabilities, 
actual and potential component failures and/or operator errors observed during individual 
events were reflected by changing failure probabilities from preset values to event-specific 
values.  On the other hand, branch probabilities for the system successfully operated or 
unchallenged during the events were given by quantifying the simplified fault trees with 
use of the preset values.  All of the individual events involved successful actuation or 
operable condition of the reactor trip, AFW, HPI and the RCS cooldown to the RHR 
pressure, and in the Palo Verde event, the condensate system was also maintained operable.  
Hence, no failure probabilities were changed for these fault trees.  In the following, the 
changed failure probabilities are described.  
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(1) Initiating event  
The initiating event probabilities were set to 1.0 except for the North Anna event in 1989, 
that is the potential SGTR event.  The leak size observed in this event was small and the 
occurrence probability of a large tube rupture was assumed to be 0.1, that was employed in 
the USNRC’s analysis in Ref. (16).  
(2) Main feedwater (MFW) 
The two events at North Anna involved the malfunctions of the valves: one was on the 
regulating valve and the other was on two relief valves.  For these events, the probability 
of 1.0 was set to the basic event ‘MFW hardware failures’. 
(3) Primary feed and bleed (F&B) 
In the Ginna event, one PORV stuck open and its block valve was closed.  The stuck open 
PORV might not prevent the RCS depressurization but this study assumed that the F&B 
operation could not be done due to the PORV inoperability.  The Mihama event 
experienced failure to open of both PORVs.  Therefore, the branch probability of 1.0 was 
applied to these two events.  
(4) RCS depressurization to below SG relief valve setpoint 
In the five events at Point Beach, Ginna, Fort Calhoun, McGuire and Palo Verde, it took 
considerably longer times (more than a few hours) to equalize the primary and secondary 
pressures.  Therefore, it is considered that these events would have the potential for 
serious conditions if any operator actions would have not been taken.  This study 
examined whether or not such a delayed action might be risk significant from the point of 
the potential for core damage.  As can be seen from the Boolean algebra equation in the 
previous subsection, however, the fault tree constructed there does not model such a 
delayed action explicitly mainly because such a delayed action is generally regarded as one 
of operator errors or not considered in fault trees.  In order to represent the delayed action 
observed during these events, in this study, the basic event ‘failure to initiate 
depressurization’ on the relevant fault tree was divided into ‘failure to timely initiate’ and 
‘failure to recover from the initial error’.  On the other hand, the USNRC’s analysis for 
the Palo Verde event in Ref. (20) took into account failure to depressurize RCS and 
determined its probability by applying a probability of 0.12 to failure to timely initiate the 
RCS depressurization and a probability of 0.34 to failure to recover from the errors during 
the initial depressurization.  Therefore, this study determined the probability of ‘failure to 
initiate depressurization’ on the relevant fault tree by multiplying these two probabilities 
and applied it to the above five events in common even though their respective situations 
were actually different from each other.  In the Mihama event, PORVs failed to 
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depressurize RCS and the pressure equalization was performed by using the pressurizer 
auxiliary spray and securing the HPI pumps based on the emergency operating 
procedure
(38)
.  In order to address the PORV failure, this study assigned a probability of 
1.0 to the basic event ‘hardware failures’ on the relevant fault tree.  As well, the use of 
pressurizer auxiliary spray was regarded as a recovery action and a probability of 4.0×10
-2
, 
which was derived from Ref. (19), was applied to its failure.  In Ref. (19), four recovery 
classes are defined and a non-recovery probability is given for each class.  The 
probability applied here is that for the failure recoverable in the required period on a 
procedural basis and the lowest one among them.  However, other possible recovery 
actions were not taken into account for this event. 
(5) Isolation of ruptured SG 
The ruptured SG isolation was slowly done (it took more than 40 min) in the four events at 
Point Beach, Fort Calhoun, North Anna in 1989 and Palo Verde.  In order to address the 
delayed isolation, a basic event ‘failure to timely isolate due to operator error’ was taken 
into account instead of the basic event ‘failure to timely isolate due to valve failures’ on the 
relevant fault tree.  It was assumed that a probability for the former basic event depended 
on the leak rate observed but was independent from the other basic event ‘failure to 
recover’ on the fault tree because any methods or data for treating dependencies between 
the actually observed failures and the successful operations (that is, the potential failures) 
were not available.  Considering the fact that the first three events experienced a 
relatively small leak size of approximately 300 l/min to 500 l/min and the Palo Verde event 
had a leak rate of more than 900 l/min, a probability for the basic event ‘failure to timely 
isolate’ was assumed to be 0.1 for the first three events and that for the Palo Verde event 
was assumed to be 1.0.  As well, the Mihama event involved the MSIV malfunction 
(failure to close completely) and the operators took the recovery action successfully at the 
failed valve.  A failure probability of 1.0 was applied to the basic event ‘failure to timely 
isolate due to valve failures’ on the fault tree.  As a probability for failure to recover, the 
preset value was employed for these events.  
(6) Residual heat removal 
Only the North Anna event in 1989 involved the RHR component failure (suction isolation 
valve failure to remain open).  The probability of 1.0 was assigned to the RIIR system 
unavailability. 
 
4.  Analysis Results and Discussions 
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4.1 Branch Probabilities  
The branch probabilities calculated are indicated in Table IV.5 for individual events.   
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As shown in this table, their respective branch probabilities for the two top events, the 
reactor trip and the RCS cooldown to the RHR pressure, were the same for all of the events 
because the generic fault tree models were employed and these functions were successful 
(that for the reactor trip was estimated at 1.0×10
-5
 and that for the RCS cooldown was at 
4.0×10
-3
).  However, the branch probabilities obtained for AFW and HPI ranged from 
1.6×10
-6
 to 9.6×10
-5
 and 1.9×10
-6
 to 1.2×10
-3
, respectively, according to a variety of their 
success criteria.  
As for the other top events, the specific branch probabilities were obtained for the events 
involving additional failure(s).  In the following, a brief description for each of them is 
provided. 
(1) Main feedwater (MFW) 
The branch probability obtained for the two North Anna events with the MFW valves 
failed was 0.34 while that for the other events was estimated at 6.8×10
-2
 from the generic 
fault tree model using the preset values.  
(2) Primary feed and bleed (F&B) 
Since PORV was inoperable in the Ginna and Mihama events, the branch probability for 
F&B was set to 1.0.  For the other events, the branch probabilities of approximately 
l.5×10
-3
 were obtained from the plant-specific simplified fault trees with use of the preset 
values. 
(3) RCS depressurization to below SG relief valve setpoint 
For the events involving the delayed equalization of the primary and secondary pressures 
(at Point Beach, Ginna, Fort Calhoun, McGuire and Palo Verde), the branch probability 
was given as a product of the probability for failure to timely initiate the RCS 
depressurization (0.12) and that for failure to recover (0.34) since no hardware failure was 
observed.  In respect of the Mihama event, the branch probability was set to the 
non-recovery probability of 4.0× 10
-2
 because the RCS depressurization using PORVs 
actually failed.  For the other events, the branch probability of 4.1×10
-4
 was obtained 
from the generic fault tree using the preset values. 
(4) Isolation of ruptured SG 
For the three events with the SG isolation delayed (at Point Beach, Fort Calhoun and North 
Anna in 1989), the branch probability of 0.01 was obtained by multiplying the probability 
assigned to ‘failure to timely isolate’ and the preset probability for ‘failure to recover’.  
For the Palo Verde event involving the retarded SG isolation and the Mihama event 
involving the MSIV failure, the non-recovery probability of 0.1 was set to the branch 
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probability.  For the other events, the branch probability was estimated at 1.0×10
-3
 using 
the preset values.  
(5) Residual heat removal (RHR) 
Since the North Anna event in 1989 involved the valve failure, the branch probability for 
RHR was set to the non-recovery probability of 0.12 (which is given for the failure 
recoverable in the required period with substantial operator burden
(19)
).  Because HPR 
was available throughout the event, however, the branch probability of 2.3×10
-3
 for HPR 
was obtained using the preset values.  For the other events, the branch probabilities for 
RHR and those for HPR were calculated at 1.5×10
-3
 to 7.7×10
-3
 and 1.9×10
-3
 to 2.5×10
-3
 
by applying the preset values to the plant-specific fault trees.  
4.2 Conditional Core Damage Probabilities  
The event trees were quantified using the branch probabilities mentioned above.  As seen 
from Figure IV.7, the CCDPs estimated in the study ranged from 2.8×10
-4
 to 4.2×10
-2
.  
This range is primarily due to modeling of additional anomalies observed during the 
particular event.  In the five events with a CCDP of 4×10
-2
 or higher (at Point Beach, 
Ginna, Fort Calhoun, McGuire and Palo Verde), for example, it took a relatively longer 
time to depressurize RCS and/or to equalize the primary and secondary pressures.  To 
represent such conditions in the study, a high likelihood of failure to depressurize RCS to 
below SG relief valve setpoint was applied to these events.  Consequently, high CCDPs 
were obtained and as shown in Figure IV.8, a sequence involving failure to depressurize 
RCS was identified as the dominant one for these events.  This is depicted by the 
sequence No. 3 in the event trees displayed in Figures IV.4 and IV.5.  Three of them, at 
Point Beach, Fort Calhoun and Palo Verde, also involved delayed isolation of the ruptured 
SG.  Although a higher branch probability than the preset value was applied to the top 
event for the ruptured SG isolation, the CCDPs obtained for the sequences involving 
failure to isolate the ruptured SG were relatively low (approximately 5×10
-5
 for the Point 
Beach event, approximately 1×10
-4
 for the Fort Calhoun event and approximately 5×10
-4
 
for the Palo Verde event) and had only small contributions to their respective total CCDPs 
because of a high likelihood of recovering from these sequences by the RCS cooldown and 
the subsequent RHR operation.  In the Ginna event, a PORV anomaly (stuck open) was 
observed and therefore, the F&B operation was assumed to be disabled during the event.  
However, the CCDP of 1.1×10
-7
 estimated for the sequence involving the F&B failure was 
found to have a small contribution to the total CCDP because of a low probability of the 
AFW failure (1.6×10
-6
).  As for the Mihama event with a CCDP of 4.1× 10
-2
, on the other 
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hand, the PORV failure to open had a large contribution to the CCDP because this failure 
would lead to failure to depressurize RCS which was involved in the dominant sequence 
while the contribution of the sequence involving failure of F&B to the total CCDP was 
found to be negligible (a CCDP for this sequence was estimated at approximately 5×10
-6
).  
In addition, the Mihama event involved failure of MSIV for the ruptured SG to completely 
close but the sequences involving failure to isolate the ruptured SG had relatively small 
contributions (CCDPs for these sequences were estimated at 4×10
-4
 or lower) due to the 
same reason as above.  
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Figure IV.7  Conditional Core Damage Probability Calculated for Each SGTR Event 
 
For all the remaining events except for the North Anna event in 1989, the CCDPs were 
estimated at approximately 1.0×10
-3
, which were dominated by two sequences: one 
involving failure of HPI and the other involving failure to depressurize RCS to below SG 
relief valve setpoint.  Of these four events, the North Anna event in 1987 involved two 
stuck open MFW relief valves that might cause the MFW unavailability higher but the 
CCDPs for the sequences involving the MFW failure were estimated at approximately 
10
-7
-10
-8
 due to a high reliability of AFW and consideration of F&B as an alternative 
method.  Although the other three events (at Surry, Doel and Prairie Island) also involved 
additional anomalies, they did not contribute to the total CCDPs because they were not 
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related to mitigation systems for SGTR.  
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Figure IV.8  Contributions of Sequences for Each SGTR Event 
As for the potential SGTR event at North Anna in 1989, the CCDP was estimated at 
2.8×10
-4
, which was dominated by two sequences: one involving the HPI failure and the 
other involving failure to isolate the ruptured SG and the RHR failure.  Of the three 
malfunctions observed during this event, delayed isolation of the ruptured SG and failure 
of the RHR suction valve had a large contribution to the total CCDP but the other 
malfunction, the MFW regulating valve failure, did not contribute substantially because of 
a high diversity of its relevant function (AFW and F&B). 
4.3 Discussion 
(1) Effects of ASP models and data applied  
As mentioned above, this study indicates that in general, SGTR would be a significant 
precursor with a CCDP of 1×10
-4
 or higher.  Also, it is shown that the sequence involving 
failure to depressurize RCS to below SG relief valve setpoint has a large contribution to the 
total CCDPs for all the actual events.  For the events with a CCDP of approximately 
4×10
-2
, in particular, this sequence contributes more than 95% of the total CCDP because 
the relatively high probabilities were applied to failure to depressurize RCS.  In order to 
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examine the adequacy of applying such high probabilities, additional calculation was 
carried out by using the preset value.  As shown in Figures IV.9 and IV.10, CCDPs are 
reduced to approximately 1×10
-3
 but the sequence mentioned above has a relatively large 
contribution and remains dominant.  In the ASP method, probabilities higher than the 
preset values should be used to address the anomalies observed and thus, a CCDP for 
SGTR involving failure to timely depressurize RCS would become higher than those 
obtained by using the preset value.  This means that failure to timely depressurize RCS 
during SGTR may be a risk significant factor and recovery actions should be studied for 
this failure.  However, there would be an ample time to take some alternative measures, 
such as a water addition to RWST and continuous HPI operation, for recovering from such 
sequences.  Taking these measures into consideration might reduce the CCDPs.  
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Figure IV.9  Comparison of CCDPs for Base Case and Using Preset Value 
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Figure IV.10  Sequence Contributions for Using Preset Value 
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On the other hand, a sequence involving the HPI failure is also identified dominant for the 
other six events.  The event tree models employed in this study assumed that the HPI 
failure would lead to core damage regardless of success or failure of AFW/MFW.  In a 
case that AFW/MFW is successful, however, the timely RCS depressurization could 
terminate the primary-to-secondary break flow and subsequently, the plant would be 
brought into cold shutdown using RHR.  Considering such an alternative method might 
reduce the CCDPs for these events. 
(2) Contributions of additional anomalies observed 
In addition to failure to timely depressurize RCS, several anomalies related to mitigation 
systems observed were taken into account in this study.  The failure modes of PORVs 
identified in the Ginna and Mihama events are different from each other, failure to reseat 
and failure to open, respectively.  Both failure modes are considered important to safety 
from the separate points of view and their respective effects on SGTR are found to be 
remarkably different.  In other words, the former would create another leak path 
recovered by closure of its block valve and might disable the F&B capability, which does 
not substantially contribute to the total CCDP.  On the other hand, the latter was not 
restored during the event and might not only make F&B inoperable but also degrade the 
functionability of the RCS depressurization, which has a large contribution to the total 
CCDP.  Also, as seen from the results for the two North Anna events, some failures 
related to mitigation systems such as the RHR suction valve failure would have relatively 
large contributions to the total CCDPs but some failures such as the MFW valve failure 
would not contribute.  Consequently, their respective contributions of failures in 
mitigation systems might be dependent on the degree of diversity or redundancy in their 
relevant functions. 
(3) Comparison with USNRC’s analysis results 
The five SGTR events at Prairie Island, North Anna in 1987 and 1989, McGuire and Palo 
Verde had been analyzed in the USNRC’s ASP Program.  In the following, the analysis 
results obtained in this study are compared with those obtained from the USNRC's 
analyses and the causes of differences are discussed. 
For the events at Prairie Island and two events at North Anna in 1987 and 1989, the results 
from this study are comparable to those from the USNRC’s analyses(9,14,16) as seen from 
Figure IV.7.  Slight differences in CCDPs are mainly due to the different branch 
probabilities used for the HPI failure.  As for the other events at McGuire and Palo Verde, 
the CCDPs obtained from the USNRC’s analyses (7.7×10-4 and 4.7×10-5, respectively) and 
this study are significantly different.  This is mainly because this study applied a 
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relatively high probability to failure to depressurize RCS in order to reflect the condition 
that the RCS pressure remained above the secondary pressure for a long time.  In the 
USNRC's analysis for the McGuire event
(16)
, this condition was not taken into account and 
all the systems/functions needed for mitigating SGTR were assumed successful.  The 
USNRC’s analysis for the Palo Verde event(20) developed the event specific model that 
incorporated three operators' actions – the RCS depressurization and subsequent low 
pressure injection (LPI), the SGTR identification, and the RWST refill - and assigned 
relatively high branch probabilities to the first and second actions (4.1×10
-2
 and 4.0×10
-2
) 
to reflect the operators' delayed actions.  However, this model assumed that any failure of 
these actions alone would not lead to core damage and thus, the sequences involving such a 
failure had relatively low CCDPs.  For example, because the first action was assumed to 
be taken for the HPI failure, a core damage sequence involving failure of this action also 
involved the HPI failure, resulting in a relatively low CCDP (3.4×10
-5
).  As well, even if 
the SGTR identification would fail, the sequences involving successful HPI and AFW were 
assumed recoverable by the RWST refill.  As a result, the CCDP for the Palo Verde event 
was lower, even compared with those from the USNRC’s analyses for the other SGTR 
events where no anomalies in mitigation systems were observed.  This implies that the 
results from the year-by-year analyses might heavily depend on the models and branch 
probabilities used and thus, comparison of the results would need applying a set of models 
and data consistently to the ASP analyses.  
 
5. Summary 
The ASP analyses were performed for ten actual SGTR events and one potential SGTR 
event, which occurred during 20 years, using the consistent ASP model.  As a result, the 
CCDPs estimated in the study range from 2.8×10
-4
 to 4.2×10
-2
.  As well, it is shown that 
five of the ten actual SGTR events, where it took a longer time to identify SGTR or to 
depressurize RCS, and one actual event with PORVs failed have relatively high CCDPs 
(4×10
-2
 or higher) which are dominated by the sequence involving failure to depressurize 
RCS to below SG relief valve setpoint.  The remaining four actual events are found to 
have relatively low CCDPs dominated by two sequences – one is the same as above and 
the other involving the HPI failure – and additional anomalies observed do not contribute 
to the CCDPs.  The potential event, where component failures were identified in 
mitigation systems, also has relatively low CCDPs but these failures are found in the 
dominant sequences.  
Through the analyses, it is clearly shown that the SGTR event which may confuse the 
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operators and prevent them from taking their timely actions needed for mitigating the event 
might generally be a significant precursor.  This implies the importance of providing 
adequate operating procedures for SGTR to the operators and/or of improving instrument 
devices to detect SGTR earlier and more accurately.  As well, some of the additional 
anomalies observed are found to be significant and thus, alternative measures for 
recovering from such conditions should be examined and incorporated into the procedures.  
It should be noted, however, that the CCDPs may have uncertainties since they heavily 
depend on the models and failure probabilities applied.  In particular, modeling and 
generic failure probabilities applied to the delayed RCS depressurization might be further 
examined considering actual situations observed in individual events. 
 
IV.4 Quantitative Risk Trends with Newly Proposed 
Risk Indicators 
Since the first report of the ASP Program was issued in 1982, eighteen reports
(9-26)
 
describing the results of the ASP Program covering the period from 1969 through 1998 had 
been published and identified approximately 600 precursors with their respective CCDPs 
of 10
-6
 or higher.  However, the report was subsequently withdrawn from distribution 
because of the USNRC’s heightened awareness of the release of sensitive information to 
the public following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001
(27)
.   
The ASP analysis has been carried out on a yearly basis and the precursor events has 
been accumulated.  As the results from the ASP Program include valuable information 
that could be useful for obtaining and characterizing risk significant insights and for 
monitoring risk trends in nuclear power industry, trending analyses of the ASP results 
has been recognized as one of indications of industry risk in the United States.  
Nevertheless, there are only a few attempts to determine and develop the trends using 
the ASP results
(42, 43)
 and of them, the occurrence rate of precursors has been employed as 
an industry-level indicator
(27)
 for monitoring industry risk trends.   
In order to more effectively and widely use the ASP results for discussing and/or 
monitoring industry risk trends, this study proposes new quantitative risk indicators in the 
industry level, that is, occurrence frequency of precursor events and annual core damage 
probability deriving from the results of the ASP analyses, and examines the trends in 
core damage risk at nuclear power plants using these two indicators.   
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1. Survey of Results from ASP Program 
In the ASP Program, approximately 600 precursors had been identified in the NUREG/CR 
series covering the years 1969 through 1998: 394 events at PWRs and 213 events at BWRs.  
As discussed in Refs. (4), (5) and (43), trends can be qualitatively discussed from various 
points of view, such as initiating events, unavailable systems and dominant sequences, by 
surveying the analysis results provided in NUREG/CR reports.  To provide a basis for 
discussions on quantitative risk trends with the proposed indicators in the subsequent 
subsections, at first, it was examined whether any trends exist in the number and CCDPs of 
precursors, both of which are closely related to the proposed indicators, by surveying the 
results from the ASP Program
 (4,5)
.  In the following, the trends observed are discussed 
taking into account the model changes. 
1.1 Trends in Number of Precursors 
Figure IV.11 shows the historical records on the reactor years and the number of 
precursors identified in the ASP Program by calendar year.  From this figure, the number 
of reactor years has increased over the years 1969 to 1991 and remained almost constant 
after that.  It can be also seen that during the period 1969 to 1981, the number of 
precursors has gradually increased as the reactor years have increased but after 1984, the 
number of precursors has decreased even though the reactor years have increased.  In the 
years after 1993 with the reactor years being almost constant, as well, the number of 
precursors has significantly decreased.  It should be noted that the number of precursors 
significantly increased in the years 1982 to 1983.  The analyses of the events in these two 
years were performed in the middle of 1990s primarily for the historical purposes to 
complete the ASP analysis and documentation for all events and there were some 
differences in the availability of information and the modeling assumptions used in the 
1982-83 event analyses compared with those in the analyses for the other years
(23)
.  For 
example, the LER reporting requirements for the 1982-83 events were different from those 
for 1984 and later.  Although plant trip information is important from the ASP perspective 
because one of the categories of events analyzed in the ASP Program includes plant trips 
with safety systems degraded, LERs prior to 1984 were not required to link plant trip 
information to reportable events.  This is the most important difference, resulting in 
assumptions made about the relationship between a trip and potentially unavailable 
equipment.  Because the link between trips and events was not described in LERs, it was 
often impossible to determine whether the component was actually unavailable during the 
trip or whether it was demanded during the trip.  In order to avoid missing any important 
precursors, as a result, it was conservatively assumed that system unavailabilities reported 
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in LERs could have occurred concurrently with plant trips, leading to the increase in the 
number of precursors.  In addition, the actual likelihood of failing recovery from an event 
at a particular plant during the years 1982 and 1983 is difficult to assess and may vary 
substantially from the values used in the analyses for the later years. 
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Figure IV.11  Reactor Years and Number of Precursors by Calendar Year 
 
Figure IV.12 compares the annual distributions of precursors at PWRs and BWRs, 
separately.  It can be seen from this figure that their respective numbers and historical 
trends are slightly different from each other.  Although the number of precursors changes 
drastically before and after the period 1982 to 1983 at both PWRs and BWRs, the number 
at PWRs is larger than that at BWRs over the years.  In particular, this trend can be 
clearly seen after 1986.  At PWRs, twenty or more precursors are identified during the 
years 1982 to 1992, excluding three years (1984, 1986 and 1990), and the number of 
precursors in these eight years is up to 195 that is equivalent to about 50% of the total 
number (394 events) of the precursors over the years 1969 through 1998.  On the other 
hand, at BWRs, there are only five years in which ten or more precursors are identified 
(1982 to 1985 and 1987) but the number of the precursors in these years is equivalent to 
almost a half of the total number of BWR precursors (95 of 213 events).  As well, for the 
PWR precursors, an increasing trend is observed during the years 1969 to 1983 and a 
decreasing trend exists after that.  On the other hand, for the BWR precursors, such an 
increasing trend does not appear while a more remarkable decreasing trend is observed 
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after 1982.  
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Figure IV.12  Annual Distribution of Precursors at PWRs and BWRs 
 
The precursors identified in the ASP Program can be classified into two general categories 
in terms of initiating events: precursors involving initiator where an initiating event 
actually occurred and those involving unavailabilities where safety-related system(s) had 
been rendered unavailable or experienced degraded conditions with no occurrence of any 
initiating event.  Figure IV.13 shows the annual distributions of precursors by these two 
categories.  Comparing these two categories, the number of precursors involving initiator 
is larger than that of precursors involving unavailabilities until 1987, in particular 
significantly during the years 1982 to 1987.  However, in later years, the numbers of these 
two categories have been comparable.  A similar trend is observed for the PWR 
precursors but for the BWR precursors, the number of precursors involving initiator is 
larger than that of precursors involving unavailabilities over the years 1969 through 1998.   
As seen from this figure, in addition, an increasing trend is observed during the years 1969 
to 1983 and a decreasing trend exists after that for the precursors involving initiator.  Such 
an increasing trend during the years 1969 to 1983 can be seen at PWRs but not observed 
for the BWR precursors involving initiator.  The decreasing trend after 1983 exists more 
remarkably at BWRs compared with PWRs.  On the other hand, the precursors involving 
unavailabilities have a different trend.  During the years 1974 to 1987 excluding 1982, the 
number of such precursors is almost constant, that is, less than ten, but after that, a slight 
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decreasing trend is observed.  While a similar trend can be seen for the PWR precursors 
involving unavailabilities, the number of such BWR precursors is almost constant, that is, 
less than five, over the years except 1982.    
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Figure IV.13  Annual Distributions of Precursors by Categories 
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1.2 Trends in Conditional Core Damage Probabilities of Precursors 
Figure IV.14 displays the number of precursors at PWRs and BWRs, separately, according 
to probability bin (decades of CCDPs: 10
-6
 to 10
-5
, 10
-5
 to 10
-4
, 10
-4
 to 10
-3
, 10
-3
 to 10
-2
, and 
higher than 10
-2
) for the five time periods corresponding to the times of ASP models 
changed.  From this figure, it can be seen that the distributions of precursors from the 
CCDP point of view vary according to the individual periods.  During the period 1969 to 
1981, more than a half of precursors have a CCDP of 10
-4
 or higher, approximately 30% of 
which are in the highest two CCDP bins.  This trend can be seen more remarkably for the 
PWR precursors.  At BWRs, however, more than 60% of the precursors are in the lowest 
two CCDP bins.  These trends mean that the PWR precursors in this period have a 
relatively higher CCDP compared with those at BWRs.  Seven of eight precursors with a 
CCDP of 10
-2
 or higher (six at PWRs and one at BWR) are identified in this period.  In 
the period 1982 to 1983, more than a half of precursors are in the lowest CCDP bin.  
However, different trends are observed for the PWR and BWR precursors.  At PWRs, 
about 60% have a CCDP of 10
-6
 to 10
-5
 while the BWR precursors consist of about 40% in 
the lowest CCDP bin, about 40 % in the range 10
-5
 to 10
-4
 and about 20% in the range 10
-4
 
to 10
-3
.  Thus, the precursors at BWRs have a slightly higher than those at PWRs in this 
period contrary to the previous period.  For the period 1984 to 1987, the precursors are 
distributed almost evenly in three CCDP bins, 10
-6
 to 10
-3
.  A similar trend can be seen for 
the PWR precursors and the BWR precursors even with a slight difference between them.  
Similar to the previous period, the precursors during the period 1988 to 1993 are almost 
evenly in three CCDP bins.  While this trend can be seen for the PWR precursors more 
clearly, almost a half of the BWR precursors are in the range 10
-5
 to 10
-4
.  The number of 
occurrences at PWRs is significantly larger than that at BWRs and hence, the trend 
observed for PWRs has a large contribution to that for all precursors.  In the latest period 
1994 to 1998, more than a half of precursors have a CCDP of 10
-5
 to 10
-4
 and about one 
fourth are in the lowest CCDP bin.  A similar distribution is observed for the PWR 
precursors.  While the distribution of BWR precursors is different from that of PWRs, 
however, their number is significantly small compared with PWRs and hence, their 
distribution has almost no effect on the overall trend in distribution of precursors.  
As mentioned above, significant differences can be observed in the distributions of 
precursors by CCDP bins for five time periods.  These differences seem due to mainly the 
ASP model changes.  For example, a relatively large number of precursors with a high 
CCDP have been identified for the period 1969 to 1981 due to a set of generic or 
standardized event trees being applied in common to all PWR events or all BWR events 
and no recovery action being considered in the analyses.  For the other four periods, on 
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the other hand, the contributions of such precursors have been lowered because the event 
tree models improved by reflecting the plant design difference in 1985 were employed in 
the analyses of 1984-87 events, recovery actions were incorporated into the models used in 
the analyses of 1982-83 events as well as 1988-93 events, and the fault trees representing 
plant-specific design and procedures were applied in the analyses of 1994-98 events.    
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Figure IV.14  Distributions of Precursors by CCDP Bins 
 
2. Definition of New Risk Indicators  
The USNRC has been using the occurrence rate of precursors that is defined by dividing 
the number of precursors by the total reactor years for each calendar year as one of the 
indicators to assess the industry performance
(27)
.  As discussed in the previous subsection, 
in addition, the trends of precursors can be examined from various points of view such as 
the number of precursors identified and their CCDPs.  These trends are related to core 
damage risk at nuclear power plants but provide only qualitative views.   In order to 
examine quantitatively the trends in nuclear power plant risk from different points of view, 
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this study newly proposes two quantitative risk indicators, occurrence frequency of 
precursors and annual core damage probability (annual CDP), and applies these indicators 
to evaluate the historical trends based on the ASP analysis results.  
The occurrence frequency of precursors depicts the trends on how the likelihood of risk 
significant events have changed at PWR plants and BWR plants, respectively, as well as 
overall nuclear power industry.  This indicator, occurrence frequency, is defined, as 
shown in Equation (1), by dividing the integrated number of precursors by the integrated 
reactor years.   
 
 
  


M
m m
n
nN
t
ttN
ttF
1
     (1) 
where,  
 nN ttF  : occurrence frequency when the n
th
 precursor event occurred 
t :  date (month/year) 
nt :  date when the n
th
 precursor event occurred 
mt :  operating period (years) of plant m 
 nttN  :  number of precursor events prior to tn 
M:  number of operating plants when the n
th
 precursor event occurred 
The operating period of a plant is defined as a period from the date when its commercial 
operation commenced to the date of event occurrence.  
On the other hand, the annual CDP indicates the trends on how the potential risk has 
changed at PWR plants and BWR plants as well as in overall nuclear power industry.  
The indicator, annual CDP is defined, as shown in Equation (2), by dividing the sum of 
conditional core damage probabilities of the precursors identified by the number of 
operating reactors for each calendar year.  
M
P
P
N
i i
a
  1       (2) 
where,  
aP : annual core damage probability per reactor 
iP : conditional core damage probability estimated for precursor event i 
N : number of precursor events for each calendar year 
M : number of operating reactors for each calendar year 
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3. Trends Observed by New Risk Indicators 
Based on the results from the ASP Program, this study determines whether any risk related 
trends are observed at PWRs and BWRs, respectively by applying the risk indicators 
proposed in the previous subsection. 
3.1 Occurrence Frequency of Precursors 
As mentioned above, the precursors identified in the ASP Program can be classified 
into two general categories: precursors involving initiator and those involving 
unavailabilities.  In the following, discussed are the results obtained by applying one 
of the risk indicators proposed, that is, occurrence frequency of precursor events, for 
these two categories. 
Using the equation (1) defined in the previous subsection, their respective occurrence 
frequencies were estimated for the precursors involving initiator and those involving 
unavailabilities at PWRs and BWRs.  The estimated occurrence frequencies are 
shown in Figures IV.15, 16, and 17 for all precursors at both PWRs and BWRs (607 
events), the PWR precursors (394 events), and the BWR precursors (213 events), 
respectively.   
From Figure IV.15, it can be seen that the occurrence frequency of precursors is almost 
constant at around 0.26-0.30 events per reactor year (EPRY) before 1982 
(approximately 560 reactor years) and a remarkable increasing trend exists during the 
years 1982 and 1983 (approximately 560 to 700 reactor years).  This increasing trend 
is because a significant number of precursors have been identified in 1982 and 1983 
compared with those in the previous years.  The analysis of events in these two years 
were carried out in the middle-1990s by applying the ASP models different from those 
used in the previous years and a couple of related events were regarded as one event in 
the light of new reporting requirements with promulgation of the LER rule in 1984.  
While the increasing trend continues till the year 1985 (approximately 870 reactor 
years) because a relatively large number of precursors were identified in the years 1984 
and 1985, its gradient is smaller than the previous years.  At this time, the occurrence 
frequency reaches its highest value, 0.40 EPRY.  After 1985, the occurrence 
frequency decreases gradually and linearly to 0.28 EPRY in 1998.  These trends can 
be seen for the 397 precursors involving initiator even though the occurrence frequency 
is lower.  However, the occurrence frequency of the 210 precursors involving 
unavailabilities remains at almost constant value, 0.10 EPRY, over the years 1975 
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through 1998 while in the years 1982 and 1983 a slight increasing trend is observed. 
 
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0 400 800 1200 1600 2000 2400
Integrated Reactor Operating Years (Reactor*Year)
O
c
c
u
rr
e
n
c
e
 F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
 (
E
v
e
n
ts
/R
e
a
c
to
r*
Y
e
a
r)
All Precursors Precursors involving Initiator Precursors involving Unavailabilities + 
1982 1984 1988 1994 
 
Figure IV.15  Occurrence Frequency of All Precursors 
 
For the PWR precursors, as shown in Figure IV.16, the occurrence frequency increases 
up to 0.34 EPRY until 1973 (approximately 50 reactor years) and after that, it 
decreases significantly and reaches the value of 0.24 EPRY in 1976 (approximately 
130 reactor years).  In 1977, the occurrence frequency increases again up to 0.30 
EPRY and remains at around this value for the subsequent years 1978 to 1981.  
During the years 1982 and 1983, a remarkable increasing trend is observed and 
subsequently, the occurrence frequency remains at an almost constant rate, 0.38 EPRY 
in the years 1984 and 1985.  After that, a slight decreasing trend exists over the years 
and the occurrence frequency reaches 0.28 EPRY in 1998, but its gradient is smaller 
compared with that for all precursors shown in Figure IV.15.  A similar trend is 
observed for the 242 PWR precursors involving initiator but the decreasing trend after 
1985 (approximately 520 reactor years) is more remarkable compared with that for all 
of the PWR precursors.  On the other hand, for the 152 PWR precursors involving 
unavailabilities, the occurrence frequency is in the range of 0.10 to 0.12 EPRY over the 
years after 1975 (approximately 100 reactor years).  Compared with the trend 
observed for all precursors involving unavailabilities, a slight difference can be seen in 
the trends before 1976 and after 1988.  While the occurrence frequency of the PWR 
precursors increases up to 0.15 EPRY in 1974 (approximately 70 reactor years) and 
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decreases to 0.10 EPRY in 1976 (approximately 130 reactor years), that of all 
precursors gradually increases to 0.10 EPRY in this period.  As well, the occurrence 
frequency of the PWR precursors increases slightly from 0.10 to 0.12 EPRY during the 
years 1988 through 1993 but that of all precursors is almost constant in this period.  
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Figure IV.16  Occurrence Frequency of PWR Precursors 
 
For the BWR precursors, as seen from Figure IV.17, the occurrence frequency of the 
precursors increases up to 0.30 EPRY until 1975 (approximately 100 reactor years) and 
in the subsequent years 1976 to 1981 (approximately 120 to 240 reactor years), slightly 
decreases and remains at around 0.25-0.27 EPRY.  During the years 1982 through 
1985 (approximately 240 to 340 reactor years), a remarkable increasing trend is 
observed and in 1985, the frequency reaches the highest value of 0.43 EPRY.  This 
increasing trend is due to mainly the relatively large number of precursors identified in 
four years 1982 to 1985 compared with those in other years.  The occurrence 
frequency gradually decreases over the years after 1985 and its gradient is larger than 
those of all precursors and the PWR precursors.  The quite similar trend is observed 
for the 155 precursors involving initiators.  However, the occurrence frequency of the 
58 precursors involving unavailabilities indicates different trends.  It gradually 
increases to 0.12 EPRY until 1977 (approximately 140 reactor years) and remains 
almost constant subsequently until 1982 (approximately 260 reactor years).  In 1982, 
it rapidly rises to 0.14 EPRY due to a larger number of precursors being identified in 
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1982 but after that, a decreasing trend is observed because of a smaller number of 
precursors identified in 1983 compared with those in other years.  In particular, no 
precursor involving unavailabilities was identified in 1984.   
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Figure IV.17  Occurrence Frequency of BWR Precursors 
 
Comparing the occurrence frequencies of the PWR and BWR precursors, slightly 
different trends are observed.  In particular, the frequency of BWR precursors has a 
more remarkable increasing trend during the years 1982 to 1985.  While the 
frequency increases from 0.28 to 0.43 EPRY in this period at BWRs, that increases 
from 0.30 to 0.37 EPRY during the first two years and after that remains almost 
constant at PWRs.  As well, the decreasing trends over the years after 1986 are 
different from each other.  The frequency at BWRs decreases from 0.43 to 0.27 EPRY 
but that at PWRs decreases from 0.37 to 0.28 in the same period, indicating a larger 
decreasing rate at BWRs.  During the period 1969 to 1981, the frequency of the PWR 
precursors is higher than that of the BWR ones even though similar trends are observed 
at PWRs and BWRs.  Such differences can be seen for the precursors involving 
initiator.  In addition, there is a difference in the frequencies of precursors involving 
unavailabilities.  The frequency at PWRs decreases slightly in the years 1984 to 1988, 
increases slightly in the subsequent years until 1994 and remains almost constant after 
that while the frequency at BWRs decreases gradually over the years after 1983.  
Since much more precursors were identified at PWRs than that at BWRs, the trend 
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observed for PWRs has a larger contribution to that for all precursors. 
The results above mentioned show that the occurrence frequency of precursors totally 
has been decreasing over the years but contributions of precursors involving 
unavailabilities have been increasing.  While the precursors involving initiator could 
be easily recognized as a result of reactor trip, the precursors involving unavailabilities 
are latent/potential failure and/or degradation of the safety-related equipment that 
would not be identified during power operation and would be found in the testing or 
inspection activities.  The core damage risk induced by such precursors might 
increase if additional malfunction(s) would occur and/or potential/latent failure would 
not be identified for a longer time.  Thus, more efforts are needed to lower the 
occurrence frequency of such precursors by, for instance, earlier detection of 
potential/latent failure.    
3.2 Annual Core Damage Probability 
The annual CDP is obtained by dividing the total CCDPs by the reactor years for each 
calendar year as shown in Equation (2) defined in the previous subsection.  Figure 
IV.18 shows the annual CDP by calendar years for all precursors, and Figure IV.19 
provides the comparison of annual CDPs for the PWR and BWR precursors.   
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Figure IV.18  Annual Core Damage Probabilities for All Precursors 
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For all precursors, it can be seen from Figure IV.18 that the annual CDP is relatively 
high until 1979 because generic models were applied in common to all PWR events or 
all BWR events and any recovery actions were not considered in the analysis, resulting 
in conservative evaluations.  In particular, a high annual CDP, that is, in the range 10
-3
 
to 10
-2
 is observed during the years 1975 to 1979 due to four events with a high CCDP: 
fire at Browns Ferry Unit 1 (BWR) in 1975 (1.5×10
-1
), and loss of main and auxiliary 
feedwater at three B&W PWRs (Davis Besse in 1977 with 7.0×10
-2
, Rancho Seco in 
1978 with 1.4×10
-1
, and Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) in 1979 with 4.6×10
-1
) as 
listed in Table IV.6.  On the other hand, the annual CDP has changed slightly in the 
range of 10
-5
 to 10
-4
 after 1982 and indicates a decreasing trend over the years.  It 
seems that this drastic change of annual CDP might has been due to lessons learned 
from the core melt accident at the TMI-2 in 1979 being implemented into the plant 
design and operations and the improved ASP models being used in the analyses after 
1984.  In particular, the CCDPs estimated for the events after 1992 are lower than for 
the equivalent events in earlier years because practically available equipment or 
procedures were added to the basic models previously used.  A relatively higher 
annual CDP is observed in 1985 and 1991 due to loss of feedwater at Davis Besse 
(1.1×10
-2
) and potential unavailability of high pressure injection at Shearon Harris 
(6.3×10
-3
), respectively.  As shown in Figure IV.19, the annual CDP at PWR is larger 
than that at BWRs over the years excluding 1975 and 1984.  As mentioned above, in 
1975, the fire event at Browns Ferry Unit 1 has a large contribution to the annual CDP 
Figure IV.19  Annual Core Damage Probabilities for PWR and BWR Precursors 
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not only for the BWR precursors but also for all precursors.  As well, in 1984, 13 of 
the 19 BWR precursors have a CCDP of 10
-4
 or higher, resulting in a higher annual 
CDP while at PWRs, 10 of the 14 precursors have a CCDP of lower than 10
-4
.  
Therefore, the trend of annual CDP for all precursors is quite similar to that for the 
PWR precursors over the years except these two years (1975 and 1984).  At BWRs, 
the annual CDP is approximately 10
-4
 or lower over the years 1970 through 1993 
excluding 1975 and after 1994, about 10
-6
 or lower.  These trends in annual CDPs 
imply that in general, PWRs have a relatively higher possibility of leading to core 
damage compared with BWRs, equivalent to the PSA results in NUREG-1150
(30)
. 
Table IV.6  Precursors with CCDP of 10-2 or Higher 
Plant Event Date Event Summary CCDP 
PWR 
Turkey Point Unit 3  May 8, 1974 
failure of all three auxiliary feedwater (AFW) 
pumps in test during power operation 
1.6 x 10
-2
 
Millstone Unit 2 August 3, 1976 
inadvertent load shedding on safety-related 
busses 
1.4 x 10
-2
 
Davis Besse 
September 24, 
1977 
loss of cooling water to steam generators (SG), 
resulting in SG dryout and a subsequent stuck 
open pressurizer relief valve 
7.0 x 10
-2
 
Rancho Seco April 23, 1978 
loss of feedwater and subsequent failure of 
AFW injection valves to open 
1.4 x 10
-1
 
Salem Unit 1 
December 11, 
1978 
loss of a vital instrument bus causing failure of 
AFW pump to start 
1.4 x 10
-2
 
Three Mile Island 
Unit 2 
March 28, 
1979 
loss of feedwater, stuck open pressurizer relief 
valve and loss of high pressure injection (HPI) 
resulting in core damage 
4.6 x 10
-1
 
Davis Besse June 9, 1985 
loss of feedwater and subsequent stuck open 
pressurizer relief valve 
1.1 x 10
-2
 
BWR 
Browns Ferry Unit 1  
March 22, 
1975 
extensive cable fire involving loss of high 
pressure injection 
1.5 x 10
-1
 
 
Figure IV.20 provides the annual CDP trends of all precursors, the PWR precursors 
and the BWR precursors by precursor category.  As seen from Figure IV.20(a), the 
annual CDP of precursors involving initiator is generally higher than that of the 
precursors involving unavailabilities.  In particular, this trend can be seen remarkably 
during two periods, 1975 to 1980 and 1983 to 1986.  During the former period, the 
annual CDP of precursors involving initiator is approximately 10
-3
 or higher while that 
of precursors involving unavailabilities is in the range 10
-5
 to 10
-4
.  The major reason 
of such significant differences in the annual CDPs is that one or more precursors 
involving initiator with a high CCDP (10
-2
 or higher), listed in Table IV.6, took place in 
each of these years.  During the latter period, the annual CDP of precursors involving 
initiator is approximately 10
-4
 but that of precursor involving unavailabilities is lower 
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than 10
-5
, and in particular, lower than 10
-6
 in two years 1984 and 1985 because of a 
small number of such precursors being identified in these two years (three in 1984 and 
six in 1985).  During this period, as well, there are one or two precursors involving 
initiator with a relatively high CCDP (10
-3
 or higher) in each year except 1983, leading 
to the higher annual CDP: reactor trip with reactor core isolation cooling and residual 
heat removal (RHR) unavailable at LaSalle Unit 1 in 1984 (2.3×10
-3
), loss of feedwater 
at Davis Besse in 1985 (Table IV.6), inadvertent opening of SG relief valve resulting in 
reactor trip with HPI unavailable at Catawba Unit 1 in 1986 (3.3×10
-3
), and reactor trip 
with a stuck open pressurizer relief valve at Turkey Point Unit 3 in 1986 (1.3×10
-3
).  
In 1983, however, about 50 precursors involving initiator are identified while there are 
less than ten precursors involving unavailabilities, resulting in the significant 
difference in annual CDPs.  On the other hand, in 1974 and 1991, the annual CDP of 
precursors involving unavailabilities is higher than that of precursors involving 
initiator due to potential failure of three AFW pumps at Turkey Point Unit 3 in 1974 
(Table IV.6), and the potential failure of HPI at Shearon Harris in 1991 (6.3×10
-3
).   
For the PWR precursors, it can be seen from Figure IV.20(b) that the trends in the 
annual CDPs are similar to those mentioned above excluding the years before 1975 and 
in 1981.  The difference between the annual CDPs of all precursors and PWR 
precursors in the years before 1975 is mainly due to no precursor involving 
unavailabilities being identified and the precursors involving initiator having a 
relatively low CCDP.  Although two of ten precursors involving initiator have a 
CCDP higher than 10
-3
 and largely contribute to the annual CDP in 1981, there are only 
four precursors involving unavailabilities and their respective CCDPs are relatively 
low, resulting in the lower annual CDP of such precursors.  Also at BWRs, shown in 
Figure IV.20(c), the annual CDP of precursors involving initiator is generally higher 
than that of precursors involving unavailabilities.  In three years 1974, 1981, and 
1998, however, the annual CDP of precursors involving unavailabilities is significantly 
higher because of an event at Brunswick Unit 1 in 1981 (RHR heat exchanger damage 
due to oysters: CCDP of 6.7×10
-3
) and no precursor involving initiator being identified 
in 1974 and 1998.   The annual CDP of precursors involving initiator has changed in 
the range 10
-6
 to 10
-4
 until 1993 except 1974 and 1975, in which no such precursor is 
identified and the fire event took place at Browns Ferry Unit 1, respectively, and after 
1994, it has decreased to lower than 10
-6
.  For the precursors involving 
unavailabilities, the annual CDP is almost 10
-5
 or lower excluding 1981 in which the 
Brunswick event mentioned above occurred and in particular, it has remained at about 
10
-5
 or lower during the years after 1984. 
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Figure IV.20  Annual Core Damage Probabilities by Precursor Categories 
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3.3 Overall Risk Trends 
The results obtained from application of the newly proposed risk indicators, occurrence 
frequency of precursors and annual CDP, are summarized as follows: 
- The occurrence frequency estimated for all precursors at both PWRs and BWRs 
changes in the range of 0.26 to 0.30 EPRY during the years until 1981 and 
significantly increases to 0.40 EPRY in the years 1982 to 1985 but after that, 
gradually decreases to 0.28 EPRY in 1998.  Even though the frequency itself is 
different, a quite similar trend can be seen for the precursors involving initiator 
because such precursors have a large contribution to the total number of precursors.  
However, the trend observed for precursors involving unavailabilities is different 
and the frequency has remained at about 0.10 EPRY over the years.   
- Comparing the occurrence frequencies for the PWR and BWR precursors, slightly 
different trends are observed.  At PWRs, the frequency remains at around 0.30 
EPRY during the years until 1981 with its changes in the range 0.24 to 0.34 EPRY 
in the first several years (up to approximately 130 reactor years) and significantly 
increases to 0.38 EPRY during two years 1982 and 1983 but after that, gradually 
decreases to 0.28 EPRY in 1998.  At BWRs, the frequency until 1981 is lower (at 
around 0.27 EPRY) but after that, a remarkable increasing trend is observed (from 
0.27 to 0.43 EPRY).  Also, the decreasing trend after 1985 is slightly more 
significant compared with that at PWRs.  This means that likelihood of risk 
significant events has been decreasing at both PWRs and BWRs but in recent years, 
it might be higher at PWRs than at BWRs. 
- The trends observed for the occurrence frequency indicate that the likelihood of 
risk significant events has been decreasing in total at both PWRs and BWRs but the 
significance of potential/latent failures has been getting larger.  The precursors 
involving unavailabilities could have a higher CCDP if the time to detect 
potential/latent failures would be longer.  Therefore, it is important that additional 
efforts should be taken for eliminating such events by, for instance, earlier 
detection of potential/latent failures.  
- The annual CDP increases to 10-2 during the years 1969 to 1979 due to several 
events with a high CCDP such as the fire event at Browns Ferry Unit 1 in 1975 and 
the TMI-2 accident in 1979 and after that it has changed in the range of 10
-5
 to 10
-4
 
with the decreasing trend.  This implies that the lessons learned from the TMI-2 
accident would have been implemented into the plant design and/or operation 
practices and the likelihood of risk significant events has been lowered. 
- The annual CDP at PWRs is generally higher than that at BWRs over the years, in 
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particular, significantly during the years 1975 to 1979.  This observation is 
equivalent to the PSA results for PWRs and BWRs. 
- Comparing the precursors involving initiator and unavailabilities, the annual CDP 
of precursors involving initiator is generally higher than that of precursors 
involving unavailabilities and has a larger contribution to the total annual CDP.  
This means that the precursors involving initiator would be more risk significant 
events.  As the number of events with a relatively high CCDP becomes smaller, as 
well, the annual CDP has been getting lower.  This implies that lowering the 
number of precursors involving initiators could result in a lower annual CDP. 
- The recent trends observed in the two indicators, the occurrence frequency and the 
annual CDP, show that risk significant events have not taken place, which implies 
the nuclear power plant safety would have been improved.  
It should be noted that in the ASP Program, the models used in the analyses have been 
changed over the years and do not explicitly cover all core damage sequences, in 
particular, those induced by external events such as fire and earthquake and therefore, 
the trends described above indicate limited observations.  Despite such a limitation, 
the two indicators proposed here can provide the trends on core damage risk in 
industry-level useful for confirming that the safety of operating nuclear power plants is 
being maintained.  
4. Summary  
This study proposes new quantitative risk indicators, that is, the occurrence frequency 
of precursors and the annual CDP deriving from the results of the ASP analyses carried 
out by the USNRC and discusses their respective application results.  As described 
above, the trends on how the likelihood of risk significant events and the potential of 
core damage risk in nuclear power industry have changed are indicated by estimating 
the occurrence frequency of precursors and the annual CDP.  These trends are based 
on the ASP analysis results for the events that actually occurred and thus, may provide 
more empirical and/or realistic indications.  Specifically, the core damage risks at U.S. 
nuclear power plants have been lowered and the likelihood of risk significant events 
has been remarkably decreasing, implying that plant safety in the United States has 
been improved.  Through the applications, it is concluded that the effectiveness of the 
proposed indicators is demonstrated because these indicators can provide the 
quantitative information useful for: 
- determining the likelihood of risk significant events,  
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- monitoring and/or predicting the risk level at nuclear power plants, and 
- examining the industry risk trends.  
Although, in this study, trends on the occurrence frequency of precursors and the 
annual CDP are displayed and discussed for overall nuclear power industry, PWR 
plants and BWR plants, it is considered that the proposed indicators can be employed 
as one of the performance indicators for the specific plant category (for example, 
category by operating periods) and/or in the utility-level (that is, for individual 
utilities) if much more events will be assessed using the ASP analysis approach in the 
future.  It is also expected that the relevant data will be accumulated and more widely 
discussed in establishing risk indicators applicable to the individual plants. 
 
IV.5  Concluding Remarks 
The ASP analysis has been developed and used in the United States to identify and 
categorize the operational events as precursors to potential severe core damage accident 
sequences, that are conceptually similar to a “near miss” for a core damage, by calculating 
a probability of core damage given the failed equipment associated with the particular 
event.  The author has been carrying out the ASP analyses of specific events that have the 
potential of risk significance, trending analysis based on the ASP documents published by 
the USNRC and development of the event tree models for providing a more realistic ASP 
analyses to obtain the risk significant trends, to characterize risk insights useful for 
identifying plant vulnerabilities, to feed the lessons learned from the study back to plant 
operations, and to establish risk indicators for event assessment.  This chapter describes 
the outlines of the analysis approach, the analysis of STGR events and trending analysis of 
precursors with newly proposed risk indicators.  
Ten actual and one potential STGR events were analyzed with use of a newly developed 
consistent ASP model to identify the risk significant anomalies observed during the events 
in terms of the potential for core damage and to obtain generic insights useful for 
examining alternative mitigation measures for STGR.  The analysis results show that the 
CCDPs for SGTR events range from 10
-4
 to 10
-2
 and in particular, those involving the 
delayed identification of tube rupture or failure to timely depressurize the reactor could 
have a relatively high possibility of leading to core damage.  This means that such failures 
are generic safety issues for SGTR, implying the importance of improving the capability to 
detect SGTR and the operating procedures.  It is also shown that some of the other 
anomalies observed would largely contribute to the possibility of core damage, which 
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points out the need of examining alternative measures for recovering from such conditions. 
Quantitative risk trends were examined using newly proposed indicators, that is, the 
occurrence frequency of precursors and the annual CDP deriving from the results of the 
ASP analyses to more effectively and widely use the ASP results for discussing and/or 
monitoring industry risk trends.  Through the applications, it is shown that the core 
damage risks at U.S. nuclear power plants have been lowered and the likelihood of risk 
significant events has been remarkably decreasing.  This implies that plant safety in 
the Unites States has been improved.  Since these trends are based on the events that 
actually occurred, the proposed risk indicators may provide more empirical and 
realistic observations useful for examining and monitoring the risk trends and/or risk 
characteristics in nuclear power industry.  As well, this study underlines the need to 
accumulate the ASP analysis results and to employ the proposed indicators as one of 
the performance indicators for the specific plant category (for example, category by 
operating periods) and/or in the utility-level (that is, for individual utilities). 
The ASP analysis of specific events can draw generic safety implications useful for 
identifying plant vulnerabilities, and the proposed risk indicators can examine the overall 
picture of risks at industry and individual plant levels.  Therefore, such ASP studies 
should be actively carried out to obtain the insights for improving the plant safety.  So far, 
the ASP study has not been conducted systematically for the operational events in Japan 
and hence, it is expected that the ASP analyses will be carried out and the results will be 
accumulated so that the nuclear power plant risks could be grasped and discussed more 
widely and effectively. 
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Chapter V 
Analysis of Severe Accidents 
at Fukushima Dai-ichi 
Nuclear Power Plant 
 
V.1 Background 
On March 11, 2011, the Tohoku District-off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake and the 
subsequent tsunami resulted in the severe core damage at Tokyo Electric Power 
Company’s (TEPCO) Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 to 3, involving 
hydrogen explosions at Units 1, 3, and 4 and the large release of radioactive materials to 
the environment.  
Four independent committees were established by TEPCO, the Japanese Government, the 
Diet of Japan, and the Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (RJIF) to investigate the 
accident and published their respective reports.  TEPCO issued the interim report in 
December 2011 and the final report in June 2012 (hereinafter, the TEPCO report)
(1,2)
.  
The Government’s committee made public its interim and final reports in December 2011 
and July 2012, respectively (hereinafter, the Government report)
(3,4)
.  The Diet 
committee and the RJIF committee opened their respective investigation reports in June 
2012 and March 2012 (hereinafter, the Diet report and the RJIF report, respectively)
(5,6)
.  
Also, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA; the former nuclear regulator in 
Japan) carried out an analysis of accident causes to obtain the lessons learned from the 
accident and made its report public (hereinafter, the NISA report)
(7)
.   
This chapter delineates, at first, the severe accident scenarios at Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 
1 to 3 with use of event trees for better understanding the accident
(8)
.  Next, the 
differences in their respective positions are clarified by reviewing the five reports from 
the technological point of view, focusing on the accident progression and causes to 
specify the issues to be further examined
(8)
.  Moreover, the undiscussed issues are 
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identified to provide insights useful for the near-term regulatory activities including 
accident investigation by the Nuclear Regulation Authority
(8)
.   
 
V.2 Analysis of Accident Scenarios and Measures 
to Avoid Core Damage 
Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1 to 3 experienced almost the same accident sequences that 
involved the long-term station blackout (SBO) initiated by the earthquake and the 
tsunami, leading to severe core damage and subsequent radioactive release.  However, 
the individual sequences were chronologically different from each other.  This section 
analyzes the core damage sequences at Units 1 to 3 and depicts them on event trees 
initiated by earthquake to clarify the differences among accident sequences at Units 1 to 3.  
As well, the actual responses to avoid the severe accidents are discussed using the event 
trees.  Figures V.1 to V.3 show event trees developed for Units 1 to 3, respectively.  In 
these event trees, the “red” path indicates the actual accident sequence and the “blue” 
paths mean the ones that could avoid the reactor core from damaging. 
The representative accident sequences at Units 1 to 3 were in common as follows: The 
reactor automatically scrammed due to the earthquake, followed by loss of offsite power 
(LOOP), auto-start of emergency diesel generators (EDGs), actuation of isolation 
condensers (ICs) at Unit 1 and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) at Units 2 and 3.  
Afterwards, both DC and AC powers onsite were lost due to flooding of power centers 
(low voltage switchboards) and metal clads (high/medium voltage switchboards) by the 
tsunami and the offsite power was not recovered, resulting in the long-term SBO though 
the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) actuated at Unit 3.  As a result, the reactor 
was not depressurized, preventing alternative water injection.  Provided that DC power 
would have been available and offsite power would have been restored, the core cooling 
could have been carried out with RCIC and/or HPCI and as well, the subsequent decay 
heat removal might have been performed, bringing the reactor into cold shutdown.  
Even in the case of no AC power restoration, the reactor depressurization and the 
subsequent alternative water injection with containment venting might have prevent the 
core from damaging if DC power would be available.  As well, timely recovery of 
electric power supplies could have made the decay heat removal capability available, 
avoiding the core damage.  In such a way, core damage might have been avoided by 
using some cooling measures, including alternative water injection, if DC power would 
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have been available and AC power would have been restored. 
 
1. Unit 1 
The reactor scrammed due to the earthquake, followed by LOOP, turbine trip, closure of 
main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), and so on.  The closure of MSIVs caused the 
reactor pressure to rise and ICs automatically actuated.  As well, EDGs automatically 
started and supplied the electric power to onsite loads.  ICs operated for approximately 
10 min and then, the operators manually tripped ICs.  EDGs operated for approximately 
30 min until a series of tsunami waves attacked the site.  Afterwards, the electrical 
switchboards were flooded by the tsunami, resulting in loss of DC power.  As a result, 
ICs and HPCI could not start both automatically and manually and the indicators of 
reactor parameters such as water level were lost in the control room.   
At that time, Unit 1 was brought into SBO with DC power lost.  Since no electric power 
supply was restored after that, the accident progressed to core damage.  In order to 
recover from such accident sequences and avoid the core from damaging, the accident 
managements were required as follows: restoring electric power supplies and 
subsequently, establishing decay heat removal or assuring alternative water injection with 
the reactor depressurized and the containment vented.  Considering that the core damage 
might have occurred within 2-3 h after the IC trip, however, it would have been highly 
unlikely to execute these actions successfully in a timely manner.  Actually, such efforts 
were unsuccessful.  The accident progression at Unit 1 seems one of the typical SBO 
sequences defined in the past probabilistic risk/safety assessment (PRA/PSA). 
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Figure V.1  Event Tree and Accident Sequences for Unit 1 
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2. Unit 2  
The reactor scrammed due to the earthquake, followed by LOOP, turbine trip, closure of 
MSIVs, and so on.  The MSIV closure caused the reactor pressure to rise and 
safety/relief valves (SRVs) cyclically operated to control the reactor pressure.  As well, 
EDGs automatically started and supplied the electric power to onsite loads.  Since RCIC 
was manually started in accordance with the operating procedures for transients with 
MSIV closed
(9)
 before the electric power supplies were lost by the tsunami, it could 
continue to run for 70 h despite loss of DC power.  After the trip of RCIC, the efforts to 
restore the electric power supplies and to depressurize the reactor were unsuccessful, 
resulting in SBO with DC power lost followed by core damage.   
In order to recover from such accident sequences and avoid the core from damaging, the 
following accident managements were required: restoring electric power supplies and 
subsequently, establishing decay heat removal or assuring alternative water injection with 
the reactor depressurized and the containment vented.  Compared with the sequence at 
Unit 1, the time available for doing that was longer and thus, the likelihood of having 
restored electric power supplies and assured alternative water injection is relatively higher.  
Since the electric power supplies were not restored in a timely manner and the reactor 
was not depressurized, however, alternative water injection was not carried out.  
Although the accident sequence at Unit 2 was SBO with DC power lost, RCIC continued 
to run for a long time without its control and the switchover of water source was 
performed.  Therefore, it can be considered that the sequence at Unit 2 was, in actual, 
loss of decay heat removal.   
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Figure V.2  Event Tree and Accident Sequences for Unit 2 
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3. Unit 3  
The reactor scrammed due to the earthquake, followed by LOOP, turbine trip, closure of 
MSIVs, and so on.  The MSIV closure caused the reactor pressure to rise and SRVs 
cyclically operated to control the reactor pressure.  As well, EDGs automatically started 
and supplied the electric power to onsite loads.  The operators manually started RCIC 
according to the operating procedures for transients with MSIV closed
(10)
.  Although the 
sequence at Unit 3 was the same one at Unit 2 until the tsunami hit the site, some DC 
power centers were not affected by the tsunami and thus, control power supplies and 
HPCI were also available.  RCIC automatically tripped due to malfunction of a valve 
after running for approximately 20 h.  Then, HPCI automatically actuated and the 
reactor water level was recovered and maintained.  The operators switched over HPCI to 
the test line operation to depressurize the reactor.  However, HPCI was manually tripped, 
considering the possibilities of pipe ruptures due to vibrations of the HPCI turbine caused 
by a long time operation of HPCI under the low pressure conditions.  Since SRVs could 
not be operated at all, afterwards, the efforts to restart HPCI were unsuccessful due to 
depletion of batteries, resulting in SBO with DC power lost followed by core damage.   
In order to recover from such accident sequences and avoid the core from damaging, the 
following accident managements were required: restoring electric power supplies and 
subsequently, establishing decay heat removal or assuring alternative water injection with 
the reactor depressurized and the containment vented.  Although the time available for 
taking some measures was longer, considering that RCIC and HPCI operated for totally 
35 h, no accident management measure was successful.  In particular, the reactor 
pressure had been maintained at 1 MPa or lower for 8 h, during which HPCI was 
operating (0.58 MPa at the time of HPCI trip), and hence, alternative water supply with 
fire engines might have been allowed during this period.  However, no water supply was 
performed in a timely manner since plant personnel was forced to interrupt their work for 
preparing the alternative water supply by the hydrogen explosion at Unit 1 and high 
radiation on the site.  At Unit 3, DC power for controlling RCIC and HPCI remained 
available and the cooling water was supplied by RCIC and HPCI even in the limited time.  
Therefore, the sequence at Unit 3 was a typical one of the SBO sequences but its 
progression was longer than that generally assumed in the past PSA.  Actually, the 
operators switched over HPCI to test line operation to depressurize the reactor but after 
the manual trip of HPCI, the reactor pressure increased again, preventing the alternative 
water supply.  Hence, the HPCI test line operation was not considered as a 
depressurization measure in the event tree.   
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Figure V.3  Event Tree and Accident Sequences for Unit 3  
As mentioned above, the accident sequences can be delineated with event tress.  Since 
the current event tree approach is intended to represent the accident sequences for a 
single unit, however, the adverse effects from the neighboring unit, such as the impact of 
hydrogen explosion at Unit 1 on the recovery actions at Unit 3, are not usually considered 
in event trees.  Also, the sequences delineated in event trees at Units 1 and 2 are 
apparently the same although they are chronologically different from each other.  
Therefore, it seems essential to improve the event tree approach so that chronologically 
time-dependent sequences can be explicitly delineated and the circumferences of 
neighboring unit(s) can be modeled to provide the accident sequences more realistically.  
V.3 Review of Accident Investigation Reports 
Their respective positions in five reports are not necessarily in agreement.  Particularly, 
the TEPCO report, the Government report and the Diet report express significantly 
different positions on some matters.  This section discusses the differences in their 
positions. 
1. Electric Power Supplies 
1.1 Transmission Lines of Offsite Power Supplies 
The TEPCO report, the Government report and the NISA report indicate no significant 
differences in their respective positions on causes of LOOP.  On the other hand, the Diet 
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report focuses on the fact that 6 out of 7 transmission lines had been connected to the 
same substation and points out insufficient diversity and independence of offsite power 
against external hazards such as earthquake and inadequate aseismic design of substation 
as one of the causes of LOOP.  The NISA report emphasizes the need to improve the 
reliability of offsite power, considering the fact that the nuclear power plant (NPP) safety 
had heavily been affected by unavailability of AC power sources, while the report insists 
that the plant safety should not rely on offsite power sources excessively.   
The regulations of NPPs in Japan require the individual reactors have more than two 
transmission lines from offsite power but do not specify these lines be connected to one 
or more substations.  On the other hand, Appendix A to 10 CFR 50, “General Design 
Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants”, in the United States specify that the electric power 
from the transmission network to the onsite electric distribution system be supplied by 
two physically independent circuits (not necessarily on separate rights of way) designed 
and located so as to minimize to the extent practical the likelihood of their simultaneous 
failure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions
(11)
.  
Although this requirement is more stringent than that in Japan, it is not clear whether or 
not offsite substations are regulated.  It is necessary to study how the regulatory 
coverage should be defined to improve the reliability of offsite power.  For reference, in 
Japan, some sites such as Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant are supplied with offsite power 
from separate transmission lines connected to two or more independent substations. 
1.2 Layout Designs of Electrical Switchgears for Onsite Power 
Supplies 
While the TEPCO report describes only the damage situation of electrical switchgears for 
onsite power supplies, such as metal clads (MCs), power centers (PCs), and DC power 
distribution systems, and EDGs, other three reports address the causes of loss of onsite 
power supplies as follows. 
The Government report states that many switchgears for onsite power supplies were 
flooded by the tsunami, resulting in loss of their respective functions, and raises concerns 
about lack of physical separation for electrical switchgears and EDGs.  In addition, it 
points out that TEPCO had not implemented any measures to cope with the case where 
two or more units would be affected simultaneously by external events such as natural 
disasters and any unit might not be provided with power from its neighboring unit(s) 
because the TEPCO’s accident management against SBO was incorporated based on the 
assumption that at least one of neighboring units might not be affected. 
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The Diet report introduces the fact that all normal MCs and emergency MCs, and normal 
PCs for Unit 1 were located on the first floor of the turbine building and points to the 
vulnerability of power supply system to external events such as flooding and fire as well 
as threats from malicious and intentional acts.  As well, it states that SBO could have 
occurred even if only one specific area was damaged.  
The NISA report places emphasis on the fact that devices and components located on the 
same floor of building lost their functions due to a common cause, that is, flooding by the 
tsunami and thus, highlights the need to enhance the physical separation and 
independence of onsite power supplies. 
However, these reports do not address and analyze reasons why the electrical switchgears 
and EDGs had been installed on the first floor or basement level of building.  The Safety 
Design Review Guides established by the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan requires 
the redundancy or diversity and independence for emergency power supplies
(12)
 but does 
not specify the requirement on physical separation.  This means lack of regulatory rules 
and is supposed one of root causes of the accidents.  More important things are the 
licensee’s thoughts about layout of electrical switchgears and EDGs.  Although the 
layout design at PWRs and BWRs in Japan has been defined focusing on aseismic 
natures, maintainability, connectivity with the control room, and so on
(13, 14)
, as shown in 
Table V.1, no specific guidelines have been prepared and thus, the layout design has 
relied on the licensees’ discretion, which might have led to the fact that electrical 
switchgears and EDGs had been installed in some specific areas.  
Table V.1  Basic Concepts of Layout Design for Electrical Components – (a) BWRs 
Early phase of introduction (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP Units 1-5) 
 Layout design followed that of U.S. BWRs.  
 Seismic Design: EDGs were installed in the building, which was founded directly on bedrock, and placed on the 
foundation of basement (the lowest level) considering their heavy weights and vibration mitigation.  Switchgears 
(metal clad and power center) were basically placed on locations near their loads such as pumps.  
Middle phase of introduction (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP Unit 6, Fukushima Dai-ni NPP Units 1-4) 
 EDGs and emergency electric components belonging to the high aseismic category were installed in the 
accessory building attached to the secondary containment building (reactor building).  The accessory building 
was constructed by enhancing the ground contact area (relief limit of building foundation). 
 EDGs were placed on the foundation of basement considering their heavy weights and vibration mitigation. 
Later phase of introduction (Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP Units 1-7) 
 Because of deeper bedrock level compared with the preceding sites, the reactor building needed to be deeply 
buried in the ground.  
 EDGs were placed on the first basement level or the first level, which is near the ground leveling surface of the 
accessory building, emphasizing maintainability.  
 EDGs were laid out so that their vibrations can be coped with by the building structure. 
 After that, this design concept was followed and the installation of EDGs on the first floor became the 
standardized layout design.  
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Table V.1  Basic Concepts of Layout Design for Electrical Components – (b) PWRs 
 Basic Concept: The height of buildings and framework were determined in consideration of quake resistance, and 
the heavy loads were placed on the lower floors and the light loads were on the upper floors.  
 Relays, metal clad switchgears and batteries were placed on the locations near the main control room inside the 
reactor building in consideration of physical connectivity.  
 In many plants, relays, metal clad switchgears and battery rooms were located on the floor below the main control 
room. 
 EDGs were placed on the ground level in consideration of their maintainability.  
(Note: At PWRs, there is almost no difference in layout design by age and type of reactors.) 
 
1.3 Trip of Emergency Diesel Generators 
Although all but the Diet report assume that the cause of EDG tripping was the flooding 
of EDGs, onsite power distribution system and/or DC power supply system by the 
tsunami, the Diet report takes different positions on the EDG trips.  The Diet report 
estimates the arrival times of the first and second waves and, based on this estimation, 
expresses its views that it is impossible for the tsunami to have been the cause of loss of 
emergency AC power supply from EDG-A at Unit 1, EDG-B (air-cooled) at Unit 2 and 
EDG-B (air cooled) at Unit 4 unless the second wave had arrived before AC power was 
lost.  Also, the Diet report raises a question about other EDGs (EDG-B at Unit 1, 
EDG-A Unit 2, EDG-A and B at Unit 3) having tripped by the tsunami and assumes one 
case that the cooling line or fuel oil supply line of EDG might have been broken by the 
earthquake and consequently, EDGs might have tripped due to being overheated or 
supplied with no fuel oil, and the other case that some parts of EDGs might have been 
deformed or dislodged by the earthquake and the EDG shafts or bearings might have 
been out of alignment, causing EDGs to trip due to being overheated or thermally bound.  
As pointed out by the Diet report, it is likely that piping or mechanical parts could have 
been broken due to the earthquake, resulting in EDGs having stopped.  However, such 
conditions would have occurred in a random manner.  Considering the fact that EDGs 
had automatically started after the earthquake and subsequently, tripped almost 
simultaneously, it does not seem realistic to assume that simultaneous tripping of EDGs 
would have been mainly attributed to the mechanical failures caused by the earthquake.  
On the other hand, operating experience shows failures to continuously run of EDGs and 
EDGs might have tripped if random failures would have coincided with defects in 
maintenance and thus, the views of the Diet report cannot be dismissed.  
 
2. Core Cooling 
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2.1 Isolation Condenser at Unit 1 
All the investigation reports discuss the IC issues at Unit 1 as an important matter. 
However, their respective positions are different from each other on the manual trip of 
ICs, actuation of their isolation valves, including logic for closing the valves, and 
operating procedures. 
(a) Reasons of manual trip 
Both ICs automatically started on the reactor high pressure signal but were manually 
tripped approximately 10 min later.  The TEPCO report makes the case that the manual 
trip of ICs was consistent with the relevant operating procedures because the operators 
recognized that the reactor cooldown rate limit of 55
o
C/h would have been exceeded.  
Although the Government report agrees with the TEPCO’s position, the Diet report 
opposes to that and points out the possibility of the broken IC piping.  The Diet report 
states as follows: TEPCO should have well known how the reactor pressure and coolant 
temperature would vary when both ICs automatically actuate at the same time and should 
have set the IC auto-start conditions; if the operators manually tripped ICs since the 
cooldown rate could not be maintained below the limit of 55
o
C/h, nevertheless, it is likely 
that the cooling capability of ICs was too high to be used actually or the IC piping rupture 
would have led to the cooldown rate limit being exceeded.  Then, the report points out 
that the TEPCO’s position is irrational and self-contradictory.  As well, the Diet report 
stresses the possibility of IC pipe failures due to the earthquake based on the following 
two reasons; i) the Unit 1 plant personnel stated that he tripped both ICs to confirm 
whether or not the coolant was leaking from the IC piping or other pipes because of the 
rapid reactor pressure drop, to control the reactor pressure and then, to bring the reactor 
into cold shutdown according to the operating procedures, and ii) ICs were working for 
11 min, resulting in the reactor pressure decrease from approximately 6.8 MPa to 4.5 
MPa.  Furthermore, the Diet report describes that the possibility of a small-break LOCA 
with a leakage of 0.3 cm
2
 or less cannot be excluded referring to the analytical results 
with RELAP5 by JNES. 
However, the manual startup and trip of ICs for controlling the reactor pressure is 
consistent with the operating procedures and actually, a similar operation was executed in 
the events at Tsuruga Unit 1 in 2003 and 2004
(15)
.  In addition, as pointed out by the Diet 
report, TEPCO had no experience of using ICs and had not provided the operating staff 
with any simulator training.  Therefore, the plant personnel might not have known how 
the reactor pressure decreases when ICs work.  It is no wonder that they have thought of 
several possibilities including leakage from the IC piping because the cooldown rate was 
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faster than that observed in the normal shutdown process.  Also, the analysis performed 
by JNES shows that the reactor pressure and temperature calculated for the case of no 
leakage assumed were in good agreement with those measured.  It is not necessarily 
appropriate to point out that the reactor pressure had decreased too rapidly.  In addition, 
seat leak in valves and/or seal leak in pumps might have been enlarged to the leakage of 
about 0.3 cm
2
 due to unidentified causes.  Therefore, the rapid decrease of reactor 
pressure is not a decisive factor in determining that the damage to piping took place due 
to the earthquake. 
(b) Logic for closing isolation valves  
The Diet report makes an objection to the terminology “fail safe” being used to the logic 
for closing the isolation valves of ICs in the TEPCO and the Government reports.  This 
is a dispute concerning whether or not the concept and use of “fail safe” are appropriate 
to the logic for closing the isolation valves and is not related directly to the accident 
progression and causes.  Instead, it should be verified whether the logic had been 
designed as the result of having examined to which priority should be given between the 
ICs’ function and the isolation of steam supply line break.  According to the NISA 
report, in the logic for RCIC or HPCI, any signal for isolating valves in its turbine steam 
supply line is not generated when the electrical power is lost for break detection circuits.  
Additionally, the Diet report states that at a U.S. BWR, Oyster Creek, the isolation valves 
of ICs are not closed on loss of electric power.  It is necessary to analyze and/or examine 
the reasons why the basic concepts are different in the design of equipment or systems 
which have a similar function. 
The NISA report points out as follow; although the interlock for closing isolation valves 
had been designed so that ICs might lose their function by activating the interlock in the 
case of loss of DC power to the control circuits of valves, such a design concept was not 
correctly recognized by TEPCO, contributing to the accident progression.  
(c) Operating procedures 
The Government report expresses its view as follows; it is not unnatural that the shift 
operators were attempting to gradually reduce the reactor pressure with the cooldown rate 
limit of 55
o
C/h not being exceeded and finally to bring the reactor into cold shutdown.  
As well, the TEPCO report claims that the operators were controlling the reactor pressure 
by opening and closing the valves of ICs to bring the reactor into cold shutdown and 
there was no particular problem because these actions were similar ways in the training 
programs.  The NISA report states that the reactor pressure decreased to the value lower 
than that specified in the operating procedures due to the auto-start of ICs but the operator 
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action for controlling the reactor pressure seems to have been properly executed by 
opening and closing the valves of ICs through the comparison with the pressure trends 
observed at Tsuruga Unit 1.  This implies that no procedural problem was involved in 
these operations.  However, the operating procedures specify that the reactor pressure be 
maintained at 6-7 MPa with use of ICs.  Such an IC operation is considered a kind of 
temporary actions until reopening MSIVs is allowed.  In this accident, the 
unprecedented large earthquake occurred, resulting in automatic reactor scram and loss of 
offsite power.  Hence, the operators should have considered the possibilities of strong 
aftershocks and have attempted to bring the reactor into cold shutdown as soon as 
possible instead of maintaining the reactor pressure using ICs.  Actually, the operating 
procedures for the reactor scram with MSIV closed do not assume the auto-start of ICs 
and specify that the reactor be depressurized with SRVs, HPCI test line operation without 
injection or manual operation of ICs
(16)
.  In the original design, ICs are intended to 
maintain the reactor in a hot shutdown condition.  Provided that the operators would 
have fully recognized the original design concept of ICs, it is unnatural that they 
attempted to place the reactor into cold shutdown using ICs in the case that the reactor 
automatically scrams due to earthquake like this time.  Furthermore, the TEPCO report 
states that only the operation (opening/closing) of IC valves had been executed without 
steam flowing, as well as the tabletop exercises, in the training program, implying that the 
operators could not have understood the reactor pressure behaviors when using ICs.  
Nonetheless, the report claims that proper operations towards cold shutdown were carried 
out in the control room as per training.  As pointed out in the Government and Diet 
reports, it is a very important point that there is no experience of using ICs and no 
simulator training had been performed at all.  It should be noted that Fukushima Dai-ichi 
Unit 1 had been operated without experience and adequate training on safety-related 
systems which are expected to actuate when a transient occurs (in other words, the safety 
culture had been lacking over many years) and thus, the individual licensees should 
confirm that such situations are not applicable to their own plants.  Although the NISA 
report refers to the Tsuruga Unit 1 event in which manual startup of ICs was carried out 
prior to its auto-start, no further discussion is provided on difference of the IC operations 
at Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 1 and Tsuruga Unit 1. 
It is noteworthy that none of the five reports discuss the adequacy of the operating 
procedures applied immediately after the earthquake, including the IC operations.  Thus, 
Section V.4 will address the technical issues on this matter. 
Regarding the fact that TEPCO made wrong assumptions that ICs had still been operating 
based on the temporary readings of water level gauge, the Government and Diet reports 
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note that both the TEPCO headquarters and the site personnel incorrectly assessed high 
radiation being detected near the Unit 1 reactor building at approximately 17:50 on 
March 11, 2011.  Taking the high radiation level into account, TEPCO should have 
suspected that ICs had not operated anymore and the core had already been uncovered.   
2.2 Continuous Operation of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) 
and Alternative Water Injection at Unit 2 
Although DC power was lost after the tsunami hit the site, at Unit 2, RCIC had been 
operating for approximately 70 h.  About 35 h after loss of DC power, the water source 
of RCIC was manually switched over from the condensate storage tank (CST) to the 
suppression pool.  On this switchover, the Government report describes that the 
suppression pool might have gradually lost its capability of pressure suppression and 
steam condensation, leading to less steam being released from the RCIC turbine and the 
subsequent decrease of steam flow rate and rotation speed of the turbine.  Since CST 
still had enough water volume at that time, the switchover of water sources is open to 
question. 
In addition, the Government report assumes that the plant personnel interpreted the Unit 2 
situation more optimistically based on the fact that RCIC had continuously been 
operating and did not recognize the needs to monitor and appropriately assess the water 
temperature and pressure in the suppression pool.  As a result, the report points to the 
likelihood of having carried out containment venting, reactor depressurization and 
subsequent alternative water injection by fire engines prior to the explosion in the Unit 3 
reactor building.  In the following paragraph, the TEPCO’s responses will be discussed 
on the continuous operation of RCIC and alternative water injection from a different 
point of view from the Government report.  
It seems that the operators thought that RCIC had been unavailable due to loss of its 
control power because DC power supply had been lost due to the tsunami.  In fact, the 
plant personnel confirmed, on the spot, that RCIC was operating after they observed the 
reactor water level being above the top of active fuel (TAF) by connecting the temporary 
batteries to the instruments.  As indicated in the NISA report, however, RCIC is 
designed to keep the turbine stop valve as is in the case that its control power is lost (that 
is, “fail as is”) and thus, the drive steam is continuously supplied to the turbine even in 
the case of loss of DC power supply.  In addition, the governor valve of RCIC is 
hydraulically controlled, which is designed to fully open by its spring force in the case 
that its control power is lost, and the hydraulic pressure is ensured as long as RCIC is 
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operating since the pressure is raised by the turbine.  The operators should have checked 
the operability of RCIC in the earlier stage after loss of DC power supply if such design 
specifications would have fully been understood.  Provided that this check would have 
been made earlier, the operators could have recognized the conditions where RCIC was 
operating, have expected the inevitable trip of RCIC, and then have aligned alternative 
water injection earlier.  According to the analytical results, it is highly likely that the 
core would have been avoided from damaging if the reactor depressurization and 
subsequent alternative water injection would have been executed within 13,000 sec 
(approximately 3.6 h) after RCIC tripped
(17)
.  This implies that the operators would have 
had time to take actions needed for avoiding core damage. 
While the TEPCO report does not state the reason why RCIC tripped, the Government 
report addresses the possibility of the reactor pressure exceeding the pump discharge head.  
As indicated in the Government report, however, the water temperature and pressure in 
the suppression pool was 149.3
o
C and 0.486 MPa respectively about 1 h before the RCIC 
trip was judged and the pool was in a mostly saturated condition.  Consequently, it can 
be thought that the RCIC pump would have tripped due to cavitation.  
2.3 Trip of Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) at Unit 3 
Some of DC power supplies were available at Unit 3.  RCIC was aligned so that cooling 
water could pass through both its injection and test lines.  This alignment aimed at 
avoiding RCIC from automatically tripping on reactor high water level to reduce the 
drain on batteries due to the RCIC startup and trip and to maintain reactor water level.  
Then, the operators set the flow rate to allow reactor water level to vary slowly.  
However, RCIC tripped automatically approximately 20 h after manual startup.   
The TEPCO report attributes the cause of trip to a valve malfunction but does not provide 
its details.  On the other hand, the Government report describes that the cause was the 
latch being dislodged in the valve.  If this latch is considered to be the latch mechanism 
in the turbine stop valve, such failures had previously been observed at Fukushima Dai-ni 
Units 1 and 2 on September 23, 2003 and July 15, 2008, respectively, the causes of which 
had been identified mechanical degradations due to inadequate maintenance
(18)
.  In 
another event at Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 5 on October 28, 2007, the ill-maintained trip 
mechanism had caused the latch failure
(18)
.  Therefore, it is necessary to examine how 
the latches had been maintained and what kinds of corrective actions had been applied to 
prevent the latches from being dislodged. 
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2.4 Trip of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor 
Depressurization with Safety/Relief Valves (SRVs) 
Although HPCI operated over approximately 14 h, it was manually tripped with concern 
that the decreased turbine rotation speed would cause its accessories such as pipes to 
damage due to vibrations and that the resultant steam leakage would take place.  After 
that, the operators made efforts to restart RCIC and HPCI since SRVs could not be 
opened.  However, RCIC and HPCI were not started because of the valve malfunction 
and the battery depletion, respectively.   
The Government report expresses the critical views on the manual trip of HPCI and the 
subsequent attempts to restart RCIC and HPCI as follows; (i) the operators should have 
expected that the batteries had been expended by RCIC and HPCI having operated for 
approximately 20 h and over 14 h respectively and that the batteries might not have had 
the capacity sufficient for manually opening SRVs, and (ii) they should have recognized 
that HPCI would not be restarted in the case of unsuccessful attempts to open SRVs once 
HPCI had been tripped because they had been aware that the batteries might be exhausted 
for restarting HPCI.  The report also states that the sharing of information on the manual 
trip of HPCI was delayed, the responses to serious situations fell behind, and as a result, 
these delayed actions aggravated the plant conditions and the work environment, making 
it more difficult to depressurize the reactor and to execute alternative water injection.  
Furthermore, the report addresses that the operators should have attempted to 
depressurize the reactor using SRVs by aligning alternative water injection lines in 
advance prior to the manual trip of HPCI.  On the other hand, the Diet report points out 
that the severe accident might have been avoided by quickly depressurizing the reactor to 
the pressure below the pump head and instantly injecting water to reflood the core, 
instead of sticking to maintaining water level.  The report also raises a question about 
the prolonged test line operation of HPCI.   
These reports are to the point in terms of the timing of manual reactor depressurization.  
In particular, it is supposed that there was a great opportunity of executing the reactor 
depressurization and the subsequent water injection with use of fire engines in the period 
from the afternoon on March 12, 2011 through the predawn on March 13, 2011 since the 
reactor pressure had been below 1 MPa.  Considering that the containment venting was 
successful several times after that, additionally, the severe core damage might have been 
avoided if the core could have been reflooded in this timing.  As well, a question arises 
about the fact that the reactor pressure had been maintained low over the long time by the 
test line operation of HPCI if the operators would have well recognized that SRVs can be 
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manually opened only when the reactor pressure is higher than 0.686 MPa.  In any case, 
it is a very important point that the reactor had not been depressurized using SRVs with 
alternative water injection aligned while the batteries had been available.  Therefore, the 
detailed survey and analysis are needed on this matter. 
The Government report states that it was found that the operators opened SRVs at about 
9:50am on March 13, 2011 and raises a question about whether or not the SRVs had been 
maintained at their open positions in the process of the reactor having been depressurized 
to 0.460 MPa at about 9:10am on that day.  This indication differs from the TEPCO’s 
position as follows: the reactor pressure began to decrease when SRVs had manually been 
opened at about 9:08am and after that, the reactor pressure had been maintained low with 
an SRV opened by connecting the batteries to control panels.  This is a very important 
issue for understanding the accident progression and thus, further investigation needs to 
be carried out to clarify the fact. 
 
3. Reactor Depressurization 
3.1 Safety/Relief Valves (SRVs) at Unit 1 
Since the measured reactor pressure had not been available after ICs were disabled under 
the SBO situation, the TEPCO report assumes the scenario as follows; the reactor 
pressure was controlled by cyclic operation of SRVs, the reactor coolant flowed into the 
suppression pool through SRVs, the reactor water level gradually decreased, resulting in 
core uncovery and subsequently core melt, and the SRV nozzle gasket(s) and/or in-core 
instrument tube(s) failed due to extremely high temperature in the reactor pressure vessel 
(RPV) in the course of core melting, depressurizing the reactor.   
On the other hand, the Diet report points out that at Unit 1, the SRVs might have never 
(or almost never) actuated during the accident progression because no recorder of SRV 
operations had been installed and nobody heard any sound stemming from the SRV 
operations at Unit 1.  The report also assumes the scenario that a certain piping 
connected to RPV might have failed due to the earthquake, leading to a small break 
LOCA and subsequent core damage.  Although the Diet report addresses the possibility 
of a small break with 0.3 cm
2
 based on the analysis with RELAP5 performed by JNES, 
such a leakage brings almost no change in the reactor pressure and water level and thus, 
is inconsistent with the scenario the report assumes above.  Other two scenarios can be 
supposed; one that certain piping connected to RPV was cracked due to the earthquake 
and then the material strength was lowered by being subjected to high temperature after 
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the core uncovery, resulting in the crack growth, and the other that the leakage of SRV 
nozzle gasket developed into its failure due to being exposed to high temperature 
conditions.  If the RPV melt-through would occur under the high pressure condition, the 
containment atmosphere might be directly heated by molten fuel particulates released 
from RPV, resulting in the containment failure.  This phenomenon is so called “direct 
containment heating due to high pressure melt ejection”.  Therefore, it is important to 
determine whether or not such a phenomenon had taken place in the accident in order to 
better understand the accident progression and obtain the insights on plant behaviors.  
The further analysis and investigation are needed on how the reactor was depressurized 
after the initiation of core melt.   
3.2 Safety/Relief Valves (SRVs) at Unit 3 
Concerning the reactor depressurization with use of SRVs after the manual trip of HPCI, 
the Government report indicates that the operators had not been trained on how to 
depressurize the reactor using SRVs when the reactor pressure is lower than 1 MPa 
though SRVs are designed to be manually operated under the reactor pressure of 0.686 
MPa or higher and be maintained at their open position under the pressure of higher than 
0.344 MPa.  Then, the report addresses that the risk of failure to depressurize the reactor 
should have been taken into account when the operators tripped HPCI.  However, it is 
considered necessary to examine whether or not the contents of training had been enough 
for operators to understand the design specifications of such equipment and components. 
 
4. Containment Integrity and Venting 
4.1 Operator Actions for Containment Venting 
The TEPCO report states that the plant personnel looked at relevant diagrams and 
consulted with contractors in order to check types and structures of valves on 
containment venting lines and to determine whether or not those valves can be manually 
opened.  Also, the Government report shows that the plant personnel had to identify the 
valves to be opened, to confirm their locations and to check if they can be operated 
manually, one by one.  The Diet report points to the problems concretely as follows; (i) 
the containment venting was one of the simplest actions of operating a switch for the 
valve based on the premise that the power would be available and the operation would be 
executed in the control room, and thus the operating procedures had not specified the 
manual operation for containment venting in the case of loss of power, (ii) manual 
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operation of valves were very difficult due to lack of the relevant diagrams and poor 
maintenance of manually operable parts, (iii) the training of accident management (AM) 
including containment venting had been conducted by using the personal computer screen, 
which simulated the control panel for AM, and clicking a mouse.  The positions and 
indications in these reports imply the problem that no as-built inspection had been 
performed for the containment venting components, showing the need of checking if 
licensees themselves can correctly perceive the as-built situations of equipment for 
ensuring the safety of nuclear reactor installations.  Since the AM systems such as 
containment venting are intended to be used in the case that safety-related systems have 
already been unavailable, in particular, it should be raised as an issue that the operating 
procedures and operator training had not been provided based on such on-the-spot 
actions. 
4.2 Containment Integrity at Unit 2 
(a) Pressure drop in suppression pool 
The suppression pool pressure gauge went off the scale low at about 6:14am on March 15, 
2011.  The TEPCO report estimates that the pressure drop was caused by a failure of 
pressure instruments.  On the other hand, the Diet report assumes that the pool water 
temperature was too high to condensate vapor, steam bubbles were formed on the water 
surface, and then intermittent or continuous vibrations occurred, resulting in a burst or 
large scale damage in the suppression pool.  Since, however, the drywell pressure was 
increasing afterwards, it is unlikely to assume that the burst would have occurred in the 
suppression pool as pointed out in the Diet report, and it is reasonable to presume the 
pressure instrument would have failed as indicated in the TEPCO report.   
(b) Implementation of containment venting 
The TEPCO report states that several attempts on containment venting were unsuccessful 
(at about 11:00 on March 13, 16:00 on March 14 and 23:30 on March 14).  The 
Government and Diet reports also indicate the same positions.  On the contrary, the 
NISA report says that a small amount of gases might have been released in a short time 
through the small venting valve with no change of the containment pressure, according to 
the rapid increase of dose rate on the site at about 21:00 on March 14 and the subsequent 
containment pressure rise, though the venting would not have fully functioned.  The 
report also indicates that the rupture disk on the drywell venting line might have opened, 
leading to a large amount of radioactive materials being released at 0:00 on March 15.  
However, in the report, the venting is considered one of the possible pathways, through 
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which the radioactive materials were released, and it is likely that the containment 
leakage might have occurred.   
As mentioned above, there are some differences in their respective positions about 
whether or not the containment venting was successful but it is thought that these 
differences have not affected the accident progression so much.  The RJIF report states 
that although it is not clear whether or not the containment venting was carried out, the 
heat could have been released from the containment to the environment earlier if the 
venting line would not have been equipped with any rupture disk.  Since rupture disks 
are passive components and in general, their reliability and leak-tightness are higher than 
those of active ones, they are considered suitable for ensuring the containment venting on 
demand without erroneous operation.   
(c) Containment pressure trends while RCIC operating 
For the containment pressure behaviors while RCIC operating, the TEPCO report 
estimates a scenario in which seawater might have entered the torus room and removed 
heat from the containment due to heat transfer through the suppression pool wall, leading 
to the gradual containment pressure rise.  The estimation is based on the fact that the 
torus room at Unit 4, the structure of which is similar to the torus at Unit 2, was almost 
half flooded.  The NISA report supports this position.  On the other hand, the 
Government report presumes another scenario in which the containment might have 
leaked due to overtemperature in the early stage of accident and then the leakage might 
have gradually been enlarged.  In addition, the report expresses its objection to the 
TEPCO’s estimation on seawater ingress into the torus room for the following reasons; 
the RCIC room located at the first basement of Unit 3 reactor building had not been 
submerged and it is unlikely that the RCIC room of Unit 2 had been flooded to the same 
extent because RCIC has been operating continuously.  There is no evidence and no data 
to determine if seawater entered the torus room or if the containment leakage was 
enlarged and therefore, the further and in-depth survey and examination are required on 
this matter. 
 
5. Hydrogen Explosion (Hydrogen Flow Paths into 
Reactor Building) 
The TEPCO report describes as follows on hydrogen explosions at Units 1, 3 and 4. 
(a) At Unit 1: Hydrogen was generated by the Zr-H2O reaction in the process of core 
melting and then, transferred into the containment.  In the containment, seals in 
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flanges of top head, equipment and/or personnel hatches and those in electrical 
penetration assemblies might have failed due to overtemperature, deteriorating the 
containment integrity.  Hydrogen passed through the failed seals into the reactor 
building.  Such a direct leak path is highly likely though another pathway is 
supposed as the leakage from the containment through the standby gas treatment 
system (SGTS) lines when venting. 
(b) At Unit 3: As well as at Unit 1, two pathways, that is, the direct leak path and the 
leakage through the SGTS lines are assumed.  It is thought that the former is a main 
pathway and the latter’s contribution is limited because (i) the SGTS inlet valve, 
which connects the venting line to SGTS, is a normally closed isolation valve and is 
designed to close on loss of power (“fail closed” design) and as well, it is unlikely 
that venting gases leaked into the SGTS lines according to the dose rates measured 
upstream and downstream of the inlet valve, (ii) while the containment pressure 
remained high for a long time, the venting was carried out in a short time and so, the 
venting gases were allowed to flow into the reactor building through the STGS lines 
for the limited time, and (iii) radioactive materials could have been removed from the 
venting gases due to scrubbing effects in the suppression pool but high radiation 
doses were observed near the reactor building after the explosion.  
(c) At Unit 4: Their respective venting lines of Units 3 and 4 are joined just before the 
inlet of stack.  The radiation doses were measured on the SGTS filters (see Figure 
V.4).  The results showed that the highest dose was observed on the filter train outlet 
(downstream) and the dose gradually decreased towards the filter train inlet 
(upstream).  This means that the contaminated gases passed through this line from 
the downstream side to the upstream one.  Thus, it is highly likely that the venting 
gases flowed from the Unit 3 reactor building through the SGTS lines into the Unit 4 
reactor building. 
The Government and NISA reports basically agree with the TEPCO’s positions above 
mentioned though the Government report does not exclude the possibility of reverse gas 
flow (from the containment through the SGTS lines into the reactor building) when 
venting at Unit 1.  For the explosion at Unit 4, on the other hand, the Diet report 
addresses the contribution of hydrogen generated by radiolysis and released by 
vaporization in the spent fuel pool (SFP), in addition to the contribution of the leak flow 
from Unit 3. 
Their views that the hydrogen having leaked directly from the containment is a dominant 
contributor to the explosion at Unit 1 are acceptable, considering the fact that the 
containment had been maintained at the pressure of about 0.75 MPa until the explosion 
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occurred at 15:35 on March 12.  However, it should be noted that the containment 
venting had been executed one hour before the explosion and hence, the possibility of 
reverse flow should not be excluded.  
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Figure V.4  Dosimetries at Standby Gas Treatment System Filters for Units 3 and 4 
(This figure is prepared by modifying the figure provided in Ref.(2).) 
Since the hydrogen explosion occurred at Unit 3 immediately after the fourth 
containment venting was conducted, it is likely that the hydrogen might have flowed back 
into the reactor building when venting and contributed to the explosion.  Based on the 
radiation doses measured on the SGTS filters at Unit 3, the TEPCO report indicates as 
follows: different trends of doses were observed in two filter trains; the doses were lower 
than those measured on the filters at Unit 4; the doses measured downstream of the valve 
connected to the stack (○2  in Figure V.4) were significantly low, indicating the valve 
leak-tightness would have been maintained; and the valve connected a venting line to the 
SGTS inlet (upstream) (○1  in Figure V.4) is the same design as this valve.  Thus, the 
report assumes a low likelihood of leakage from this line.  However, it is thought that 
the basis of the above TEPCO’s assumption is not necessarily enough because (i) the 
dose on the filter in the center was the highest, (ii) a total amount of doses at Unit 3 were 
higher than those at Unit 4, and (iii) as described above (b), it is stated that radiation 
dosimetry was performed for the valve connected a venting line to the SGTS inlet (○1  in 
Figure V.4) but this statement is inconsistent with Figure V.4 (in this figure, no measured 
dose is indicated for the valve ○1 ).  The Government report expresses its view that it is 
not unnatural that the radiation doses on the SGTS filter at Unit 4 were comparable to 
those at Unit 3 since the radioactive materials adhered and deposited on the inner surface 
of piping by condensation while passing through the relatively long SGTS piping from 
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Unit 3 to Unit 4.  However, this view does not deny the possibility of a large amount of 
hydrogen flowing back to the Unit 3 reactor building.  Considering the fact that the 
containment pressure has been maintained at about 0.4-0.5 MPa, excluding the short 
period after the SRV was opened (during this period, the containment pressure exceeded 
0.8 MPa), the containment pressure did not necessarily exceeded the design pressure for a 
long time and this is inconsistent with the TEPCO’s position that the containment 
pressure has remained high, as mentioned above (b).  As well, the containment pressure 
increased and decreased before and after the venting, indicating that no large containment 
leakage occurred any time.  Based on these containment pressure behaviors, it seems 
non-negligible that the hydrogen which flowed back when venting might have 
contributed to the explosion in the Unit 3 reactor building. 
Although, on the other hand, the Diet report addresses the possibility that hydrogen 
generated in the Unit 4 SFP might have been a dominant contributor to the explosion at 
Unit 4, this view is not consistent with the fact that the third and fourth floors of the 
building deformed downwards, the fifth floor was damaged, and its reinforcing steel was 
bent up.  Thus, the possibility seems highly unlikely. 
 
V.4 Undiscussed Issues 
This section discusses the technical issues with which none of the five investigation 
reports dealt.  These are related to the design concepts and operating procedures. 
(1) Adequacy of operating procedures applied at Unit 1 
The TEPCO report clearly states that the operating procedures for transients with MSIVs 
closed were applied to the operations of Units 2 and 3, but for Unit 1, just says that the 
operation was executed according to procedures, without specifying operating procedures 
applied.  On the contrary, the TEPCO’s submittals to NISA show that the operating 
procedures for transients with MSIVs closed were applied to the Unit 1 operation and 
insist that the operation was adequately executed in accordance with those procedures 
without any problem, as well as Units 2 and 3
(9,10,16)
.  However, those procedures 
specify that when any MSIV cannot be reopened, the operators use SRV(s) or IC(s) to 
depressurize the reactor and bring it into cold shutdown, consuming steam by operating 
HPCI in test-line mode.  Concretely, the operators are required to depressurize the 
reactor by (i) manually opening a SRV, (ii) manually starting the HPCI test-line operation 
(if water injection is not needed), or (iii) using ICs (see Table V.2).  In the event at 
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Tsuruga Unit 1, on the other hand, one IC train was manually started to depressurize the 
reactor in accordance with the operating procedures
(15)
.  Although ICs automatically 
started six min after the earthquake took place in Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 1, the 
auto-start of ICs is not consistent with the operating procedures and also different from 
those of Tsuruga Unit 1.  Considering that RCIC was manually started at Unit 2 four 
min after the earthquake, the operators might have manually started IC(s) according to 
the procedures.  In addition, the HPCI test-line operation causes the reactor to be rapidly 
depressurized, as actually observed at Unit 3, by releasing steam to the turbine and the 
opening of SRV(s) also leads to rapid reactor depressurization.  The reactor pressure 
behaviors by these operations are completely different from the pressure being 
maintained at 6-7 MPa by the IC operation.  Therefore, there seems no consistency of 
basic concepts in preparing the operating procedures and these procedures should be 
validated and verified through the comparison with those of Tsuruga Unit 1.  
Furthermore, for the other procedures, it seems necessary to check and examine their 
basic concepts by comparing with those of other plants.   
Table V.2  Outlines of Accident Operating Procedures for Reactor Scram with MSIVs 
Closed (Excerpt) 
(1) “1. Outlines of Accident”, “(2) In the case that any MSIV cannot be reopened”: Depressurize the reactor by using 
SRV(s) or IC(s), consuming main steam by operating HPCI in test mode, to bring the reactor into cold shutdown.  
(2) “2. Points of Operation”: (6) In the case that the condenser hot well level decreased by the MSIV closure, operate 
HPCI manually to prevent the condensate water system from tripping and to consume main steam.*1  (8) In the case 
that any MSIV cannot be reopened, depressurize the reactor and cool the core by using SRV(s) or IC(s).  
(3) “4. Flowchart” *2: Control the reactor pressure by using SRV(s).  Operate HPCI in the case that the condenser hot 
well level decreased.  
(4) “6. Reactor Pressure Control”: “9. When the reactor pressure increased, open SRV(s) manually or use IC(s) to 
maintain the reactor pressure in the range of 6.27-7.06 MPa.”  “10. If the condenser hot well level decreased, 
operate HPCI manually to maintain the reactor water level.”  
(5) “In the case that any MSIV cannot be reopened” (including the case that the condenser vacuum is 67.4 kPa abs or 
higher and the case that the condenser vacuum was lost), “12. Reactor Depressurization” *3: “3. Depressurize the 
reactor by (1) opening SRV(s) manually, (2) operating HPCI in test mode (in the case that no coolant injection is 
required) or (3) using IC(s).” 
*1
  It seems that the different operator response is required because the condensate water 
system trips in the case of loss of offsite power. 
*2
  The operation of ICs is not specified in the flowchart of operating procedures. 
*3
  While it is specified that the reactor cooldown rate limit of 55
o
C/h be met, this section of operating 
procedures does not require the operators to maintain the reactor pressure at 6.27–7.06 MPa. 
 
While the TEPCO report states that the operating procedures had been prepared for the 
case of reactor scram due to huge earthquake (earthquake-induced reactor scram) and the 
case of LOOP, these procedures are not referred to at all and are assumed to have not 
been applied.  In this accident, the offsite power was lost due to the earthquake and the 
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actions to be taken might have been different from those for transients with MSIVs 
closed.  The adequacy of applying the procedures for transients with MSIVs closed 
should be examined and it should be determined whether or not the procedures for huge 
earthquake or LOOP were applied.  If not, the reasons should be clarified.  In addition, 
the operating procedures for the case of earthquake-induced reactor scram with LOOP 
had already been prepared and the procedures specify that the operators manually initiate 
the HPCI pump to maintain the reactor water level and manually open and close SRV(s) 
to control the reactor pressure
(19)
.  However, the TEPCO report does not refer to the 
procedures at all.  It is also necessary to clarify why the procedures were not applied. 
The operating procedures for transients with MSIVs closed require the operators to 
confirm that all of MSIVs fully closed and then to check and report that SRV(s) operated 
successfully.  This means that the procedures presume the operation of SRV(s).  
However, both the actual reactor pressure trends and the analytical results with RELAP5 
by JNES show that after the closure of MSIVs, ICs automatically started before the 
reactor pressure reached the setpoint for opening SRVs.  This pressure behavior is 
different from that assumed in the procedures.  On the contrary, the analytical results 
with evaluation models (EMs) shown in the safety analysis report of Unit 1
(20)
 indicate 
that after the closure of MSIVs, the reactor pressure increases, SRV(s) opens, the reactor 
pressure is suppressed to 7.7 MPa or lower, and then, the pressure is controlled by cyclic 
operation of SRV(s).  Based on these results, it can be assumed that the operating 
procedures for transients with MSIVs closed might have been prepared by referring to the 
analytical results with EMs.  Originally, the analyses with EMs are intended to provide 
conservative results and hence, do not simulate actual plant behaviors.  Licensees should 
reference to the analytical results with best estimate codes, which can provide more 
realistic plant behaviors, when preparing the operating procedures.  It is considered 
necessary to check if any difference exists between assumptions in operating procedures 
and actual behaviors for all postulated transients and accidents at nuclear power plants. 
It is thought that the operators should have manually started one IC train instead of 
waiting for auto-start of ICs, like the event at Tsuruga Unit 1.  At Tsuruga Unit 1, the 
manual startup of IC is supposed to be executed at the reactor pressure of 6.8 MPa, which 
is lower than the setpoint for its auto-start (7.2 MPa)
(15)
.  As well, the operating 
procedures for transients with MSIVs closed do not give a priority to use of ICs at 
Fukushima Dai-ichi Unit 1 and the operational concept on use of ICs is different from 
that at Tsuruga Unit 1.  It is needed to identify the reasons of such a difference.  
Moreover, at Tsuruga Unit 1, the operator training has been carried out using a simulator 
of ICs.  Practices of reflecting the simulator training into the procedures should be 
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established, particularly for passive systems such as ICs, since it is very difficult or 
impossible for operators to understand the plant behaviors at the time of their operation, 
by a walkdown, on-the-job training and/or routine testing of valve operation.  Although 
Unit 1 experienced at least three incidents involving the MSIV closure in 1980s
(18)
, ICs 
had not been used at all since its commercial operation was commenced according to the 
Diet report. 
(2) Design concepts of valves in standby gas treatment system (SGTS) on 
loss of driving forces 
At Units 1-4, all the inlet and outlet valves in SGTS are air-operated valves (AOVs) and 
are designed to open on loss of compressed air in the case of LOOP (so-called “fail open” 
design).  However, this is not always a standard design.  For example, at Shika Unit 2, 
motor-operated valves (MOVs) are used, which are designed to remain as is when their 
driving forces are lost (so-called “fail as is” design)( 21).  Because SGTS is one of the 
safety systems and its driving force is supplied from emergency power systems, both the 
inlet and outlet valves are automatically opened on demand even in the case of LOOP and 
the subsequent loss of emergency power makes these valves to remain open, resulting in 
similar conditions to those at Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 1-4.  However, the design 
concepts on loss of driving force are completely different between “fail open” and “fail as 
is” and thus, such design concepts for these valves should be clarified by examining the 
actual designs at the other plants. 
(3) Design concepts of valve configuration on containment venting lines 
The containment venting line is equipped with a normally-closed MOV and a 
normally-closed AOV in series outside the containment boundary as well as a rupture 
disk, setpoint of which is higher than the design pressure of containment.  These valves 
and the rupture disk isolate the containment during normal operation.  It seems that the 
reason why two normally-closed valves and the rupture disk were equipped in series is to 
meet the requirement on containment isolation specified in the Safety Design Review 
Guides
(12)
.  Considering the design feature of rupture disk, the requirement might have 
been met by equipping one normally-closed valve and the rupture disk.  If the 
requirement on containment isolation would have been more scrutinized when designing 
the containment venting lines, in other words, the venting operation might have been 
carried out in a more effortless way.   
Additionally, the venting line is connected to the SGTS inlet and joins the venting line of 
the neighboring unit just before the stack.  Although it was necessary to ensure that the 
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SGTS would not be adversely affected by connecting the venting line, the “fail safe” 
design of the SGTS valves (i.e., the design that the valves automatically open in the case 
of LOOP) was not sufficiently examined because SBO and loss of DC power had not 
been postulated in the design of SGTS.  As a result, lack of such considerations might 
have led to the hydrogen explosion at Unit 4 and contributed to those at Units 1 and 3. 
If the rupture disk would be placed inboard and the normally-closed valve would be 
outboard of the containment, the manual operability of valve is expected to be improved.  
It seems essential to check if any consideration had been taken in configuring venting 
lines. 
(4) Operating basis on startup of containment cooling systems 
During the period from the reactor scram to SBO, the containment spray or the 
suppression pool cooling by residual heat removal system (RHR) was started up at Units 
1 and 2 to respond to continuously gradual increase of containment pressure and 
temperature since the containment ventilation systems tripped due to loss of normal 
power.  On the other hand, at Unit 3, no suppression pool cooling was carried out even 
though the containment pressure and temperature have gradually been increasing due to 
steam inflow through cyclic operation of SRVs and the RCIC operation.  According to 
the Government report, the operators at Unit 3 were concerned that the RHR seawater 
pumps would be damaged by the kataseism (dilatational wave) because the large tsunami 
warning had been announced.  As a result, the suppression pool cooling had not been 
conducted at all.  Considering the differences in operators’ responses at Units 1, 2 and 3, 
the adequacy and reasonableness, including compliance of operating procedures, should 
be examined and the operating procedures should specify, in advance, actions to be taken 
when the tsunami may hit the site.    
 
V.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter delineates, at first, the severe accident scenarios at Fukushima Dai-ichi Units 
1 to 3 with use of event trees to clarify the differences among accident sequences at Units 
1 to 3 and discusses the actual responses to avoid the severe accidents using the event 
trees.  Next, the differences in their respective positions are clarified by reviewing the 
five investigation reports from the technological point of view, focusing on the accident 
progression and causes to specify the issues to be further examined.  Furthermore, 
identified are the technical issues which are not discussed in these reports.   
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In the following, the different positions among the reports are summarized. 
(1) Electric Power Supplies: The independence of offsite power transmissions and the 
aseismic design of substations are disputed as a problem, but the more important 
thing is how these substations should be taken into account in the nuclear safety 
regulations.  For the onsite electric power systems, a problem that many components 
had been laid at the specific locations is pointed out and thus, the basic concept of 
such layouts needs to be discussed in detail.  In addition, it is indicated that the 
tripping of EDGs might have not been caused by the tsunami-induced flooding, based 
on the arrival time of tsunami.  Considering the fact that two or more EDGs tripped 
almost simultaneously, it is natural to regard the tsunami-induced flooding as the 
direct cause. 
(2) Core Cooling: The possibility of the IC pipe leakage is addressed as the reason of 
manual trip of ICs, but its bases are not necessarily apparent and not enough to claim 
that the view that ICs had been manually tripped to observe the operational limit on 
cooldown rate is unreasonable.  As well, it should be noted that the design concepts 
of control logic for closing isolation valves on the steam supply lines are different 
between ICs and HPCI/RCIC, instead of disputing the adequacy of applying the 
terminology, “fail safe”, to the control logic.  The operations after the scram due to 
the earthquake, particularly the IC operation, should be further analyzed to determine 
their adequacies.  As for the RCIC operation at Unit 2, it is necessary to analyze how 
the operators understood the continuous operation of RCIC in the case of loss of DC 
power, in addition to the fact that the operators did not fully monitor the suppression 
pool temperature and pressure after the switchover of water source.  If RCIC might 
have tripped due to the dislodged latch in the valve at Unit 3, as pointed out, it is also 
necessary to review the past maintenance records in detail and to check if any 
deficiencies were involved in maintenance practices.  Indicated is the critical view 
that alternative water injection should have been configured prior to manual trip of 
HPCI and then SRVs should have been opened at Unit 3.  Considering the fact that 
the containment venting was successful afterwards, further discussions should be 
made on the pros and cons of the long-term HPCI operation in test-line mode. 
(3) Reactor Depressurization: Although pointed out is the possibility that SRVs had not 
been operated at all and the coolant flowed out from the broken pipe(s) at Unit 1, its 
bases are not necessarily apparent.  For SRVs at Unit 3, the fact that any operator 
training had not been conducted on the operation of SRVs under low reactor pressure 
is acknowledged as a problem but it is more noteworthy what kind of training 
programs the operating staff had received on specifications and functional restrictions 
of SRVs. 
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(4) Containment Integrity and Venting Operation: As indicated, only tabletop exercises 
had been conducted on venting operation.  As well as such training practices, it 
should be noted that any as-built inspection and/or check had not been carried out.  
While a possibility of the burst having caused the pressure drop in the Unit 2 
suppression pool is pointed out, it is highly unlikely that the burst took place because 
the drywell pressure increased afterwards.  For the containment pressure behavior at 
Unit 2, two possibilities are assumed; one is that seawater flowed into the torus room 
and the other is the containment leakage.  These two possibilities should be further 
examined. 
(5) Hydrogen Explosions: The hydrogen explosions at Units 1 and 3 are presumed to 
have occurred due to mainly hydrogen leaking directly from their respective 
containments and the explosion at Unit 4 is assumed to be caused by hydrogen 
reversely flowing from the Unit 3 containment when venting.  Based on the fact that 
the containment venting was executed shortly before the explosions at Units 1 and 3, 
however, the contribution of venting gases should be further discussed. 
Also, the following undiscussed issues are identified. 
(1) Adequacy of Operating Procedures Applied at Unit 1: The operating procedures 
applied at Unit 1 assume that SRVs would open and close automatically after the 
reactor scram and thus, the scenario is different from the actual plant behavior.  Also, 
the procedures do not specify that ICs be positively used.  In-depth analyses are 
required on the basic concepts for preparing the operating procedures.  In addition, 
the procedures for the earthquake-induced reactor scram had been prepared but it is 
unknown whether those procedures were used.  If not, the reason should be clarified. 
(2) Design Concepts of SGTS Valves on Loss of Driving Forces: The SGTS inlet and 
outlet valves connected to the containment venting lines are designed to open when 
losing their driving forces (so-called “fail open” design).  It is necessary to review 
the design concepts for these SGTS valves in detail.  
(3) Design Concepts of Valve Configuration on Containment Venting Lines: The design 
concepts should be examined about the configuration of venting lines consisting of 
one rupture disk and two normally-closed valves placed in series upstream of the 
disk. 
(4) Operating Basis of Startup of Containment Cooling Systems: While the suppression 
pool cooling was initiated after the earthquake occurred at Units 1 and 2, RHR was 
not started up in consideration of the damages to pumps due to tsunami-induced 
kataseism at Unit 3.  It is necessary to identify the causes of such a difference in 
operations.  
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A couple of investigation reports underline the importance of clarifying the effects of the 
earthquake on the plant facilities in the future.  In order to obtain better understandings 
of the severe accident progression, as well, it is important to investigate the phenomena 
which influenced the plant behaviors, to identify the damages which might have affected 
the accident progression and to clarify the conditions for water injection and reactor 
depressurization by conducting onsite surveys, if possible.   
This study highlights the need to further discuss and examine the technical safety issues 
so that the insights and lessons learned from the Fukushima accident can be fed back to 
other nuclear facilities as well as power plants domestically and worldwide. 
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Chapter VI 
Discussion on Insights and 
Precursors to Fukushima Accident 
This chapter discusses the insights obtained through the analyses described in the previous 
chapters in terms of their commonalities in the Fukushima accident, identifies precursors to 
the Fukushima accident, and addresses generic issues to be resolved. 
 
VI.1 Insights from Analysis of Operating Experience 
The generic study on the INES report indicates that most of the events at nuclear power 
plants were rated on the “defense-in-depth” criterion and that these events have different 
characteristics depending on the reactor types but the degraded functions of emergency 
core cooling system (ECCS) and electric power systems were common issues to all types 
of reactors
(1)
.  This means that the plant safety have been actually challenged by the 
degradation of defense-in-depth, in particular ECCS and electrical power supplies.  
Considering that the Fukushima accident involved loss of AC/DC power and loss of core 
cooling, the defense-in-depth concept should be incorporated into the plant operation as 
well as design more strictly to ensure the plant safety. 
The comprehensive reviews of IRS reports identified a various types of safety significant 
events including loss of offsite power (LOOP), failures of emergency diesel generators 
(EDGs), loss of heat sink, etc.  In particular, many recurring events were identified, 
indicating that the previous corrective actions have not necessarily been effective to 
prevent the recurrences.  This implies the necessity of examining the robust approach to 
take effective measures.  As well, some events are considered precursors to the 
Fukushima accident, which will be discussed in the following section.  As for the external 
hazards, some plants experienced the events beyond the design basis and thus, more 
attention should have been paid to those taking into account the challenges they pose and 
the unexpected conditions they may cause.    
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The topical study on loss of decay heat removal demonstrates that the decay heat removal 
function should be restored in a short term during shutdown.  In the Fukushima accident, 
decay heat removal was lost and not recovered at Units 1-3, resulting in severe core 
damage.  Fortunately, at Units 5 and 6 in shutdown, one EDG was operable and the 
condensate transfer pumps were used for core cooling in a timely manner, bringing these 
units into safe shutdown conditions.  This underscores the necessity of enhancing the 
diversity of decay heat removal as well as its driving force and of recovering the heat 
removal within a short time.  Another topical study on safety/relief valve (SRV) setpoint 
drift shows the potential failure to open of SRVs, that is, one of the safety significant issues 
for overpressure protection.  In the Fukushima accident, manual opening of SRVs could 
not be done because of no driving force (compressed air).  Since SRVs play an important 
role of reactor depressurization to allow low pressure coolant injection to operate, their 
functionabilities should be maintained even though the driving forces are lost.  The 
topical study on the criticality accidents indicates the common issues/problems among the 
accidents: the violation of procedures/rules, the changes of procedures without regulatory 
authorization, unexpected use of equipment, etc.  These were mainly caused by the 
priority being given to the production or work efficiency.  In addition, lack of 
understanding of criticality hazards was also one of contributing factors.  For the 
Fukushima accident, management issues such as cost-reduction and capacity factor 
enhancement were considered one of the contributors.  As well, it was pointed out that the 
results from probabilistic risk/safety assessment (PRA/PSA) showed lower core damage 
frequencies compared with those in foreign countries and hence, safety measures had been 
perceived as being already enough to prevent severe accident.  As a result, further 
improvements to accident management had not been taken into account
(2)
.  This implies 
that the risks of severe accidents had been downplayed.  Although tsunami-induced core 
damage risks had been recognized, no PSA study for tsunami had been carried out and thus, 
any countermeasures had not been taken based on the literature survey results which 
indicated that no tsunamigenic earthquake would occur offshore of Fukushima.  This also 
means the lack of understanding of tsunami risks.  The common or similar issues 
identified in the JCO and Fukushima accidents may highlight the importance of learning 
the lessons from past operating experience at other types of facilities. 
The accident sequence precursor (ASP) analysis of steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) 
events reveals that reactor depressurization is one of dominant factors to core damage 
sequences.  Although the reactor type and initiating event are different, this ASP study 
and the Fukushima accident imply that the reactor depressurization might be one of key 
factors to place the reactor to a safe shutdown condition, in particular, in the case of 
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transients with power conversion system unavailable.  While manual depressurization of 
the reactor for such transients can be done by using the pressurizer relief valves and the 
main steam relief valves at PWRs, only the use of SRVs is available at BWRs.  Therefore, 
alternate measures for manual depressurization should be considered at BWRs. 
It is questionable whether or not the insights and lessons obtained from operating 
experience in foreign countries have adequately been fed back to the plant designs and 
operations and any additional measures have been taken in Japan.  This implies that lack 
of attitude of learning from the past operating experience widely might have led to one of 
contributors to the Fukushima accident. 
 
VI.2 Precursors to Fukushima Accident 
1. Major Occurrences Contributing to Fukushima 
Accident 
The Fukushima accident was initiated by earthquake and flooding due to subsequent 
tsunami.  Although the earthquake itself might not have led to any significant damage to 
safety-related systems or structures, it caused the breakdown of external electric power 
grid in wide areas, resulting in LOOP at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant.  As 
a consequence, all the six units including three units in shutdown lost their offsite power. 
The tsunami caused flooding of the site far beyond the design basis assumptions.  This 
affected the units in a slightly different manner
(3)
.  At Unit 1, EDGs and DC batteries (or 
their associated electrical boards) were flooded and unavailable after the tsunami.  The 
extended station blackout (SBO) with DC power unavailable resulted in loss of safety 
functions such as core cooling, pressure control, residual heat removal and containment 
cooling.  At Unit 2, as well as Unit 1, EDGs and DC batteries were lost due to the 
flooding but the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) continued to run without its control 
for approximately 70 h.  Unit 2 also experienced the extended SBO and failures of DC 
batteries, leading to loss of core cooling, loss of pressure control, loss of residual heat 
removal, and loss of containment cooling.  On the other hand, at Unit 3, a part of DC 
batteries were available, allowing RCIC to be controlled and the high pressure coolant 
injection (HPCI) to actuate.  Therefore, RCIC and HPCI operated for approximately 20 h 
and 14 h, respectively.  After the batteries depleted, Unit 3 also lost the core cooling, 
pressure control, residual heat removal, and containment cooling because of the prolonged 
SBO.  As Unit 4 was in shutdown, all the fuel assemblies had been placed in the spent 
 Chapter VI 
VI-4 
fuel pool.  Due to SBO and loss of DC power, the pool cooling was unavailable.  At 
Units 1 to 4, the operators were forced to carry out the blind operation because all the 
indications of plant parameters in the main control room (MCR) were lost due to loss of 
DC power.  Although Units 5 and 6 also was in shutdown, all the fuel assemblies have 
been loaded in the core.  Since one EDG and DC power supply remained available at Unit 
6 after the tsunami hit, the electric power was supplied to both Units 5 and 6, alternatively, 
leading to the core cooling with cyclic operation of SRVs and manual operation of 
condensate transfer pumps.  
As a consequence, Units 1 to 3 at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant experienced 
the following types of occurrences, which are major ones contributing to the severe core 
damage and characterized it, as well as the earthquake and tsunami exceeding design basis.  
- LOOP (caused by earthquake) 
- Flooding (resulting from tsunami) 
- Loss of onsite power, unavailabilities of EDGs (caused by flooding) 
- Long-term SBO 
- Loss of DC power (caused by flooding) 
- Loss of MCR (mainly caused by loss of DC power) 
- Loss of core cooling, in particular at Unit 1 (caused by loss of DC power) 
- Loss of ultimate heat sink, residual heat removal (mainly caused by tsunami) 
- Loss of containment function (caused by long term loss of residual heat removal) 
The relations among these occurrences are illustrated in Figure VI.1.   
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Figure VI.1  Relations among Major Occurrences in Fukushima Accident 
 Chapter VI 
VI-5 
Most of these occurrences had previously taken place at some plants and were identified as 
safety significant events in Chapter II even though the causes of events were different from 
those of the Fukushima accident.  In the following, precursors to the Fukushima accident 
are discussed focusing on these occurrences and the beyond design basis events in the past. 
 
2. Short Description of Selected Events 
Of approximately 200 events identified as safety significant, six events were selected as 
precursors to the Fukushima accident listed below.  These precursors were identified as 
events involving beyond design basis initiator and/or one or more occurrences which 
contributed to the severe accident at Units 1 to 3 of the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power 
Plant.  
- Event 1: fire, massive internal flooding and loss of safety systems 
- Event 2: fire, prolonged station blackout involving loss of control room and loss of 
residual heat removal 
- Event 3: external flooding involving partial loss of safety systems and multi-unit site 
issue 
- Event 4: loss of offsite power with one of two emergency diesel generators inoperable 
- Event 5: tsunami-induced external flooding 
- Event 6: common-mode loss of instrument power 
It should be noted that there may be more safety significant events and the selection is 
therefore not intended to be complete.  Nevertheless, the selected events are good 
examples to discuss the precursors to the Fukushima accident.  The following event 
descriptions are basically extracted from their respective IRS reports
(4-9)
 but some of them 
can be seen also in published documents
(10-12)
. 
(1) Event-1 
The major occurrences in this event are provided in Figure VI.2.  The turbine blades 
failed, resulting in significant vibrations of the turbine.  This led to an automatic trip of 
the No. 2 turbine generator (TG-2).  Shortly afterwards, the reactor scrammed manually, 
TG-1 tripped and fires and explosion occurred in TG-2.  The fire progressed due to lube 
oil spread and affected numerous cable trays, causing the unavailability of several safety 
equipment and/or their support systems.  Also, smoke entered the electrical building and 
MCR, which forced the use of autonomous equipment. 
The reactor building was flooded due to large leakage of water from several sources such 
as seawater from the TG-2 condenser cooling system, overfilling of the component cooling 
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demineralized water tanks and water from the fire protection system.  The flooding 
affected the equipment important for recovering the plant such as shutdown heat exchanger 
pumps, shutdown ventilation system compressors and spent fuel cooling pumps.  
This event did not have any radiological consequences and the core was continuously 
cooled.  However, the event constituted a serious threat to the plant safety since several 
safety systems failed, affecting the adequate coolability of the core.  Plant design was 
insufficient to cope with common mode failures (mainly due to fire and flooding) and 
operating procedures were not available to manage such a complex event.  In particular, 
there was neither level instrumentation in the reactor building nor other preventive 
measures as physical barriers or pedestals for safety equipment. 
As summary, this event involved fire, flooding, loss of 48 VDC control busses causing loss 
of control from MCR, and partial loss of safety systems.    
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Figure VI.2  Major Occurrences in Event-1 
 
(2) Event-2 
The major occurrences in this event are shown in Figure VI.3.  During the power 
operation, the turbine blades failed, resulting in turbine vibration and subsequent hydrogen 
leakage, and a fire took place in the turbine building, accompanied by a hydrogen 
explosion.  The turbine generator tripped automatically and the reactor was immediately 
shut down.  Due to the fire, electrical cables have been burned, resulting in complete loss 
of power supply in the unit.  The core cooling was maintained by thermosyphon effects.  
As well, the diesel-driven fire pumps were started to inject water into the secondary side of 
steam generators (SGs).  The atmospheric steam discharge valves (ASDVs) were kept 
open to reduce the pressure in SGs.  The operators were forced to leave MCR because a 
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large amount of smoke entered MCR and thus, an attempt was made to take charge of the 
situation from the emergency control room but it was impossible due to no indication on 
the unit panel available stemming from loss of power supply.  MCR could be reoccupied 
after about 13 h.  
During the incident, two EDGs automatically started but tripped due to loss of control 
power.  The third diesel generator, common to two units, was started and after 6 h one of 
the busses could be charged.  One of the shutdown cooling was started after 17 h.  Thus, 
SBO can be considered to have lasted for about 17 h.   
The prolonged SBO condition and consequent degradation of several safety systems were 
caused by cable fire and lack of proper fire barriers/fire retarding provisions together with 
physical separation in redundant safety-related cables.   
As summary, the incident was a “Beyond Design Basis Accident”, as an SBO was not 
considered during the design stage.  Also, this event involved loss of MCR and no 
indications were available in the emergency control room.  Therefore, the important 
parameters had to be measured directly in the field, resulting in the blind operation of the 
plant. 
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Figure VI.3  Major Occurrences in Event-2 
 
(3) Event-3 
Figure VI.4 displays the major occurrences in this event.  Exceptionally bad weather 
(combination of very strong winds and precipitation with tide) resulted in the formation of 
waves moving up the river, causing partial flooding of four-unit site.  At the same time, 
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the 400 kV offsite power supplies to two units were lost for several hours and the 225 kV 
auxiliary power supply to all the units was lost for about 24 h.  Several rooms were 
flooded because the cable way penetration and fire-door were damaged with water.  Due 
to the flooding, the essential service water system (ESWS) train A pumps were lost as a 
result of immersion of their motors.  In addition, the isolation faults occurred in the 48 
VDC switchboards and the low pressure injection and containment spray pumps were 
declared unavailable because of their pits being flooded.  Consequently, two units were 
shut down and placed to shutdown state by using SGs to cool the primary coolant.   
During the first hours of the incident, the arrival of additional teams outside the plant was 
impossible due to the damage resulting from the tempest (flooding of the access routes, 
many tree falls, etc.).  The plant staff initiated pumping operations to unwater the 
buildings.   
This event highlighted inadequate protection measures against flooding.  Hence, the 
major changes consisted of heightening the protection dyke facing the river and an 
anti-swell wall was built above the dyke.   
As a result of this incident, the condition of all power plants was re-assessed in order to 
check the compliance with the existing baseline and incorporate rapidly the event feedback.  
The power plant protection methodology was also revised which led to develop a new 
methodology for each site.  This approach was used to define and implement protection 
modifications when required. 
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Figure VI.4  Major Occurrences in Event-3 
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(4) Event-4 
As shown in Figure VI.5, in this event, two independent failures led to the unavailability 
of one of two EDGs and the loss of offsite power.  The event was initiated by a relay 
failure on one of the two safety switchboards, resulting in being impossible to connect the 
EDG.  During this incident, another fault on a generator breaker took place and as a result, 
the line breaker opened, disconnecting the reactor from the 400 kV main offsite power line.  
In addition, the instrumentation and control device used to switch over to the auxiliary 
offsite power supply had been cut, according to the required operating procedures.  
Consequently, the offsite power was totally lost.   
The loss of offsite power led to a reactor scram and reactor coolant pump shutdown.  As 
well, the remaining EDG automatically started up and supplied the electric power to the 
corresponding safety systems.  Subsequently, the reactor core was continuously cooled by 
circulating reactor coolant through the secondary cooling system in thermosyphon mode 
(natural circulation).  At the same time, preparations were started to connect the “Station 
Blackout EDG” to emergency switchboard.  When offsite power was restored several 
hours after the event initiation, one of the reactor coolant pumps could be started up and 
forced circulation of coolant in the reactor coolant system became available, bringing the 
reactor unit to a safe state. 
It should be noted that individual plants in this country underwent design changes in the 
1980s to deal with a total loss of offsite and onsite power: installation of the “Station 
Blackout EDG” (mobile generator), together with an emergency turbine generator.  This 
equipment would have guaranteed control of a more severe situation. 
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Figure VI.5  Major Occurrences in Event-4 
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(5) Event-5 
Figure VI.6 shows the major occurrences in this event.  A nuclear power plant site was 
flooded by the unexpected high waves, which was induced by the tsunami originating from 
a huge earthquake off the coast of island, thousands of kilometers from the site.  As a 
result, seawater entered the pump house through the intake tunnel and the water level in the 
pump house increased up to the condenser cooling water (CCW) pump stool level, causing 
the tripping of these pumps.  The MCR operator tripped the turbine and consequently the 
reactor tripped.  The primary system was cooled down by opening the atmospheric steam 
discharge valves.  Increase in water level in the pump house caused all the CCW pumps 
and all the process seawater (PSW) pumps unavailable except for one PSW pump.  
Additionally, the emergency process seawater (EPSW) pumps became unavailable because 
they got submerged in seawater.  Offsite power remained available and the reactor was 
brought to a safe shutdown state.  The sampling tank for collecting the liquid effluents got 
dislodged and the cement brick enclosure was washed away up to a length of about 60 m 
from the jetty entrance towards the sea. 
As summary, in this incident, the plant safety was not affected because no water entered 
the reactor building, turbine building and the service building while the process water 
systems were affected by the tsunami.  It should be noted that the site was partly 
inundated with the tsunami wave, resulting in non-safety structures being dislodged. 
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Figure VI.6 Major Occurrences in Event-5 
 
(6) Event-6 
The major occurrences in this event are shown in Figure VI.7.  While operating at full 
power, an internal failure in the main transformer caused a generator, turbine and reactor 
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trips.  Following the generator trip, a momentary voltage decrease occurred on the 
in-plant electrical distribution system.  The degraded voltage resulted in a simultaneous 
common-mode loss of five of eight non-safety related uninterruptible power supplies 
(UPSs) that powered important instruments in MCR and other plant equipment.  
Although the two safety-related UPSs were not affected, all indications of reactor control 
rod position were lost, resulting in the operators’ inability to verify that the reactor would 
remain shutdown.  Also, all MCR annunciators (alarms) were lost, hampering the 
operators’ ability to monitor post-scram operation of the plant, and both the in-plant radios 
and the page telephone communications systems were unavailable, limiting the MCR 
communications with in-plant personnel.  Other non-safety related systems/components 
which were lost included safety parameter display system, process computer and some 
plant lighting.  These UPSs have internal continuously charged backup batteries to 
prevent a loss of control logic power but the backup batteries were past their useful life and 
were discharged due to inappropriate preventive maintenance.  The UPS power was 
restored in about one-half hour and a normal cooldown was conducted.  Internal 
deficiencies, common to all five UPSs but unknown to the plant staff, had made the power 
supplies susceptible to failure initiated by degraded voltage.  
As summary, this incident did not pose any threat to the plant safety because automatic 
reactor protection system functioned properly and all engineered safety features were 
available and used as needed.  The difficulty experienced by the operators because of loss 
of many normally available plant status indications underscored the importance of the lost 
UPSs. 
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Figure VI.7  Major Occurrences in Event-6 
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3.  Main Features on Effective Safety Layers or 
Provisions 
The consequences of the six events selected are much lower than those from the 
Fukushima accident because the core cooling remained available or was recovered before 
the event sequences progressed to core damage.  The differences of the selected events 
are summarized from the viewpoint of the safety layers or provisions that have been 
effective.  Table VI.1 shows the main features of events selected.  The effective safety 
layers or provisions for the events are briefly described below: 
Table VI.1  Main Features of Safety Layers or Provisions in Events Selected 
Event 
No. 
Offsite Power 
Onsite AC Power 
(EDG) 
DC Power 
Heat Removal 
(Core Cooling) 
Main Control 
Room 
1 not lost not lost partly lost partly lost partly lost 
2 completely lost completely lost completely lost shortly lost lost (evacuated) 
3 partly lost not lost not lost partly lost not lost 
4 completely lost partly lost not lost partly lost not lost 
5 not lost not lost not lost not lost not lost 
6 not lost not lost partly lost not lost partly lost 
Event 1: Fire, massive internal flooding and loss of safety systems 
Event 2: Fire, prolonged SBO involving loss of control room and loss of residual heat removal 
Event 3: External flooding involving partial loss of safety systems and multi-unit site issue 
Event 4: Loss of offsite power with one EDG inoperable 
Event 5: Tsunami-induced external flooding 
Event 6: Common-mode loss of instrument power 
 
(1) Event-1 
Core cooling was never lost completely but the equipment important for recovering 
the plant, such as shutdown heat exchanger pumps, was affected by flooding.  
Electrical power was available on the site throughout the event, though DC power was 
partly lost due to cables being affected by fire and the MCR habitability was 
threatened by smoke.  Insufficient design features were identified against common 
mode failures due to mainly fire and flooding. 
(2) Event-2 
Electrical power supply was completely lost due to the burnt cables and shutdown 
cooling was lost though core cooling was carried out by natural circulation with use of 
the emergency measures including manual actuation of diesel-driven fire pumps and 
opening of ASDVs.  As well, MCR was evacuated due to smoke ingress and the 
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emergency control room had no indications.  As a result, the operators were forced to 
take the blind operation of plant. 
(3) Event-3 
Offsite power supplies were lost at multiple units, due to severe weather condition, but 
electrical power was available at the individual units throughout the event.  Since 
heat removal could be ensured by SGs, core cooling was never lost.   However, 
essential service water was partly lost due to flooding and the low pressure injection 
and containment spray pumps were declared unavailable.  The flooded areas were 
recovered by pumping operation.  This event highlighted inadequate protection 
measures against flooding. 
(4) Event-4 
The event involved loss of offsite power and failure to connect one of two EDGs due 
to two independent electrical faults.  The unit lost the switchboard on one train as 
well as offsite power sources.  Power supply to the safety equipment was therefore 
only provided by the remaining EDG.  Heat removal was not lost and DC power 
remained available.  The mobile generator was connected on the switchboard in 
anticipation that the situations would have been aggravated. 
(5) Event-5 
The event was caused by the earthquake-induced tsunami and only non-safety 
equipment was affected.  Offsite power was available, core cooling and heat removal 
remained operable and DC power was supplied to essential buses throughout the event 
because of no water ingress into the reactor, turbine and service buildings.  Thus, no 
threat was given to the plant safety.  However, the higher water level in the pump 
house made the regulatory requirements to be revised.  
(6) Event-6 
The event involved failures of five non-safety related UPSs, resulting in loss of 
indications of control rod position and loss of MCR annunciators.  Thus, the 
operators faced the difficulties in monitoring the post-scram plant condition.  
Because the safety-related UPSs were not affected and offsite power supplies 
remained available, however, all safety functions were available and the reactor was 
taken to cold shutdown according to the emergency operating procedures.  Plant 
personnel manually restored power output from UPSs by using an alternate power 
source.  
 
 Chapter VI 
VI-14 
4.  Lessons Learned from Precursor Events 
Based on the safety relevance of the events selected, lessons learned were described in 
their respective IRS reports.  Although these lessons could help avoid recurring events at 
other nuclear power plants or at least reduce their potential consequences, they are specific 
to the individual events and not necessarily applicable to the Fukushima accident.  In the 
following, the generic lessons are derived and discussed focusing on the relations to the 
Fukushima accident. 
(1) Event-1 
In this event, two initiators which caused common mode failures, fire and flooding, 
seriously compromised the plant safety.  The consequences of fire were very significant 
as follows: all cables in the turbine generator area were burnt resulting in partial loss of 
core cooling, the compressed air system was severely damaged leading to difficulties to 
control the feedwater supply and affecting the air-operated isolation valves, and loss of 48 
VDC control buses disabled control of important functions from MCR and position 
changes of certain valves.  The significant flooding of reactor building affected equipment 
very important for recovering the plant.  Although the exhaust pumps had been installed 
in the reactor building, they could not operate due to loss of power supply caused by fire.  
The plant was not designed to cope with such a large-scale flooding and thus, there was 
neither level instrumentation in the reactor building nor other preventive measures as 
physical barriers or pedestals for safety equipment.  The root causes were inadequate 
compartmentation or physical separation of redundancies, buildings and fire zones.  As 
well, there were deficiencies in independence of safety systems. 
This event demonstrated that fire might induce internal flooding which could aggravate the 
situations and hence, measures against both fire and flooding should be taken into account 
in the plant design and layouts to prevent common mode failures.  In particular, special 
attention should be paid to routing of power cables and the electrical power system for the 
safety system should be located at physically separated areas train by train.  If necessary, 
additional defenses should be provided   For example, fire retardant materials should be 
used for cables and physical barriers should be added between components.   
The loss of control of important functions from MCR forced the operators to execute the 
manual actions locally, implying the importance of an emergency control room 
independent from MCR. 
(2) Event-2 
This event resulted in a complete SBO which lasted for about 17 h.  The causes of 
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extended SBO and consequent degradation of several safety systems were the cable fire 
and lack of proper fire barriers/fire retarding provisions together with inadequate physical 
separation in redundant safety-related cables.  As well, in this event, MCR had to be 
evacuated due to ingress of smoke and no indications were available in emergency control 
room due to loss of control power supply.  Therefore, some of important parameters had 
to be locally measured.  As a consequence, the operators were forced to take the blind 
operation of plant.  It should be noted that this plant survived the extended SBO and the 
core cooling was maintained by establishing the natural circulation with use of fire fighting 
system and ASDVs.  This seems a good example of successful accident management. 
To prevent recurrence of such an event, the licensee and the regulatory authority obtained 
the generic lessons as follows: in-depth review of physical separation and fire protection 
provision for power and control cables should be performed to avoid common mode 
failures; the control room habitability should be ensured under adverse conditions outside; 
the capability to cope with extended SBO should be reviewed along with the duration of 
SBO; and adequacy and reliability of water supply from fire fighting system to cater to 
simultaneous needs of fire fighting and supply to SGs should be looked into.   
(3) Event-3 
In this event, exceptionally severe weather conditions combined with inadequate protection 
measures caused a flooding of the reactor building and the simultaneous failures of 
safety-related systems at two units.  As well, the arrival of additional teams from outside 
the plant was hampered by the flooding of access routes, many tree falls, and so on.  
Because electrical power remained available, these units were brought to a shutdown state 
by using SGs.   
The flooding revealed some weaknesses in the site protection against external flooding.  
The water infiltrated into the duct cover slabs, flooding the sub-levels of the administrative 
buildings and common auxiliaries building, and then, propagated into the rooms of two 
units through doors and cableway penetration that was damaged with the water entering, 
reaching the sub-levels of the electrical buildings and the water pumping station.  This 
event underlined the importance of identifying all the paths by which water might enter the 
site and/or buildings and eliminating these paths if necessary. 
It should be noted, as well, that several defense lines were reinforced at this plant after the 
event.  For example, the protection dyke facing the river was heightened and an anti-swell 
wall was built above this dyke.  The warning system level was changed by introducing a 
pre-alert and an alert thresholds for average wind speeds aiming at enabling the early 
 Chapter VI 
VI-16 
arrival of the additional teams.   
(4) Event-4 
During this event, the unit lost the switchboard on one train as well as offsite power 
sources.  Power supply to the safety equipment was therefore provided by only one EDG.  
However, the mobile generator was connected to the safety busbar so that the reactor could 
cope with the subsequent aggravating situation.  As well, the emergency turbine generator 
that runs on the steam produced by the secondary cooling system was ready to operate in 
the event of simultaneous loss of both offsite power sources and both EDGs.  This event 
highlighted that diverse measures should be implemented to re-establish the power supply 
to the systems required for heat removal in a short time even in the station blackout.  It 
should also be borne in mind that a number of changes had been made during 1980s to deal 
with a total loss of offsite and onsite power.   
In addition, the switchboard failure was due to a malfunction on an overcurrent relay, the 
cause of which was the formation of zinc filaments similar to tin whisker.  This 
phenomenon had been observed in other countries but never at the plant.  Since such an 
unexpected phenomenon or event might occur and affect the plant safety, special attention 
should be paid to the introduction of new technologies and design changes.  As well, the 
event revealed that a measure aiming at preventing emergency battery consumption might 
make managing the consequences of two electrical failures occurring one after the other 
more difficult.  The lessons from this observation should be taken into account when the 
practices are changed. 
(5) Event-5 
Although the tsunami waves hit the plant site, resulting in the flooding of pump house, no 
seawater entered the vital areas such as the reactor and turbine buildings and thus, the plant 
safety was not affected.  However, some non-safety systems and components were 
damaged or rendered unavailable, causing the plant outage.  After the event, a new alarm 
was provided in MCR to indicate high level in the pump house. 
The highest water level recorded in the pump house was 10.56 m, which was 4.56 m 
higher than the normal operating level.  As per the regulatory requirement, tsunami is one 
of the external events to be considered for siting and design of plants.  Since the 
requirements at that time were based on information available about 15 years ago, the 
revision of regulatory requirements was studied taking into account the experience of the 
tsunami.  This event implies the needs to consider the impact of tsunami induced by the 
teleseismic earthquake in the plant design and/or regulatory requirements.   
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(6) Event-6 
The simultaneous tripping of UPSs was caused by a design deficiency of control logic 
battery in each UPS and inappropriate preventive maintenance of its backup battery.  
Under degraded voltage conditions, the UPS logic power supply switching circuit does not 
actuate until the supply voltage has decreased well below the level that will cause the trip.  
However, during this event, the backup batteries were discharged due to failure to perform 
adequate maintenance.  Had either deficiency been corrected, the simultaneous loss of 
UPSs would have been avoided.  In this event, the control rod position indications were 
lost and thus, the operators could not verify that the reactor would remain shut down.  
This means the needs to prepare the procedures that specify the alternative measures when 
the parameters important to safety are not monitored in MCR. 
This event highlighted the common-mode vulnerability of the multiple non-safety related 
systems.  Plant personnel should assure that design considerations even for such 
non-safety related systems and components include analysis for determining failures that 
could degrade the plant safety.  Particular attention should be paid to batteries that supply 
backup power to control logic since their use in such an application may not be well 
documented in equipment literature.  Such non-safety systems/components may be used 
for accident management measures and therefore, plant personnel should take into account 
latent failures of them which could challenge the plant safety.    
 
5.  Event Tree for Precursor Event and Fukushima 
Accident 
For one of the six precursor events (Event-2) which is the most notable near-miss to the 
Fukushima accident, the event tree was developed, as shown in Figure VI.8, to delineate 
its accident sequences and to provide an easier comparison of those with the Fukushima 
accident.  In this event tree, the red line denotes the actual sequence in the precursor and 
the blue line shows the sequence in the Fukushima accident.  While the Fukushima 
accident was initiated by the earthquake and the subsequent tsunami, the precursor was by 
internal fire.  However, in both events, their respective plant system behaviors were 
similar to each other as follows: the reactor scrammed; offsite power lost, EDGs 
automatically started but tripped, resulting in extended SBO occurred; DC power became 
(partly) unavailable; emergency core cooling was unavailable due to loss of power; MCR 
lost its function, leading to a blind plant operation.   
Fortunately, in the precursor, the alternative core cooling was established by using 
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diesel-driven fire pumps to supply water to the secondary side of SGs and thus, the core 
was cooled by natural circulation.  As well, the power was recovered approximately 17 h 
after the event initiated.  In the Fukushima accident, the alternative core cooling was not 
done and electrical power supplies were not recovered in a timely manner, resulting in 
severe core damage and the subsequent large release of radioactive materials.  The critical 
difference between these events is whether or not alternative core cooling was successful 
or not as shown in Figure VI.8.  The Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant also has 
diesel-driven fire pumps as alternative measures to supply cooling water into the reactor 
and in particular, at Unit 1, these pumps can provide water to the secondary side of ICs.  
Nevertheless, at the time of accident, these pumps could not supply water to the reactor 
because the reactor pressure could not be decreased below the pump head.  At Unit 1, ICs 
were manually tripped before the tsunami attack and became unavailable after that.  As a 
result, diesel-driven fire pumps were no longer able to play a role of alternative water 
supply.  In the precursor event, the SG pressure was decreased by keeping ASDVs open 
so that the diesel-driven pumps could supply water to SGs continuously.   
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Figure VI.8  Event Tree for Precursor (Event-2) and Fukushima Accident 
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Considering these facts observed, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the success or 
failure of timely depressurization has control of the plant destiny.  In other words, this 
means that both the precursor and the Fukushima accident underscore the importance of 
preparing the robust depressurization measures for executing alternative water supply in a 
timely way when safety-related systems are unavailable to cool the core. 
 
VI.3 Generic Issues to Be Resolved 
The Fukushima accident was severe core damages at three units and large releases of 
radioactive materials as a result of prolonged SBO, which was caused by mainly the 
earthquake and subsequent tsunami.  The earthquake damaged breakers and distribution 
towers, causing a loss of all offsite power sources to the site.  As well, the tsunami caused 
extensive damage to site buildings and flooding of the turbine and reactor buildings.  
Intake structures were unavailable because the pumps, strainers and equipment were 
heavily damaged by the tsunami and debris, resulting in a loss of the ultimate heat sink.  
The tsunami also flooded some of EDGs and the electrical switchgear rooms.  As a 
consequence, all AC power was lost at Units 1-5 and all DC power was lost at Units 1 and 
2 (one EDG at Unit 6 continued to function and a part of DC power from batteries 
remained available at Unit 3).   
In such a way, the Fukushima accident experienced the tsunami-induced common cause 
failures (CCFs) as follows: EDG failures, electrical switchgear failures, loss of ultimate 
heat sink, loss of core cooling, loss of MCR lighting, loss of MCR instrument, loss of 
reactor pressure control (inoperable SRVs), and loss of decay heat removal.  Eventually, 
the Fukushima accident highlighted the vulnerabilities to CCFs due to flooding.  In other 
words, it was revealed that there had been deficiencies in layout design and physical 
separation of electrical components.  Since the natural phenomena such as tsunami are 
inevitable, the plant design is required to assume the design basis and implement the 
measures against them.  At the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant, the breakwater 
had been installed against tsunami
(3,13)
.  In addition, the elevation of seawater pump 
motors had been raised and some measures had been taken for building penetrations and 
pump seals to prevent inundation
(3,13)
.  However, neither layout change nor improvement 
of physical separation had been carried out until the accident occurred.  As a result, the 
tsunami which exceeded significantly the design basis hit the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear 
Power Plant site, resulting in those measures having been disabled.  This shows the 
difficulty of coping with the tsunami beyond design basis. 
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To overcome this difficulty, in principle, it is considered effective that the defense-in-depth 
concept is incorporated into the plant design.  At first, the coastal levee should be built 
against tsunami beyond design basis to protect a plant site from being inundated.  
However, it seems very difficult or impossible to determine how high it is enough because 
the height of such a tsunami wave has a large uncertainty and cannot be evaluated 
deterministically.  Next, the vital areas should be waterproofed to protect safety-related 
equipment from being submerged, assuming that seawater would ingress into the site.  In 
addition, physical separation, in particular, at different levels is considered one of measures 
effective to reduce the possibility of common cause failures due to flooding.  It is also 
difficult to assure the water tightness of vital areas because there might be many 
penetrations for cables and/or pipes.  In the third place, assuming that the vital areas 
would be flooded, the equipment/devices and procedures should be prepared to conduct the 
pumping operation for removing seawater from those areas.  Actually, such an operation 
was demonstrated to be effective in the past event as mentioned in the previous section 
(Event-3).  However, the pumping operation may depend on the site situation and thus, 
there are some difficulties in demonstrating its effectiveness.  When implementing 
countermeasures against tsunami or flooding, these difficulties should be overcome by 
establishing the plausible premises, in particular the design basis assumptions.  
Although it has not been determined how the earthquake adversely affected the plant 
equipment, particularly safety-related equipment in the Fukushima accident, the 
earthquake beyond design basis should be taken into account in the design.  However, the 
conventional design approach against earthquakes generally has been based on aseismic 
standards and thus, the safety significant equipment has been designed to withstand the 
design basis earthquake.  In this approach, it seems difficult to avoid the common cause 
failures of safety systems/components which belong to different layers of defense-in-depth 
in the case that the earthquake beyond design basis would hit the plant site because those 
systems/components are usually designed according to the same design standards or 
equivalent ones.  Therefore, when the aseismic design approach is applied against the 
earthquake beyond design basis, it is essential to clarify how the aseismic standards should 
be applied to individual layers of defense-in-depth concept and/or to incorporate a new 
concept such as structural diversity by combining the seismic resistant structure, seismic 
isolation structure and seismic response control structure into the design.  
The Fukushima accident also underlined vulnerabilities to loss of DC power, which led to 
failure to manually depressurize the reactor and loss of MCR indications.  In the accident, 
the reactor could not be depressurized and as consequence, alternative water injection was 
not carried out.  At BWRs, manual reactor depressurization in the case of transient relies 
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on SRVs, however, the manual opening of SRVs usually needs compressed air to their 
actuators and DC power to their electromagnetic valves which supply compressed air.  
Therefore, SRVs become inoperable if either compressed air or DC power is lost.  In 
addition, the alternative water injection has been prepared based on the assumption that the 
reactor would be depressurized successfully.  In light of such current situations, more 
robust measures should be studied and implemented to ensure the reactor depressurization 
and subsequent alternative water injection.  For example, the diversity should be 
incorporated into the design of SRVs by using different drive mechanisms.  In actual, four 
different types of SRVs have been applied at U. S. BWRs; one type is direct-acting SRVs 
and the other three types are pilot-actuated SRVs
(14)
.  Direct-acting SRVs use an attached 
actuator to overcome the spring tension in the main part of SRV to open the valve (see 
Figure VI.9
(14)
) and are the same or similar design to those at BWRs in Japan including the 
Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant.  Pilot-actuated SRVs use the air actuator to 
which air pressure is applied by energizing the solenoid-operated valve.  For one type of 
them (two-stage SRV, see Figure III.16 in Chapter III), the air operator directly operates the 
pilot piston to open the main valve.  For another type, the air operator directly opens the 
second stage disc by mechanically depressurizing the second stage piston to open the main 
valve (see Figure VI.10
(14)
).  For the third type (three-stage SRVs, see Figure VI.11
(14)
), a 
second pilot valve is actuated that is independent of the primary pilot valve.  It seems that 
the appropriate combined use of these types is effective to improve the reliability of 
manual reactor depressurization with SRVs.   
Loss of MCR should be noted as one of important issues to be resolved.  As mentioned 
previously, one plant had experienced the blind operation due to loss of MCR but the 
lessons learned from this event had been fed back to neither the plant design nor operation 
in Japan.  Eventually, in the Fukushima accident, almost all indications in MCRs were 
lost and thus, the operators could not assess the situations where the individual units were 
faced.  Also, the operators misunderstood the reactor water level at Unit 1 based on the 
false indication from the level instrument, which was affected by the pressure inside 
containment.  Considering the facts from the precursor and the Fukushima accident, MCR 
should be backed up with the dedicated DC power or the emergency control room should 
be improved to avoid the blind operation.  Also, the level instrument should be redesigned 
to provide accurate indications without being affected by its surroundings.  At a U.S. 
BWR, the reactor vessel pressure and level can be monitored in the reactor building by 
using mechanical instruments which require no electric power to function
(15)
.  Addition of 
such local instruments should be studied so that the plant condition can be grasped even in 
the case that all DC power would be lost.   
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Figure VI.9  Direct Acting SRV(14) 
 
Furthermore, the Fukushima accident revealed some multi-unit site issues.  Specifically, 
all of the six units were affected by the earthquake-induced loss of offsite power and four 
units suffered from the tsunami-induced loss of DC power.  In the past, some multi-unit 
plants had undergone similar situations.  As mentioned previously, at a plant site, two 
units lost the offsite power and suffered the flooding of buildings due to severe weather 
condition.  At another plant, two units tripped simultaneously due to loss of offsite power 
as a result of incorrect switchyard protective relay tap settings
(16)
.  These incidents show 
that events affecting two or more units on a site might result in more complicated situations 
if some systems are shared with those units.  Although, in Japan, the safety-related 
systems are independent from each other between the individual units on a plant site, MCR 
is shared with two units on many sites as well as the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power 
Plant.  It seems very difficult or impossible to separate MCR at the existing plants.  Thus, 
the functions in emergency control rooms should be enhanced so that the operators can 
monitor the plant conditions and take actions required for placing the reactor to a safe 
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shutdown state even in the case that MCR lost its function.  Another multi-unit site issue 
is insufficient accident management measures.  The accident management measures had 
been taken assuming that the severe accident would occur at a single unit because mainly 
the internal events had been considered.  Although all the nuclear power plants in Japan 
had implemented onsite interchange power supplies between two units as one of accident 
management measures, for example, this measure was not effective in the Fukushima 
accident.  In one precursor event, onsite power was recovered by starting up an EDG 
shared with the neighboring unit which was not affected.  If the neighboring unit would 
have also been involved in the event, however, the plant situation would have been more 
complicated and aggravated.  It seems that this precursor provided an opportunity of 
reconsidering accident management but the chance was missed.  Accident management, 
in particular, alternative power supplies should be implemented for individual units on a 
site assuming the case that two or more units would be involved.   
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Figure VI.10  Pilot-Actuated SRV – actuation function not dependent on the pilot(14) 
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Figure VI.11  Three-Stage Pilot-Actuated SRV – actuation function not dependent on the 
pilot(14) 
 
For the plant system design, the operators had not recognized types and structures of 
valves on containment venting lines and had to check whether or not those valves could be 
manually opened in the Fukushima accident.  This implies that the “as-built” inspection 
by licensees is essential, in particular for the systems and components infrequently used.  
In addition, the IC valves were designed to close automatically due to loss of DC power at 
the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant, however, this design does not seem the 
standard one because the different design concept, “fail as is”, is applied at the U.S 
BWRs
(2)
 and the valves on HPCI/RCIC turbine steam supply line do not close due to loss 
of DC power
(17)
.  Furthermore, the SGTS valves are designed to open automatically when 
their driving forces are lost at Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant but other some 
Japanese BWRs incorporates the different concept, “fail as is”(18).  These facts indicate 
that the design concept of either pen/close” or “fail as is” depends on the plant or licensee.  
The reasons of such differences should be examined to clarify the adequacy and 
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applicability of design concept. 
The above mentioned problems are considered generic issues to be resolved to further 
improve the plant safety. 
 
VI.4 Concluding Remarks 
Through the analysis of operating experience, safety significant insights were obtained for 
nuclear power plants as follows.   
- The degraded functions of ECCS and electric power systems were common issues at 
nuclear power plants and the defense-in-depth concept should be incorporated into the 
plant operation as well as design more strictly to ensure the plant safety.   
- Various types of safety significant events were identified, including loss of offsite 
power, failures of emergency diesel generators, loss of heat sink, etc., some of which 
are considered precursors to the Fukushima accident.   
- Some plants experienced the events beyond the design basis, showing that more 
attention should be paid to those taking into account the challenges they pose.   
- Identified were several factors which might be applicable to the Fukushima accident.  
For example, one topical study indicates that loss of decay heat removal might lead to 
the core uncovery within several hours even in the reactor shutdown state.  This 
underscores the need to recover the decay heat removal function in a short time.  
Another topical study on safety/relief valves shows that the potential failure to open of 
them is one of the safety significant issues for overpressure protection, implying the 
importance of maintaining their functionabilities adequately.  The topical study on 
criticality accidents reveals that it had been recognized that such accidents would not 
occur before the JCO accident.  This is the case with the Fukushima accident.  Risks 
of severe accidents had been downplayed because of lower core damage frequencies 
compared with those in foreign countries and TEPCO had been convinced that no 
tsunami earthquake would occur offshore of Fukushima according to the documentary 
records, implicating lack of understanding of tsunami risks.  This means that it is 
important to learn the lessons from the past operating experience in other types of 
facilities. 
- The ASP analysis of SGTR events and the Fukushima accident imply that reactor 
depressurization might have been one of key factors to bring the reactor into a safe 
shutdown state.  While manual reactor depressurization is able to be done by using 
the pressurizer relief valves and the main steam relief valves at PWRs, only the use of 
 Chapter VI 
VI-26 
SRVs is available at BWRs.  Therefore, alternate measures and diversity should be 
taken into account for manual reactor depressurization at BWRs. 
These insights and lessons should have been fed back to the plant designs and operations 
adequately.  It should be recognized that lack of attitude of learning from the past 
operating experience might have contributed to the Fukushima accident. 
Of approximately 200 events identified as safety significant, six events were selected as 
precursors to the Fukushima accident: 1) fire, massive internal flooding and loss of safety 
systems, 2) fire, prolonged station blackout involving loss of MCR and loss of residual 
heat removal, 3) external flooding involving loss of safety systems and multi-unit site issue, 
4) loss of offsite power with one of two emergency diesel generators inoperable, 5) 
tsunami-induced external flooding and 6) common-mode loss of instrument power.  The 
first event demonstrates that fire might induce internal flooding, which could aggravate the 
situations, and suggests that the electrical power system for the safety systems be located at 
physically separated areas and special attention be paid to layout of power cables and 
protection against common mode failure such as physical barriers.  The second event 
highlights the importance of performing in-depth review of physical separation for 
electrical cables to protect safety systems against common mode failures, ensuring the 
control room habitability under adverse conditions outside, and reviewing the capability to 
cope with extended SBO.  The third event reveals some weaknesses in the site protection 
against external flooding and underlines the possibility that the flooding-induced 
degradation might affect simultaneously all the units on a site.  The fourth event did not 
lead to SBO but reveals the needs for installing additional electric power sources, such as a 
mobile generator and emergency turbine generator, to cope with a more severe situation.  
As well, this event demonstrates that two or more units on a site might be simultaneously 
affected by external events.  The fifth event involved the tsunami-induced flooding, 
which did not threaten the plant safety, but implies the need to consider the impact of 
tsunami in the plant design and/or regulatory requirements.  After this event, the revision 
of regulatory requirements was studied taking into account the experience of the tsunami.  
In the sixth event, the common mode failures of non-safety related UPSs resulted in an 
unexpected loss of indication of control rod position and MCR annunciators.  This event 
underscores the needs to perform the analysis of their designs for determining common 
mode failures that have the potential of threatening the plant safety.  Some of these events 
might have induced new phenomena or unexpected aggravating conditions and special 
attention should be paid to the plant design and accident management measures.  In 
particular, the second event is the most notable near-miss to the Fukushima accident and 
the timely depressurization and subsequent alternative water supply could avoid the plant 
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from severe accident.  This event emphasizes the importance of preparing the robust 
depressurization measures for executing alternative water supply in a timely way. 
The Fukushima accident highlights the vulnerabilities to the flooding.  Although the 
Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant had taken some measures against tsunami such as 
the installed breakwater and the elevated seawater pump motors, the tsunami exceeding the 
design basis hit the site and rendered those measures disabled because neither layout 
change nor improvement of physical separation had been carried out.  To cope with the 
tsunami beyond design basis, it is considered effective that the defense-in-depth concept is 
incorporated into the plant design; 1) coastal levee against tsunami beyond design basis, 2) 
waterproofed vital areas and physical separation, and 3) pumping operation to unwater the 
areas.  However, it seems very difficult or impossible to determine how high the levee is 
enough and to assure the water tightness of vital areas.  When implementing 
countermeasures, these difficulties should be overcome by establishing the plausible 
premises, in particular the design basis assumptions.  In addition, the Fukushima accident 
underlines the vulnerabilities to loss of DC power including failure of manual reactor 
depressurization and loss of MCR, insufficient accident management measures, lack of 
knowledge on “as-built” or “as is” plant system design, poor quality of accident/emergency 
operating procedures, and inconsistent design concepts on “fail open/close” or “fail as is”.  
Manual reactor depressurization depends on SRVs in emergencies and thus, more robust 
approaches should be implemented in the plant design by applying different drive 
mechanisms to SRVs.  MCR should be backed up with the dedicated DC power or the 
emergency control room should be improved to avoid the blind operation.  Furthermore, 
the “as-built” inspection by licensees should be performed for the systems and components 
such as containment venting system which is infrequently used.  As well, the reasons of 
“fail close” design of IC valves and “fail open” design of SGTS valves at the Fukushima 
Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant should be examined to clarify the adequacy and applicability 
of design concept through the comparison with the designs at other plants.  
This study manifests the importance of analyzing the Fukushima accident more 
comprehensively and in detail in consideration of the insights and lessons gained from past 
events. 
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Chapter VII 
General Conclusions 
 
VII.1 Concluding Remarks 
Since the TMI-2 accident, it has been worldwide recognized an important and effective 
means to obtain the lessons and insights through the analysis of the incidents and 
accidents that actually occurred and to feed them back into the design, construction, 
operation and management of facilities.  Licensees or operators of nuclear facilities are 
required to report the events at their own plants to the regulatory authorities 
immediately, analyze their causes, and implement corrective measures.  As well, the 
international reporting systems have been operated to exchange event information 
among member countries.  Using such information, the activity called operating 
experience feedback (OEF) has been carried out on a national or international basis.  
This activity can be achieved by a systematic and comprehensive review and analysis of 
events from various points of view such as generic aspects (generality, commonality, 
similarity), specific aspects (specificity, uniqueness), and risk significance aspects.  
Aiming at providing insights and technical issues useful for regulating and enhancing 
the safety of nuclear facilities, the present thesis addresses a series of studies of analysis 
of nuclear and radiological events as follows: the generic studies (including 
comprehensive reviews) of a large number of events, topical studies on safety 
significant events, accident sequence precursor (ASP) studies, and review of the five 
investigation reports on the Fukushima accident.  As well, described are new computer 
software tools developed to assist in the comprehensive reviews.  Finally, insights from 
these studies and precursors to the Fukushima accident are discussed to clarify the 
generic safety issues to be resolved. 
(1) Chapter II 
Chapter II describes the generic studies on INES reports and IRS reports, and computer 
software tools developed for supporting generic studies.   
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The generic study covered approximately 500 events reported to INES during the years 
1990 to 2000 and examined overall trends and characteristics of events rated at Level 2 
or higher.  The main observations obtained from this study are as follows: 1) the 
number of such events has been remained at 10-20 events per year throughout the 
period; 2) two events rated at Level 4 involved fatalities due to overexposure and about 
half of 15 events at Level 3 were associated with overexposure resulting from lost 
sources or radiation devices; 3) the degraded functions of ECCS and electric power 
systems were common issues to nuclear power plants.  The other generic study 
analyzed more than 2000 IRS reports during the period 1988 through 2012 and 
identified approximately 200 safety significant events.  These significant events can be 
roughly categorized into three groups: recurring events, events associated with external 
hazards and the events related to new phenomena or unexpected aggravating conditions.  
Recurring events indicate that the previous corrective actions have not necessarily been 
effective to prevent the recurrences.  As for the external hazards, more attention should 
be paid to those beyond the design basis assumptions based on the past events.  The 
new phenomena or unexpected aggravating conditions have a potential to threaten the 
plant safety but it seems difficult to detect them prior to their appearances.  The safety 
significant events identified (might) have affected the facility, environment and public 
health and thus, should be further examined and discussed.  The results from these 
studies have been disseminated into the nuclear community, contributing to the sharing 
and more effective utilization of event information.  These studies underline the needs 
to perform systematic and comprehensive reviews of various events to gain the safety 
significant insights. 
As a supporting tool for comprehensive review, a new computer software package 
CESAS was developed to extract the event sequence from the event description written 
in English.  The analytical process consists of three steps: (i) to analyze each sentence 
syntactically and semantically, (ii) to identify sentences, clauses or phrases representing 
occurrences, (iii) to deduce the mutual relationship between occurrences.  Through the 
application, it is shown that CESAS-extracted event sequences generally agreed with 
manually-extracted ones, demonstrating the effectiveness and feasibility of CESAS.  
The web-based database, which contains the INES reports translated into Japanese, was 
developed to provide an effective tool for the media and public as well as for the nuclear 
community.  These tools may make the generic studies more efficient. 
(2) Chapter III 
Of topical studies performed on safety significant events identified in the generic 
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studies, this chapter discusses three topical studies on loss of DHR during reactor 
shutdown at PWRs, criticality accidents at nuclear fuel processing facilities, and 
setpoint drift in safety or safety/relief valves at U.S. LWRs. 
The first study reviewed a total 63 loss of DHR events under reduced inventory 
conditions during the years 1976 through 1990 at U.S. PWRs to identify the trends and 
characteristics and to clarify the major causes which could prolong the duration of the 
DHR loss.  It is found that four-fifths of them were caused by cavitation or air binding 
of DHR pumps, that is, air entrainment into the DHR pumps and the major contributor 
of air entrainment was the lowering the RCS water level too far, mostly resulting from 
inaccurate level indication.  This highlights the need to improve the reliability of water 
level instruments.  In many events involving air entrainment, the DHR loss lasted for 
more than 1 h and the remarkable coolant heatup was observed.  The heatup rates were 
evaluated with use of the data obtained from the event reports.  The calculated heatup 
rates are in reasonably good agreement with the observed ones.  In addition, the times 
to bulk boiling in the core and core uncovery were estimated and the results show that 
bulk boiling and core uncovery would take place within 1 h and several hours 
respectively even if the DHR loss would occur in the late stages of shutdown, for 
example, 30 d after the reactor trip.  This implies that the recovery actions need to be 
prepared in advance against loss of DHR pumps. 
In the second study, 21 criticality accidents were analyzed in terms of similarities to the 
JCO accident, focusing on the accident sequences and causes, to identify the lessons 
which should have been fed back.  The results show that almost all of them occurred 
when handling uranium or plutonium solution in vessels/tanks with unfavorable 
geometry.  Common issues identified in the accident scenarios and causes include 
violations of procedures and/or technical specifications, unexpected use of vessels/tanks 
for improving work efficiencies, procedural changes without any application to and 
permission from the regulatory body, lack of understanding of criticality hazards, and 
complacency that a criticality accident would not occur.  In addition, the fact that most 
of accidents occurred in 1950s to 1960s might have contributed to the JCO accident.  
This study underscores the importance of making the lessons learned from the past 
similar events permeate throughout the workers. 
The third topical study analyzed events involving setpoint drift in safety or safety/relief 
valves at U.S. LWRs (SRVs at BWRs, PSVs, and MSSVs at PWRs) by reviewing 
approximately 90 LERs from 2000 to 2006, focusing on causes and setpoint deviation 
ranges, to provide the insights useful for improving the reliability of these valves.  The 
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results show that for SRVs and MSSVs, disc-seat bonding is a dominant cause of the 
setpoint drift high and has a tendency to cause a relatively large deviation of the setpoint.  
This means that disc-seat bonding might be a safety concern from the viewpoint of 
overpressure protection.  The deviations due to the drift low are smaller compared with 
those due to the drift high.  For PSVs, the deviation of setpoint is generally small, 
although its causes are not specified in many instances.  It is important to share the 
insights obtained from the analysis of events involving setpoint drift in terms of 
overpressure protection and pressure boundary integrity. 
The topical studies derive the generic safety issues and insights useful for examining the 
measures against individual topics and show that the lessons learned from past events 
have not sufficiently been employed and/or effective measures have not taken.  This 
means that sharing and exchange of information on operating experience should be 
enhanced on a national and international basis.  In particular, the lessons learned and 
insights obtained should be disseminated into the nuclear community.  Also, the 
licensees should perform root cause analysis and then, implement effective corrective 
actions with particular attention paid to such recurring events.  Highlighted is the 
importance of topical studies focusing on the recurring events to derive the generic 
safety implications. 
(3) Chapter IV 
Together with the outlines of ASP analysis approach, described are the ASP analyses of 
specific events that have the potential of risk significance and trending analysis based 
on the ASP documents published by the USNRC.   
The ASP analysis was carried out for ten actual and one potential STGR events, with 
use of a consistent event tree model newly developed, to identify risk significant 
anomalies observed during the events in terms of the potential for core damage and to 
derive generic insights useful for examining alternative mitigation measures for SGTR.  
The estimated CCDPs range from 10
-4
 to 10
-2
.  It is also shown that five SGTR events 
have relatively high CCDPs which are dominated by the sequence involving failure to 
depressurize RCS to below SG relief valve setpoint.  This means that the delayed 
identification of tube rupture or failure to timely depressurize the reactor is a generic 
safety issue for SGTR.  The analysis underscores the importance of providing more 
adequate operating procedures and improving the capability to detect SGTR.  It is also 
pointed out that alternative measures need to be examined for the case of failure to 
depressurize.   
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Quantitative risk trends were examined using newly proposed risk indicators, that is, 
occurrence frequency of precursors and annual core damage probability, to grasp the 
overall picture of nuclear power industry risks based on approximately 600 precursors 
identified in the USNRC’s ASP Program.  It is revealed that the core damage risks at 
U.S. nuclear power plants have been lowered and the likelihood of risk significant 
events has been remarkably decreasing.  Since these trends are based on the events 
that actually occurred, the proposed risk indicators may provide more empirical and 
realistic observations.  As well, it is demonstrated that the proposed indicators 
could be useful for determining the risk characteristics of events, monitoring the risk 
level at nuclear power plants, and examining the industry risk trends.   Furthermore, 
this study underlines the need to accumulate the ASP analysis results and to employ 
the proposed indicators as one of the performance indicators for the specific plant 
category and/or in the utility-level (that is, for individual utilities). 
These studies show that the ASP analysis of specific events can draw generic safety 
implications useful for identifying plant vulnerabilities, and the proposed risk indicators 
can examine the overall picture of risks at industry and individual plant levels.  
Therefore, such ASP studies should be actively carried out to obtain the insights for 
improving the plant safety.  
(4) Chapter V 
This chapter delineates, at first, the severe accident scenarios at the Fukushima Dai-ich 
Nuclear Power Plant with use of event trees to clarify the differences among accident 
sequences at Units 1 to 3 and discusses the actual responses to avoid the severe 
accidents using the event trees.  Next, the differences in their respective positions are 
clarified by reviewing five investigation reports by the Government, Diet, TEPCO, RJIF 
and NISA, focusing on the accident progression and causes to specify the issues to be 
further examined.  Moreover, the undiscussed issues are identified to provide insights 
useful for the near-term regulatory activities including accident investigation by the 
Nuclear Regulation Authority.  The different points clarified are related to; layout 
design concepts of electrical components such as switchgears, causes of EDG tripping, 
possibility of IC pipe leakage, reason of manual trip of ICs, design concepts on control 
logic for closing isolation valves of ICs, validity of manual tripping of HPCI at Unit 3, 
operator training on manual opening of SRVs, operators training on containment 
venting, integrity of Unit 2 suppression pool (causes of its pressure drop), hydrogen leak 
path to the reactor building, etc.  The undiscussed issues identified include adequacy of 
operating procedures applied at Unit 1, design concepts of SGTS valves on “fail open”, 
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design concepts on valve configuration in venting lines, and operating basis of startup 
of containment cooling systems when the tsunami is expected.  This review highlights 
the need to further discuss and examine the technical safety issues so that effective OEF 
can be performed at other nuclear facilities domestically and worldwide.   
(5) Chapter VI 
This chapter discusses the insights obtained through the analyses of operating experience 
in terms of their commonalities in the Fukushima accident, identifies precursors to the 
Fukushima accident, and addresses generic issues to be resolved.  The insights obtained 
are as follows: 1) the degraded functions of ECCS and electric power systems are 
common issues at nuclear power plants and the defense-in-depth concept should be 
incorporated into the plant design and operation more strictly, 2) various safety 
significant events are identified, some of which are considered precursors to the 
Fukushima accident, 3) some plants experienced the events beyond the design basis, 
showing that more attention should be paid to those taking into account the challenges 
they pose and 4) several factors applicable to the Fukushima accident are identified and 
the lessons learned should be studied and implemented appropriately.   
Six events were selected as precursors to the Fukushima accident, 1) fire-induced massive 
internal flooding and loss of safety systems, 2) fire-induced and prolonged station 
blackout involving loss of control room and loss of residual heat removal, 3) external 
flooding involving loss of safety systems and multi-unit site issue, 4) loss of offsite power 
with one of two emergency diesel generators inoperable, 5) tsunami-induced external 
flooding and 6) common-mode loss of instrument power.  These events underline the 
importance of physical separation, the necessity of paying special attention to protection 
against common cause failures, the need to protect the site against external hazards and 
the importance of considering new phenomena or unexpected aggravating conditions.  
As well, highlighted is the importance of robust depressurization measures for executing 
alternative water supply. 
The Fukushima accident brings to light the vulnerabilities to the flooding.  To cope with 
the tsunami beyond design basis, it is considered effective that the defense-in-depth 
concept is incorporated into the plant design; 1) installation of coastal levee against 
tsunami beyond design basis, 2) waterproofed vital areas and physical separation, and 3) 
pumping operation to unwater those areas.  In addition, the Fukushima accident exposes 
the vulnerabilities to loss of DC power disabling manual reactor depressurization and the 
main control room, insufficient accident management measures, lack of knowledge on 
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“as-built” plant equipment, and so on.  These issues might be applicable to other plants 
and thus, should be resolved on a national and international basis. 
This study manifests the importance of analyzing the Fukushima accident more 
comprehensively and in detail considering the insights gained from past events. 
 
VII.2 Future Studies Required 
The operating experience feedback has been recognized important to improve the plant 
safety.   Eventually, as mentioned in Chapter VI, there have been several events which 
are regarded as precursors to the Fukushima accident and a lot of lessons learned should 
have been fed back to the design and operation of plants.  Therefore, the analysis of 
operating experience is continuously required to obtain the insights from past events by 
identifying the event causes and corrective actions taken.  In particular, it is important 
to determine whether the individual events potentially may lead to the recurrence with 
safety significance and examine the adequate preventive measures to eliminate the 
direct and/or root causes.  As well, the precursor studies should be performed for 
safety significant events involving safety-related system failure(s) with use of the 
PRA/PSA technique to predict the event sequences which have the potential for severe 
accidents.   
In order to establish the better operating experience feedback process, several types of 
event analyses need to be carried out.  For example, a systematic and comprehensive 
review of events is essential to identify the potentially safety significant.  The topical 
study on safety significant events is necessary to examine their trends and 
characteristics.  In such a study, the event reports should be collected and analyzed 
focusing on the similarities of the direct/root causes of events and the corrective actions 
taken.  Among others, the recurring events should be addressed since the previous 
corrective actions might have been ineffective or inadequate.  As well, particular 
events should be analyzed, assuming additional failure(s), to examine whether those 
could lead to serious plant conditions.  Finally, the insights obtained from these studies 
should be disseminated throughout the nuclear community in a timely manner so that 
the plant licensees/operators and regulatory authorities can feed them back to the plant 
design, operation and/or regulations.  Thus, it is quite important that these studies will 
be performed domestically and internationally.   
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